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Abstract  
This report presents the results of the project “Tradable CO2 permits in Danish and 
European energy policy”. The project was financed by a grant from the Danish Energy 
Research Programme 1998 (Grant 1753/98-0002). The project was conducted in co-
operation between Elsamprojekt A/S (project manager), Risø National Laboratory, 
Aarhus School of Business and I/S Eltra.  
The three major objectives of the project were: 
• To identify and analyse the economical and political issues that are relevant with 
regard to the construction of a tradable CO2 permit market as well as proposing a 
suitable design for a tradable CO2 permit market for the energy sector in the EU. 
Experience from the tradable SO2 permit market in the US is taken into 
consideration as well. 
• To present an overview of price estimates of CO2 and greenhouse gas permits in 
different models as well as discussing the assumptions leading to the different 
outcomes. Furthermore, the special role of backstop technologies in relation to 
permit prices is analysed. 
• To analyse the connection between CO2 permit prices and technology choice in the 
energy sector in the medium and longer term (i.e. 2010 and 2020) with a special 
emphasis on combined heat and power and renewables. In addition, the short-term 
effects on CO2 emissions and electricity trade of introducing tradable CO2 permits 
with limited coverage (i.e. a national system) as well as complete coverage (i.e. 
including all the countries) in the Nordic electricity system are analysed.  
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Preface 
This report presents the results of the project “Tradable CO2 permits in Danish and 
European energy policy”. The project was financed by a grant from the Danish Energy 
Research Programme 1998 (Grant 1753/98-0002). I/S Eltra provided additional funding by 
putting up working resources for the project. 
The project was conducted in co-operation between Elsamprojekt A/S (project manager), 
Risø National Laboratory, Aarhus School of Business and I/S Eltra.  
During the period of the study, the issue of tradable CO2 quotas has become increasingly 
important on the political agenda. The application for the project was made before the 
Kyoto Conference in December 1997. With the inclusion of tradable quotas as one of the 
flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, international attention has increased 
considerably. In many ways, the focus has changed from the project oriented mechanisms, 
like Joint Implementation, towards the more generalised concept of emissions trading.  
The Danish law on CO2 quotas for the electric utilities has been approved by the European 
Commission and will be implemented within a year. The Commission has produced its own 
“Green book” on emissions trading and several countries including Norway, Sweden and 
UK have produced national studies on the issue. Transnational companies like Shell and BP 
Amoco have established test systems for emissions trading within the company.  
With this report and the seminar on 11 May 2000 this project is finalised. It does not 
contain all the final answers but hopefully some insights and inspiration for further studies. 
The project group consisted of: 
Poul Erik Grohnheit, Risø National Laboratory 
Lise Nielsen, Risø National Laboratory 
Peter Børre Eriksen, Eltra 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, Aarhus School of Business 
Morten Vesterdal, Elsamprojekt 
Søren Varming, Elsamprojekt (project manager) 
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0 Summary and Conclusions 
The subject of this report is the possible use of tradable CO2 permits in European energy 
policy. Many different issues are involved in this subject, which is reflected in the 
multitude of approaches that are used in this study.  
0.1 The global context 
The interest in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases stems from the wish to reduce the 
risk of climate change. This risk is of a truly global nature and arises from the aggregate 
global emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases accumulated in the atmosphere. The 
global nature of the issue makes it necessary to establish international institutions to 
achieve common goals. It is clear that many conflicts will arise in creating such institutions 
taking into account the uneven distribution of potential costs and benefits arising from the 
reduction of greenhouse gases. 
The process of creating global institutions has so far resulted in the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. Depending on the 
point of view, these institutions can be seen as weak and insufficient or as a remarkable 
result taking the difficulties into account.  
The Kyoto Protocol establishes the frame conditions for the reduction of greenhouse gases 
and especially the following two conditions are important with respect to a tradable CO2 
permit market in the EU: 
• It sets an emission target for the EU as a whole as well as for each of the member states 
– an 8 % reduction of the emissions of a basket of six greenhouse gases in the 
commitment period 2008-2012 in relation the 1990 level of emissions. 
• It establishes flexible mechanisms (the Kyoto mechanisms) like emissions trading as 
legitimate means in pursuing the most cost efficient reduction of emissions. 
It is worth noting that the EU has been a very active player in the international negotiation 
process, but it was necessary making a number of internal compromises in order to 
establish a common position. This has resulted in the Burden Sharing Agreement, where the 
overall EU reduction target has been distributed between the Member States. The variation 
in the emission reduction targets of the Member States spans from a 21 % reduction 
commitment by Germany, on one hand, whereas Portugal is allowed to increase its 
emissions by 27 %. This is a much wider span than between any of the other industrialised 
countries. 
The Kyoto Protocol has not entered into force yet. For the Kyoto Protocol to enter into 
force it is required that at least 55 countries representing at least 55 % of the greenhouse gas 
emissions in 1990 must ratify the protocol. This means that USA, representing 
approximately 25 % of the global CO2 emissions, in practice will have a veto position in 
relation to the ratification of the Protocol. Given the extreme scepticism of the US Congress 
towards the Kyoto Protocol this poses a serious threat to the continuation of the process in 
the future. In the following, the targets and objectives of the Kyoto Protocol are 
nevertheless taken as the basis for the analysis. 
Summary and Conclusions 
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0.2 CO2 emissions from the power and steam sector as the 
starting point 
From an economic efficiency viewpoint, there is no doubt that a common framework – that 
being a tax or a permit system – that includes the basket of the six greenhouse gases in the 
Kyoto Protocol would be the preferred solution. Ideally, a common framework could secure 
that all gases and sectors are treated equivalently, thus securing that greenhouse gas 
emissions could be reduced in the cheapest way possible. 
However, from a more pragmatic viewpoint, there are a number of factors that point to an 
emission-trading scheme covering only CO2 emissions from the power and steam sector as 
being a sensible starting point, including: 
• CO2 emissions are by far the largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and will 
remain so for any foreseeable future; 
• CO2 emissions stem almost entirely from fossil fuel use, which is most easily 
monitored. Credible verification of emissions is a precondition for any trading scheme 
to develop; 
• The power and steam sector is and will remain the largest contributor to CO2 emissions. 
Furthermore, many low-cost CO2 emission reduction opportunities are present within 
the power sector; 
• The companies are relatively well-informed of the overall opportunities to reduce CO2 
emissions in the market, which can work to encourage trading early on; 
• It is likely to be politically simpler to start with a single sector. 
Clearly, focusing on CO2 emissions, let alone only a subset of CO2 emissions, cannot be the 
final answer, since emissions of other greenhouse gases make a significant contribution as 
well. If emission reductions of the other greenhouse gases are to be achieved by applying 
other policy instruments, it is likely to result in differentiated treatment of different sectors 
and gases. From an overall efficiency viewpoint this is not preferable. However, getting a 
tradable permit system underway at all is likely to pose a significant political challenge and 
in this respect it makes sense to start out with a limited system, as long as it will not prevent 
a more cost-effective solution to emerge later on. 
We can, however, also try to compensate for the limited coverage of emissions by taking 
the expected opportunities for reducing the other greenhouse gases into consideration. 
Model calculations for the EU have suggested that the cost-effective reduction of CO2 
emissions correspond to a 6.2 % reduction of emissions compared to the 1990 level. This 
reduction percentage is lower than 8 %, which corresponds to a uniform reduction of all 
gases, due to the many low-cost reduction opportunities of methane and nitrous oxide  
0.3 The political economy of a tradable CO2 permit market in 
the EU 
The underlying constellation of actor interests in this policy area will clearly have 
implications for the possible design options. Two important observations can be made 
about the positions of Member States. First of all, the initial distribution of permits in any 
tradable permit system in the EU will somehow need to reflect on the Burden Sharing 
Agreement. Secondly, any expansion of the use of fiscal measures at Community level is 
strongly opposed by some Member States as it is still very much seen as a national 
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responsibility. Thus, in order to assure that all Member States find it in their own best 
interest to participate in a tradable CO2 permit scheme, it seems that the distribution 
principle from Community level to the Member State level must involve grandfathering. In 
other words, the revenue stream generated by the sale of permits will be fully redistributed 
to the Member States. 
Furthermore, two important observations can be made about the influence of private parties 
on the EU policy-making process as well. First of all, any attempts to implement an 
upstream trading system, which is essentially a tax on all fossil fuels entering the economy, 
is likely to result in political deadlock. The existing voluntary agreement between the 
automobile industry and the European Commission is a strong indication of this. On the 
other hand, the European electricity producers have a less clear-cut agenda towards the 
climate change issue due to the asymmetric interests of the producers. As a result, 
Eurelectric has emphasised that policies and measures should not distort competition and 
therefore, they are generally supportive of market-based instruments and especially tradable 
permits. The position of some energy companies in the national policy agenda will make it 
unlikely, though, that the distribution principle to private parties will not involve some sort 
of grandfathering. 
The establishment of a tradable CO2 permit market in the EU is an area of “shared 
competence” between the European Community and the Member States. In order to try to 
avoid deadlock in the negotiations over the design options of a tradable CO2 permit market, 
the principle of subsidiarity could be applied, thus leaving some conflicts unresolved at the 
Community level and shifting them to the implementation phase.  This would suggest that 
the overall framework be defined at Community level while leaving as much scope for 
subsequent Member State action as possible.  
In other words, the level of decisional competence will be a fundamental aspect with 
respect to the design options. What is absolutely necessary to shift to the EC level and what 
can be kept at the Member State level? Given the decisional structure of the EU there is a 
permanent struggle for decisional competence between the different levels of Government. 
Undoubtedly, the larger the role assigned to Member States the easier it is to come up with 
a solution. However, the global nature of the climate change problem and the profound 
economic impact that measures to limit emissions of greenhouse gases will have, reinforce 
the case for a supra-national policy response in the EU.  
It is important to note, however, that in areas of shared policymaking the institutional 
sequence might play a strong role. Thus, if a decision is first taken at the European level 
and a framework is defined which will contain all subsequent national decisional processes, 
then options for national actors are reduced. If, by contrast, a decision is first negotiated 
within one Member State, the chances of manoeuvring to resolve interest conflicts are more 
limited at the supranational level, and the zone of possible agreement is reduced for 
European actors. This suggests that it is important to start out with a scheme that includes 
all Member States and where the overall framework is defined at Community level. This 
can be accomplished by a scheme that starts out with the power and steam sector. 
0.4 Market design 
The most fundamental design options we need to consider in establishing a tradable CO2 
permits market for the power and steam sector is the following: 
 Total amount of permits to be put into the bubble (the target level) 
 Permit contributions from each country’s emission target 
Summary and Conclusions 
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 Distribution mechanisms for permits to individual power plants. 
Target level 
The total number of permits assigned to the system determines the price of the permits and 
thus the marginal cost of emissions. Therefore, in choosing the overall allocation of permits 
to the trading system it should be taken into consideration that the opportunities for 
emission reductions vary between different sectors. This is important for two reasons. First 
of all, you minimise the distortion from not including all sectors and gases in the trading 
system from the outset and, secondly, the impact that the inclusion of more sectors over 
time will have on the equilibrium price of the permits is likely to be smaller. That is why it 
is clearly preferable with a top-down element in the setting of the overall reduction target 
for the sector so this should take place at Community level. 
However, any enlargement of the trading scheme to include other sectors, gases or even 
countries will affect the equilibrium price of CO2 permits. This is unfortunate because 
investments in cleaner technologies undertaken prior to the enlargement can turn out to be 
stranded. This problem is inherent in all tradable permit schemes that start out with less 
than complete coverage of emissions and it is not easily dealt with. 
The calculations based on the Primes model predicts that app. 260 Mt of CO2 emissions 
reductions relative to the emissions baseline should take place in the power and steam 
sector in order to minimise abatement costs. This corresponds to a reduction in the level of 
emissions in 2010 by app. 22 % compared to 1990-level, or alternatively to an overall 
allocation of permits to the electricity and steam sector in the neighbourhood of 950 Mt 
CO2 equivalents. Due to the many low-cost reduction opportunities in the power sector, the 
suggested least-cost allocation to this sector requires a much larger reduction in emissions 
(22 %) compared to the overall reduction requirement of CO2 (6.2 %). These figures along 
with simulation in other model studies could serve as a starting point for future 
negotiations. 
Target Group 
If abatement costs are to be minimised, it is preferable that the share of total emissions 
covered by an emissions permit system be as large as possible. Notably, the emissions from 
heat production and from combined heat and power production should also be included in 
the permit market. The inclusion of emissions stemming from heat as well as power 
production will secure an equal treatment of the two products. However, monitoring and 
enforcement costs will be incurred by any policy measure and may limit the coverage of 
emissions sources that is cost effective to include in the market. 
Monitoring and enforcement costs are likely to be too high to make it worthwhile to include 
all smaller industrial plants. All plants that are not included in the market should be 
regulated by a tax or some other measure to ensure that they are faced with approximately 
the same cost per unit of emissions. 
It is suggested to include all boilers larger than 25 MW in the trading scheme. The total 
number of fossil-fuelled boilers in the EU amounted to app. 7050 in 1999, while the 
number of boilers larger than 25 MWe amounted to 1690. The 1690 boilers are in the same 
order of magnitude as the US Acid Rain Program, which has proven to be a workable 
number. Secondly, the total number of companies is reduced from app. 3000 to 375 while 
most of the installed capacity of fossil-fuelled boilers is still included in the market. In other 
words, most of the emissions are still kept within the system. By doing this the 
administrative procedures can be developed and prepared for a larger scheme. 
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If the permits are grandfathered to the existing electricity producers the concentration of 
permits on a few large producers can be a real problem. However, it should be noted that 
the problem in terms of abuse of market power is not so much that the permits are 
concentrated on a few companies. Rather, it is the difference between the cost-effective 
permit allocation and the allocation that the company receives free of charge from the 
outset that is the real problem. It seems clear, though, that there will be a reasonable 
number of sources of CO2 emissions in the power sector to use it as a testing ground for an 
EU-scheme of emissions trading. In the longer run, it will be important to broaden the 
scope of the trading scheme and the inclusion of other sectors will limit the risk of market 
power. 
Distribution rule 
Two questions need to be considered with respect to the distributional aspects of the trading 
scheme: 
 Permit contributions from each country’s emission target 
 Distribution mechanisms for permits to individual power plants. 
With regard to the first point, the allocation of permits to certain sectors by individual 
Member States can be carried out in such a way as to distort competition in that sector. The 
importance of the energy sector taken together with the ongoing liberalisation of the gas 
and power sector will make the energy sector an obvious candidate for a favourable 
allocation by Member States. For that reason, the allocation of permits to the power and 
steam sector from each country's emissions target needs to be harmonised.  
The least distortive approach is undoubtedly to construct a "true" EC emission trading 
bubble from the outset. This would mean assigning 950 Mt of CO2 permits to the emissions 
trading bubble, emissions that are to be taken out of the total amount of greenhouse gas 
emissions assigned to the European Community. The revenue from the sale of the permits 
goes into the EC budget and the revenue is recycled to the participating companies 
according to some standardised rules of allocation (or redistributed to the Community at 
large if deemed possible). 
The political reality of the Burden Sharing Agreement will, however, make it very hard to 
go through with this approach. A more feasible solution is to let the total amount of 
permits, that is being allocated to the power and steam sector bubble, consist of assigned 
amounts from each Member State. The amount of CO2 permits that is assigned to the 
emissions trading bubble by each Member State will then need to be deducted from the 
overall assigned amount of each Member State as defined by the Burden Sharing 
Agreement. Furthermore, the revenue generated from the sale of CO2 permits will be 
redistributed to the Member States corresponding to the number of permits assigned by 
each individual Member State. 
The potential problem with an approach based on assigned amounts from each Member 
State is the possible distortion of competition, given that some Member States will have a 
large amount of permits compared to what their power sector actually need to cover their 
emissions of CO2. Taking this problem into account, it is shown that a proportional rollback 
of the emissions defined by the Burden Sharing Agreement does not seem like a bad 
starting point. In the long run, however, the distribution of responsibilities between Member 
States should gradually converge to a per capita allocation rule. 
With regard to the distribution of permits to private parties, it should be noted that under 
ideal conditions different distribution rules can coexist and in theory it is not necessary with 
a common distribution rule. This conclusion can, however, be challenged. 
Summary and Conclusions 
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Notably, there should be a common agreement as to how grandfathering can be out-phased 
from the system over time because there are large welfare gains if the revenue is used to 
reduce other taxes in the economy rather than being given away for free to the existing 
emitters. From a perspective of fairness this is also a better solution, as the revenue is 
distributed broadly and reflects the fact that every citizen has the same right to emit CO2 
into the atmosphere (per capita allocation rule). One way of achieving this could be to 
gradually convert the units assigned to the bubble to EC assigned amount units. The 
revenue from the sale of these units would then go into the EC budget and the revenue 
should be distributed to society at large. 
However, it seems unlikely that the distribution rule from the outset will not involve some 
sort of grandfathering. Therefore, we need to consider whether or not the grandfathering 
principle needs to be the same or whether it can be left to Member States. If it was left 
entirely up to the Member States the possible lack of competition in the power sector can be 
a problem, because some companies might be able to use a favourable allocation of CO2 
permits to gain market shares in the power market. 
The least distortive option would be to decide on a common distribution principle to the 
market participants. Notably, an allocation of permits to individual power plants based on a 
percentage reduction of the current size of emissions is to be preferred over an allocation 
principle based on past emissions, i.e. emissions in 1990.  
Leaving it to the discretion of Member States with regulatory oversight by the Commission 
is a more feasible solution. If it were left to the discretion of Member States, the 
Commission would have to approve of the principle chosen by each Member State. This 
could mean that some Member States would not be able to redistribute all the revenue to 
the participating parties because it would be in violation with the EC rules on state aid. 
Trade rules 
By an individual permit we will understand a right to emit 1 tonne of CO2. Each permit will 
specify what particular Member State has issued the permit and the year of issue (vintage 
year). Once the permit has been used to show compliance it will be withdrawn from the 
market. The duration of the compliance period is set to one year. 
The entitlement is not a full property right but rather a limited permission to emit CO2. This 
allows the government to make changes over time without any compensation to the market 
participants. This approach is also valid here to a limited extent.  
Obviously, any changes in the entitlement to CO2 permits have to be done with extreme 
caution, since a full property right is essential for a well functioning market. However, we 
need to distinguish between two things:  
 changes to the overall allocation of permits to the trading system, which in turn 
determines the market price of CO2 permits,  
 and changes to the distribution of revenue between market participants and society in 
general.  
It is important that a credible economic value of CO2 permits is established for a 
considerable time period reflecting the long investment horizons in the power sector. 
Therefore, any alterations in the overall allocation of permits to the permit market must be 
the responsibility of the EC and not the market participants. 
On the other hand, the distributional principle can be changed over time and grandfathering 
can be out-phased. However, the out-phasing of grandfathering must be completely 
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unrelated to the actual closing down of production plants, otherwise this will also inflict on 
long-term resource allocation. 
The system should allow for unlimited banking of permits. Borrowing of permits is 
preferable but problematic and could be excluded. When borrowing of permits is not 
allowed, the inter-temporal flexibility of the system is linked to the fine for being in non-
compliance, as the fine will put a price ceiling on the permit market. A low level of the fine 
will introduce more flexibility into the system because essentially the EC has extra permits 
for sale at a price equal to the level of the fine. Thus, the level of the fine should not be set 
too high and a suggestion could be app. 40 EUR/tCO2. 
We propose that the EC should undertake a yearly EU-wide auction where all or a large 
share of the permits are put out for sale. The inclusion of a large share of the permits in the 
auction will secure equal access to the permits in all the Member States and thus an 
efficient allocation of the permits. Furthermore, this will provide price information and 
transparency to the market, which is important especially in the beginning when market 
participants are not that familiar with the market. 
By putting all the permits out for sale at an auction we are separating the issue of allocation 
from the issue of distribution. The revenue from the auction is redistributed to the Member 
States according to the overall distribution of responsibilities that is decided upon.  
We propose to use a non-discriminatory pricing principle for the auction where all bidders 
of permits pay the clearing price for the permits (provided that their bid was below the 
clearing price).  
To make sure that there are buyers as well as sellers in the permit market and that the risk 
sharing capabilities of the marketplace will come into play, everybody should be allowed to 
participate in the market.  
Like in the US the system could start before the first compliance period. Possibly, the 
regulators should also release permits that are valid in the current year as well as permits 
that are valid in years to come (i.e. selling vintage year 2008 permits and vintage year 2013 
permits at the same time). 
Control system 
The purpose of the control system is to make the whole trading scheme credible by assuring 
that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a permit to emit one tonne of CO2 and 
the actual emission of one tonne of CO2. 
In the context of a European-wide scheme of emissions trading it would be natural that the 
ultimate responsibility for ensuring compliance will be on a European level. It is the general 
assumption, however, that monitoring and enforcement in relation to the companies from 
the starting point will be a Member State task, because the Member State Authorities are 
equipped with the necessary regulatory power in relation to the private parties. On the other 
hand, the system could gain in general efficiency and credibility by the establishment of a 
common European institution. This could be EEA (European Environmental Agency).  
In terms of monitoring of emissions, calculating the CO2 emissions from the fuel input is a 
very cheap and efficient method, especially for a gas fired plant. This will be relevant for 
many of the smallest installations and thus not put a lower limit to the size of plant that can 
be part of the trading scheme. For coal fired plants the uncertainties can be so large that 
direct measurement should be preferred. These installations are usually large and the extra 
costs for measurement of CO2 emissions will be of minor importance. As long as the levels 
of uncertainties are comparable (in fact, as long as the uncertainties are not biased so that 
they sum out over time), the use of different methods of measuring will pose no difficulties. 
Summary and Conclusions 
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The emissions data will be collected by means of self-reporting by the companies.   
The most important role to be played by EC institutions will be to establish minimum 
requirements with regard to the measurement of emissions while to a large extent leaving 
actual monitoring and verification of emissions to the Member State Governments.  
The annual reporting of emissions from the power and steam sector must be faster than 
today. The final data for the preceding year should be available in January in order to allow 
for a true-up period for the emission rights. To give the best possible market information it 
is proposed to report and publish emission data for companies included in the trading 
scheme on a monthly basis. This will mean speeding up of the existing reporting 
procedures, but it should be possible to do this with only minor extra costs.  
The Member States could verify the emissions reported by companies on a yearly basis and 
submit their result to an EC institution. Obviously, the Member States might have 
incentives to cheat as well, however, the scope for cheating should be relatively small with 
respect to the power and steam sector.  
With respect to the enforcement of the permit market, a central registry must be created at 
the EU level. This function can be computerised and should not give any theoretical or 
practical difficulties, which has been clearly demonstrated by the US Acid Rain 
programme. Data for emissions may be collected by national authorities but shall at once be 
transmitted to a European institution. Through the trading system, a registry of permit 
holdings of each of the actors in the market is established. Likewise, through the 
monitoring process, a registry of the actual emissions of each actor is established. The 
“trick” of the enforcement is to compare the two numbers for each actor and have the 
necessary authority to deter actors from breaking the emission limits.  
First of all, we need to deter cheating by companies. Taking into consideration that the 
likelihood of detecting cheating is pretty high in this trading scheme, it will probably not be 
necessary with sanctions such as prison sentences to deter cheating. A high monetary 
sanction should be sufficient. 
The next step will be to establish sanctions against market participants exceeding their 
permit holdings. The suggestion here is straightforward. Market participants whose 
emissions are exceeding their current permit holdings must pay a fine for their excess 
emissions. The level of the fine must be the same in all Member States. Otherwise, there 
could be carbon leakage to areas with lower fine levels. 
If the fine is kept very low, the emissions trading scheme will work very much like a price 
instrument (tax), whereas a high fine will secure that the emission target is reached (at any 
cost to society). Thus, a relatively low fine is proposed for the trading scheme, and the fine 
could be set at in the neighbourhood of 40 EUR/tCO2. The fine payments could be used by 
the enforcement institution to buy emissions permits internationally, in order to secure that 
the overall emission target of the trading system is met. 
Potential gains from trading 
There are clear benefits from allowing private party emissions trading at Community level 
compared to unilateral action by Member States. A tradable CO2 permit scheme with 
comprehensive coverage of emissions within the EU, which would have to be an upstream 
permit market, could reduce the total abatement costs by some 32 % compared to a system 
with no trading between Member States. In comparison, a Community-wide system 
containing only the electricity and steam sector would reduce the total abatement costs by 
13 % only. 
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These differences in abatement costs are, however, without taking advantage of any of the 
other Kyoto mechanisms. A full CO2 emission trading system between Annex B countries 
suggest overall cost savings in the order of 40 % compared to a situation with no trading at 
all between Member States. Obviously, these gains from trade are not as easily appropriated 
as within the EU given that no international institution can effectively enforce an Annex B 
market. 
In conclusion, a tradable CO2 permit market for the power and steam sector can provide 
significant gains from trading. However, the overall gains from trade in a CO2 permit 
market for the power and steam sector are significantly lower than from a system including 
all sectors in the EU. Thus, it is important to maintain that it can only be the starting point 
and that the system must be organised in a way that provides opportunities for other sectors 
to “opt-in” over time. In this way, the system can achieve a more comprehensive coverage 
of emissions in the longer run. 
0.5 The price of CO2 permits 
Several model calculations have been made trying to estimate the market price of 1 ton of 
CO2 (in 2010). All cost estimates are subject to a number of highly uncertain assumptions, 
and as a consequence, these estimates must be interpreted with caution. Having said that, 
though, we do believe that cost estimates carry important information.  
Obviously, the price of CO2 permits will be linked to the geographical coverage of the 
system. Any enlargement of the trading scheme to include countries outside the EU will 
alter the supply and demand side conditions of the permit market, which can lead to higher 
or lower permit prices. The effect on the permit price depends on the reduction 
opportunities as well as the obligation to reduce emissions in the countries that join the 
scheme. In case the enlargement of the trading scheme leads to a lower equilibrium permit 
price, the actual reduction of emissions that takes place in the EU will also be lower and 
vice versa.  
On the other hand, if the market participants can exploit the project-oriented mechanisms in 
the Kyoto Protocol, JI and CDM, this will only alter the supply side conditions of the 
permit market. The project-oriented mechanisms will provide the market participants with 
alternative emission reduction opportunities, thus shifting the supply curve downwards and 
lowering the permit price (the demand for CO2 permits remains the same). If there are 
plenty of low-cost emission reduction opportunities outside the EU, this could result in the 
extreme situation that all the sellers of CO2 permits would be located outside the EU. In this 
case, all the market participants inside the EU would be buyers of permits and no reduction 
of emissions would take place in the EU. The most likely result is a combination of internal 
and external emissions reductions. 
If 'tradable EU permits' is the only flexible mechanism available to the market participants, 
the EU permit price will be equal to the marginal cost of reducing CO2 emissions within the 
EU as a whole.  
Studies of permit prices when backstop technologies matter 
The present analysis stresses the importance of backstop technologies (i.e. emission 
reduction technologies), the prices at which they become profitable and their emission 
reduction potentials, in studies of permit prices and costs of CO2 reductions. The present 
analysis indicates that failure to include backstop technologies may give permit price 
estimates of limited value. 
Summary and Conclusions 
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Upper limits to the permit price 
If there are backstop technologies, which have great emission reduction potentials within 
the EU, the CO2 reduction price of one of these technologies serve as an upper limit to the 
permit price. The cheapest backstop technology will be implemented first. 
Within the EU power sector there is a large emission reduction potential in fuel switching 
and higher fuel efficiency. The prices of CO2 reductions carried out through fuel switching 
range from 70 to 300 DKK per ton CO2, depending on which fuel is being substituted, the 
type of power plant etc. The price span is not defined as the largest possible, but as the 
price span within which the bulk of emission reduction potentials are to be found. And 
furthermore, at the upper limit of the price span another technology with great potential 
takes over. 
The cost of extending the EU wind turbine capacity as a mean to reduce emissions, depends 
on the wind conditions on location, and the technical possibilities of fitting fluctuating wind 
power into the overall power system. It will be technically possible to extend the EU wind 
capacity considerably at prices below 280 DKK per ton CO2.  
According to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU must reduce emissions by 8 % as compared to the 
level of emissions in 1990. If it is technically possible to reach the 8 % target level through 
fuel switching in the power sector and increased wind power production, the upper limit to 
the EU permit price is app. 280 DKK/ton CO2, which is the estimated price of reducing 
emissions trough installing new wind mills.  
If wind turbines are the marginal CO2 reduction investment on a European permit market, 
the price of the permits will be around 280 DKK/ton CO2. If fuel switching in the power 
sector is the marginal investment, the permit price will probably be somewhere between 70 
and 280 DKK/ton CO2, depending on the price and potentials of alternative CO2 reduction 
investments.  
The lower limit to the permit price 
The lowest possible permit price is zero. This price will only be realised if: 
• New technology makes CO2 reductions almost free, or 
• Due to low activity levels (within the EU or outside) there is sufficient ‘hot air’ to reach 
the total EU target – and, none of the ‘hot air suppliers’ are able to exert monopoly 
power, thus being willing to sell permits at prices next to nothing.   
Other policies, new technology etc. 
In general, all EU policies as well as National policies that have an impact on CO2 
emissions stemming from the sectors included in the permit market will affect permit 
prices. For example, limitations of car traffic (through taxes or direct regulation such as ‘no 
cars in city centres’ policies) or heavy taxation of trucks (on a per kilometre basis) probably 
reduce emissions, and reduce the demand for and price of permits. 
New technologies may affect the supply and demand of permits and the permit price. If 
new energy saving cars were introduced, if renewable electricity production became 
cheaper or new energy saving inventions were made, this would increase the low cost 
potentials for emission reductions and likely reduce the permit price. 
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Permit prices and technology choice 
The present study also includes an analysis of permit prices and the effect on technology 
choice. The model results for the electricity and heat market – in a region with a large and 
diversified market for district heating and where the electricity market is subject to 
competition – indicates that tradable CO2 permits may lead to a very rapid substitution of 
gas for coal. The model results – assuming strictly rational techno-economic optimising 
agents – indicate that the implementation of CO2 permits to meet the Kyoto targets is likely 
not to be a major driver for new capital intensive technologies with no CO2 emissions. 
However, tradable permits can be a major catalyst for the penetration of new technologies 
with CO2 emissions in the longer run.  
In summary, the following can be concluded from the model results: 
• Tradable CO2 permits are likely to lead to a very rapid substitution of natural gas for 
coal. 
• Tradable CO2 permits are unlikely to be a major driver for new technologies with no 
CO2 emissions, but high investment costs – at least in the short and medium term  (i.e. 
until 2008-12). 
• Some elements of regulation apart from CO2 permits will be necessary to reduce the 
financial risk of investment in low-emission technologies. 
• However, an appropriate regulatory framework is essential not only for the ‘green’ 
market, but for any organised commodity market. 
A common European taxation of fuels or a European market for CO2 emission permits may 
be favourable for capital-intensive, clean technologies that will reduce the demand for fossil 
fuels. However, even very high taxes or permit prices are unlikely to have much effect on 
the development of CHP unless further measures are taken e.g. long-term contracts 
supported by a market for ‘green certificates’.  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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1 Introduction 
The European energy sector has for some time been facing the dual challenge of opening 
markets and tightening of environmental controls – especially with regard to CO2 
emissions. This dual challenge demands new approaches from all actors both energy 
companies and legislators. The traditional command and control regulation is not adequate 
for the new market conditions. For a while, a common European CO2 tax seamed to be the 
solution, but it proved difficult to implement a new tax. 
Tradable CO2 permits are an interesting alternative to consider when addressing the new 
situation. Tradable permits have been implemented in the United States to reduce SO2 
emissions. This project will investigate the possibilities and barriers in using the tradable 
permit approach to regulate CO2 emissions in a European context.  
Looking at the Danish policy debate it seems that there are two levels of difficulties in the 
decision to introduce tradable permits in environmental regulation. The first step is to 
accept the concept of establishing tradable property rights to emitting CO2 into the 
atmosphere. We shall return to this aspect shortly. The second step is to decide on an actual 
design for a trading system once the principle is accepted. This second step is the focus of 
the research project and will be developed throughout the report.  
But back to the first step: accepting the principle of emissions trading. Without this 
acceptance, the rest of the report will be utterly uninteresting. The scepticism towards 
emissions trading has been prominent not at least among environmentalists. The first part of 
the introduction will address the arguments against emissions trading. The second part will 
give a brief overview of the report. 
1.1 Why emissions trading? 
(“Believers” and environmental economists can skip this section)  
The basic virtue of emissions trading is that it is a strong instrument to achieve cost-
efficient emission reduction. And already we encounter the first attack-point against the 
instrument:  
Statement 1: If emissions reductions become too cheap the necessary technology 
development will not take place. 
The answer to Statement 1 is that different objectives need different instruments. It is 
important to separate the instruments to achieve a technology development and the 
instruments for large-scale implementation of emission reductions. The high Danish 
subsidies for wind turbines have been very effective in promoting development of the wind 
technology and the Danish wind turbine industry. But it has only been politically acceptable 
because it was – also – support for national industrial development.  
If CO2 reductions are to be implemented globally and on a large scale, it is necessary that 
the reduction costs are as low as possible. And here tradable permits are one of the options. 
Public support for technology development will have to find other forms. 
Statement 2: It is unethical that large firms can buy permits to keep up pollution. 
The basic trouble with the second statement is that large firms also get a permit to pollute 
under a traditional command-and-control system. Under the existing Danish system of 
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environmental licensing, an industry gets a permit to pollute for eight years at a time 
without paying.  And without incentive to do better than the conditions in the license. The 
tradable permit system puts a value on the continued improvement of the environmental 
performance because reduced emissions give the possibility to sell permits or to buy less. 
Statement 3: Tradable permits will be bureaucratic and will allow cheating 
Here the US Acid Rain programme is an important inspiration as it shows that it is possible 
to create a simple, yet credible system for emissions trading. To keep the system simple in 
an international context, it is necessary with high entry standards to the market for 
emissions trading. It is paramount only to allow countries with a comparable standard in 
verification and enforcement into the same market place. Once ‘bad’ allowances are traded, 
the credibility of the system erodes and the value of the allowances decline. This 
mechanism gives some kind of incentive among the participants in the market to control 
each other. In a European context, the structure of the European Union can also play an 
important role in securing a common tradable unit and thus a common currency for tradable 
CO2 permits. 
Statement 4: The flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol are designed to allow ‘hot air’ 
and thus water down the emission reduction targets. 
Regarding the Kyoto-protocol it is important to keep the discussion of ambition level in the 
target setting and the discussion of the mechanisms separate. Emission trading is equally 
good in implementing weak and strong emission targets.  
In fact, compared to a tax instrument a tradable permits market can be seen as putting more 
emphasis on the environment. This has to do with the different ways in which a tax and a 
permit system respond to uncertainty. A tradable permit market adjusts by allowing the 
permit price to rise or fall while holding the emissions level constant. A tax system, on the 
other hand, adjusts by allowing the total level of emissions to rise or fall while holding the 
price associated with emissions constant. In this way, tradable permits distribute more risk 
to the costs of reducing emissions and less risk to the level of emissions that is actually 
being achieved. 
This initial discussion only has the aim to set the stage. In the rest of the report, the 
discussion is not so much IF a trading system should be used as HOW a trading system 
should be implemented. Experience shows that the questions asked regarding 
implementation are much more intriguing than the quite simple IF question.  
1.2 The structure of the report 
Chapter 2 takes its starting point in the Kyoto Protocol and discusses in broad terms the 
flexible mechanisms with focus on emissions trading (Article 17 of the Protocol). The main 
conclusion is that trading between private parties is a prerequisite for the emissions trading 
to be efficient. 
Chapter 3 compares the virtues of emission taxes with two kinds of systems for emission 
trading – grandfathered permits and auctioned permits. The chapter treats efficiency aspects 
and possible market failures in the three types of regulation from a theoretical point of 
view. The political aspects are discussed in a public choice perspective. 
Chapter 4 gives a short description of the US acid rain programme and evaluates the 
developments in this market. The system is simple and successful, but there are important 
differences between CO2 and SO2 and between USA and Europe. 
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Chapter 5 gives a more detailed discussion of the design of a European CO2 trading 
scheme. It also discusses the distributional effects of different allocation principles for 
permits. 
Chapter 6 is the first of three chapters with a focus on quantitative analysis of different 
aspects of emissions trading. Chapter 6 analyses the Scandinavian and German electricity 
system with focus on the consequences of a national Danish CO2 quotas system compared 
to the situation without CO2 restrictions and to a system with a common regulation on CO2. 
Chapter 7 models the effect of tradable permits on the choice of technology in the 
electricity and heating sectors. The chapter builds on results from the PRIMES-model 
developed for the European Commission and an optimisation model for standardised 
generators of electricity and heat or steam. It was the expectation at the start of the project 
that the PRIMES-model would be available for analyses in the project, but with time it 
became clear that only results from PRIMES would be available, not the model as such. 
Chapter 8 gives an evaluation of different estimates of the quota-price in a European CO2 -
trading market. There is a very broad band of the results of previously published studies. A 
maximum level of the quota-price is estimated by applying the concept of backstop 
technologies. 
Finally Chapter 9 sums up the results of the whole project 
 
Chapter 2: The Kyoto Protocol and emissions trading 
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2 The Global Agenda: The Kyoto Protocol 
and emissions trading 
The main focus of this study is the application of emissions trading in Danish and European 
energy policy. Climate Change is a global issue, however, and for that reason it is necessary 
to see the discussions in the context of the negotiations regarding the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. This chapter will take a closer look at the Kyoto-protocol 
and the possible ways it can be implemented. 
2.1 Essential features of the Climate change problem 
Climate change has been a key issue on the global environmental agenda during the 1990s. 
The potential consequences of rising temperature and other changes in the global climate 
have been the driving force behind major scientific and political initiatives on an 
international scale. 
Climate change is characterised by a number of features that raise difficult questions in 
relation to the political process: 
1. Climate change is global in nature 
As opposed to most other environmental challenges climate change is global in nature. 
There is no direct connection between emissions in a certain region and the impacts in that 
region. Rather the situation is that the industrialised countries, which are the most important 
emitters of greenhouse gases, also have the best opportunities to adapt to the climate 
change.  
The global nature of the problem will make an international co-operative solution involving 
all countries the most economical. However, the asymmetric interests between many 
countries due to the very uneven living conditions will put a lot of strain on this solution. 
Many developing countries will rightfully argue that the countries in the developed world 
are responsible for the greenhouse gases that are accumulated in the atmosphere today. 
Therefore, developing countries are not willing to commit themselves to any binding 
restrictions on emissions or are not willing to do so without significant compensation. If 
some developing countries are left uncontrolled, the expected costs for the countries that do 
have a binding commitment will be driven up, which in turn will make their willingness to 
participate less likely. 
Since nations are sovereign, any international environmental agreement is self-enforcing. 
All nations are free to leave an international agreement whenever they like. Therefore, it is 
important to explore the possibilities of getting a large number of countries to participate by 
designing the rules of the game in such a way that a lot of countries find it in their own 
interest to do so. 
2. There is a high degree of uncertainty with respect to the ecological and economic 
consequences of global warming 
In its Second Assessment Report (SAR) from 1995 the Intergovernmantal Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) concluded that: 
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“The balance of evidence, from changes in global mean surface air temperature and from 
changes in geographical, seasonal and vertical patterns of atmospheric temperature, 
suggests a discernible human influence on global climate. There are uncertainties in key 
factors, including the magnitude and patterns of long-term natural variability.”  
However, it is safe to assume that, in the near future, the aggregate international benefits of 
greenhouse gas or carbon emission reductions can not be determined with any great degree 
of precision. As a result, an optimal level of emissions cannot be estimated. Instead, any 
target for an agreement among a set of countries will be cast in terms of staying within a 
certain, more or less arbitrarily chosen, level of aggregate emissions. 
3. The stock-pollutant property of greenhouse gases 
Greenhouse gases are uniformly mixed accumulative pollutants. Greenhouse gases do not 
stay in the area where the source of emissions is located and location of sources is 
irrelevant to subsequent damages. In fact, neither the source of emissions nor their timing is 
important from an environmental standpoint. In this respect, the greenhouse gas effect is a 
global mutual externality.  
Climate change is driven by the amount of greenhouse gases accumulated in the 
atmosphere over the last century. In other words, the flow of greenhouse gases coming 
from all sources within any individual year is likely to have an insignificant impact on 
climate change. Of course, the stock of pollutants in the atmosphere builds on the flow of 
pollutants, but it is only the accumulated stock that matters for climate change.  
As a consequence, there is a long time lag between the timing of emissions and possible 
effects. This long time lag between the costs and benefits of avoiding climate change poses 
a serious political difficulty since political decision-making is so short term by nature. In 
other words, there is a time consistency problem since the policy makers will have 
incentives to postpone any real reduction of emissions to some future election periods. It is 
worth noting that this very much separates the issue of climate change from most other 
environmental policy issues where the damages from emissions are usually real (and local) 
and not projected. 
2.2 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Despite the difficulties listed above, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) was adopted at the Rio Summit in 1992. The ultimate objective of the 
convention is the stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gasses at safe 
levels. The UNFCCC commits the industrialised countries (listed in Annex I of the 
convention) to a non-binding aim of returning their emission of greenhouse gasses to 1990 
levels by the year 2000. In this context it is also important that the UNFCCC recognises the 
principle of global cost-effectiveness of emission reductions (in Article 3.3) and thus opens 
up for the use of flexible instruments.  
Finally, it should be noted that the UNFCCC includes a clause, stating that the first 
Conference of the Parties (CoP1) should review the adequacy of the commitments in the 
Convention. CoP1 took place in Berlin 1995 and it was agreed that the current Convention 
commitments were inadequate, and consequently, a process enabling appropriate action for 
the period beyond 2000 should begin, including the strengthening of the commitments of 
industrial countries and countries with economies in transition.  
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2.3 The Kyoto protocol 
In December 1997 at the Kyoto Conference (CoP3) a protocol to the UNFCCC was 
adopted. The Kyoto Protocol included two major new elements: 
1) The industrialised countries committed themselves to legally binding national limits to 
the emission of a basket of six greenhouse gasses in the period 2008-2012 – The 
commitment period. 
2) Three flexible mechanisms were defined to achieve an economically efficient 
implementation of the emission reductions. 
The Kyoto Protocol will enter into force once it is ratified by at least 55 Parties representing 
at least 55 % of the total greenhouse gas emissions of Annex I countries in the year 1990. 
It is not intended to give a full overview of the Kyoto Protocol, but rather the focus will be 
on the issues relating to emissions trading. There are a number of Articles in the Kyoto 
Protocol that directly or indirectly relates to trading: 
Table 2.1. Selected articles from the Kyoto Protocol. 
Article 3.1 Defines individual and overall commitments; multiple gases are 
included; defines five year commitment period (2008-2012) 
Article 3.10 to 3.12 Defines credits and debits in emissions trading 
Article 3.13 Banking for subsequent periods is allowed; banking and borrowing 
is allowed within each commitment period 
Article 4 Allows the forming of “bubbles”. 
Article 6 Emissions reduction units in Annex B (Joint Implementation) 
Article 12 Certified Emission Reductions with non-Annex B (Clean 
Development Mechanism) 
Article 17 Acceptance of trading between Parties and possibly also between 
private legal entities 
2.3.1 Definition of emission targets 
Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol defines the five-year commitment period (2008-2012) in 
which the emissions targets for individual countries listed in Annex B have to be reached.  
The emission targets are defined for a basket of six greenhouse gasses (Listed in Annex A 
of the Protocol): carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, HFCs, PFCs and sulphur 
hexafluroride. 
Table 2.2. Global Warming Potentials (GWP) of the gases covered by the Kyoto-protocol 
Gas CO2 Methane N2O HFC’s PFC’s SF6 
GWP 1 21 310 140-12100 6800-12500 23900 
Global Warming Potential is a simple measure of the relative greenhouse effect of different 
greenhouse gasses using CO2 as the basis of comparison. (Data from IPCC 1996: Climate Change 
1995: The Science of Climate Change) 
Overall, Annex B countries must reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases (measured in 
CO2 equivalents) by at least 5 % below 1990 levels (base year) over the commitment period 
2008-2012. Most countries have committed themselves to a reduction of 8 % of their 1990 
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emissions, including the EU. Some countries have lower percentage-reductions, notably 
USA and Japan that have committed themselves to a 7 % and a 6 % reduction respectively. 
A few countries aim at a stabilisation on 1990 level: Russia, Ukraine and New Zealand. 
Norway is allowed to increase its emissions by 1 % in the commitment period compared to 
1990, Australia by 8 % and Iceland by 10 %.  
2.3.2 Monitoring, verification and enforcement 
The Kyoto Protocol has a number of provisions concerning monitoring, verification and 
enforcement regardless of whether an Annex 1 country is engaged in trading or not. 
Article 5 of the Protocol requires each Party included in Annex 1 to have in place a national 
system for the estimation of man-made emissions of all greenhouse-gases no later than one 
year prior to the start of the first commitment period (2007). The methodologies for 
estimating emissions must be accepted by The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and agreed upon by the Conference of Parties (CoP). The IPCC and the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice are charged with regularly reviewing and, if 
appropriate, revising such methodologies subject to approval by the Parties. 
The Protocol is quite vague when it comes to issues of compliance. It does have some 
provisions about the institutional set-up, notably Article 8 and 18. 
Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol concerns the establishment of expert review teams that will 
review national inventories and communications (information submitted under Article 7), 
and provide a “thorough and comprehensive technical assessment of all areas of 
implementation.” It is not fully clear, though, to what extent this assessment process 
determines compliance with the Protocol. The expert teams are to be nominated by Parties 
to the Convention and serve under the authority of the Secretariat.   
While the national governments will monitor domestic compliance, international review 
teams will review the data, assess the implementation of the commitments of the Parties, 
and identify any problems in, and factors influencing, the fulfilment of the commitments. 
Article 18 of the Protocol concerns the enforcement issues in cases of non-compliance: 
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first 
session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address 
cases of non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, including through the development of 
an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-
compliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding consequences 
shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997). 
Article 18 raises the question whether or not the penalties adopted will be sufficient to 
ensure compliance. Penalties could be as minor as a warning or could include more 
substantive restrictions. It is important to remember that an international agreement 
between sovereign nations is self-enforcing, so any nation can choose to leave the 
agreement whenever it wants. Seen in this light, any mechanism that is included in the 
Protocol to ensure compliance carries with it a trade-off against national sovereignty for all 
countries. However, in the case of emissions trading a permit does not hold any value 
unless there is enforcement, and possibly, if emissions trading go forward between a group 
of countries, there is a need for stronger enforcement than what would otherwise be the 
case. 
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2.3.3 Bubbles 
Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol states the following: 
Any Annex 1 Parties that have reached an agreement to fulfil their commitments under Article 3 
jointly shall be deemed to have met those commitments provided that their total combined emissions 
do not exceed their commitments in Annex B. Ultimately, however, each Party is responsible for its 
own Annex B commitment if the entity formed fails to meet its overall commitment (UNFCCC, 
1997). 
Article 4 was drafted to authorise and regulate the EU “bubble” or burden sharing 
agreement that was part of the EU negotiation position before Kyoto (see below). The 
Article allows alteration of national emission targets assigned in Annex B within a group of 
co-operating countries provided that the total emissions of the participating countries do not 
exceed their aggregate total as listed in Annex B. A “bubble” must be declared when the 
ratification is deposited. 
The EU has an overall commitment target of reducing the average emissions of the six 
greenhouse gases by 8 % in the period 2008-2012 in relation to the emissions in 1990 (base 
year). The EU has agreed upon sharing this commitment target between the individual 
member states according Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: EU Burden Sharing Agreement 
In the case of Denmark, the 21 % reduction commitment is not related to actual emissions 
in 1990 but instead the baseline is based on adjusted import/export figures from 1990. 
Because of the highly integrated electricity system between the Nordic countries and the 
extended use of hydropower in Norway and Sweden, there are very large fluctuations in net 
exports between these countries. 
The United States was interested in forming an emissions trading “bubble” which would 
include Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Russia and Ukraine – The so-called 
Umbrella-group. But due to the fact that each country would be ultimately responsible for 
its own emissions should the formed “umbrella” fail to meet its commitments, these 
“umbrella” countries are now pursuing an arrangement to trade co-operatively under Article 
17. Such an approach would not revise the obligations of individual participants under 
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Annex B. Given the potential ramifications of failing to meet a joint target under Article 4, 
it is difficult to imagine a proliferation of such arrangements outside of regional economic 
organisations that are moving towards a common economy and political integration (The 
Business Roundtable, 1998).  
The “bubble” approach is often termed as “trading without rules” because it sets few 
restrictions on trading between parties. If it turns out to be too difficult to agree on the 
common rules and guidelines “for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions 
trading” pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol, the “bubble” approach at least opens the 
possibility of trading emissions permits within the voluntarily formed group (UNCTAD, 
1998). 
2.3.4 The project based mechanisms 
Articles 6 and 12 in the Kyoto protocol define two project-based mechanisms Joint 
Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) respectively. Both 
mechanisms allow for trading in emissions reductions achieved through concrete projects. 
The main difference is that where JI is used between Annex B countries, the CDM is 
directed towards countries without a national emission target in the commitment period. 
The other main difference is that CDM crediting can start already in the year 2000 whereas 
JI cannot start until the beginning of the commitment period. 
2.3.5 Emission trading 
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol contains the following: 
• Allows Parties included in Annex B to “participate in emissions trading for the 
purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3” 
• Requires the Conference of the Parties to the FCCC to define the “relevant principles, 
modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting, and 
accountability for emissions trading.” 
• Limits emission trading to that which is “supplemental to domestic actions for the 
purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments” under 
Article 3.  
Participation in Article 17 trading will be voluntary. Under this Article Annex B Parties can 
sell their possible surpluses during the first commitment period (years 2008-2012) to 
Parties that have surpassed their assigned amount under Article 3. Annex B to the Kyoto 
Protocol and Annex I to the UNFCCC are now identical in nature, this change from Annex 
I into Annex B potentially allows a developing country to engage in emissions trading if it 
voluntarily adopts an emissions target and is inscribed in Annex B (Michaelowa, 1998a).  
Clearly, the wording “supplemental to domestic actions…” needs to be given a practical 
interpretation. While trading will not erode the 5 % Annex I reduction target as long as 
seller countries can be held accountable for their compliance, it will reduce domestic action 
in buyer countries. Some Parties and NGOs find this objectionable but it is nevertheless 
sanctioned by the Protocol. 
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2.4 Evaluations of the Kyoto-protocol 
2.4.1 The costs and benefits of avoiding climate change. 
The Kyoto Protocol suggests applying a quantity instrument to the five-yearly emissions of 
greenhouse gases rather than applying a tax-instrument. From a cost-benefit viewpoint, the 
choice of instrument should depend on how effectively the instrument can be used to 
equalise the marginal costs with the marginal benefits of avoiding climate change damages. 
However, to make a firm recommendation based on this principle you need to know the 
marginal damages attributable to each party. Even though climate change modelling has 
certainly improved over time, the benefits of avoiding climate change are still highly 
uncertain. Even so, something can still be said about the relative attractiveness of a quantity 
or a price instrument when you consider marginal costs as well as benefits. Specifically, it 
can be questioned whether the Kyoto Protocol specifies the right approach to deal with the 
problem at hand.  
The “business-as-usual” emissions of greenhouse gases in the future are highly uncertain 
and depend on a number of factors like population growth, productivity improvements, 
carbon intensity and energy efficiency. As a consequence, the costs to society of reducing 
the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to a pre-specified level are highly 
uncertain as well. Two opposite cases can now be identified. If the climate change problem 
is characterised by a potential catastrophe that will occur when the accumulated amount of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere pass a certain threshold, then the right approach would 
be to avoid this threshold at all costs. This can be done effectively by a quantity (permit) 
instrument. If, on the other hand, the damages resulting from climate change only rise 
proportionally with the accumulated stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the best 
way to correct this externality would be by using a price instrument (tax)1. As noted by 
(Pizer, 1999), the important distinction between the two instruments is how they adjust 
when costs change unexpectedly. A quantity instrument adjusts by allowing the permit 
price to rise or fall while holding the emissions level constant. A tax system adjusts by 
allowing the total level of emissions to rise or fall while holding the price associated with 
emissions constant. 
Most models on climate change suggest that the damages resulting from climate change 
only rise proportionally with the accumulated stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, 
so it seems that a price instrument rather than a quantity instrument should be advocated. 
Furthermore, if the assigned amounts that are defined in the Kyoto Protocol for the budget 
period 2008-2012 are assumed to continue unaltered in the future, the total stock of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will not be stabilised for a long time to come. In fact, 
given that a large developing country like China has refused to take on a binding 
commitment, there is no guarantee that the total stock of greenhouse gases will be stabilised 
at all even if the assigned amounts of Annex B countries were to be cut down further in the 
future. From an efficiency viewpoint this would tend to reinforce the conclusion that a price 
instrument should be preferred over a quantity instrument. 
                                                           
1 This is the famous result by Weitzman. In the words of (Newell & Pizer, 1999): "Weitzman's 
insight was that, on economic efficiency grounds, a flat expected marginal benefit function (relative 
to marginal costs) favours prices, while a steep benefit function favours quantities. Intuitively, 
relatively flat marginal benefits imply a constant benefit per unit of control, suggesting that a tax 
could perfectly correct the externality. In contrast, steep marginal benefits imply a dangerous 
threshold that should be avoided at all costs – a threshold that is efficiently enforced by a quantity 
control."  
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The Kyoto Protocol is just a starting point, however, reflecting a whole range of conflicting 
political interests and there is at present no way of knowing what might happen with future 
allocations of greenhouse gases. Specifically, the international conflict between 
industrialised countries and developing countries raises a number of equity issues as well. 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that costs to limit the yearly greenhouse gas 
emissions to a pre-specified quantity could run high and that this should not happen without 
a reason2.  
2.4.2 Country positions to the Kyoto Protocol 
The attitudes towards the Kyoto Protocol have been very different ranging from the green-
NGOs arguing that the Protocol does ‘too little, too late’ to members of the US Congress 
and representatives of the industry feeling that the Kyoto-protocol ruins the economy to 
solve a non-existing problem.  
The Kyoto-protocol has to be seen as a compromise and as a step in the process of 
establishing the international institutions necessary to reduce the risks of climate change. 
Although some steps forward were taken at Kyoto, such as the establishment of quantified 
and binding emissions targets in the commitment period, a lot of questions were left 
unanswered.  
The fundamental disagreement concerns the use of the Kyoto mechanisms and is centred on 
two interrelated questions:  
• Should the developing countries take on binding emissions constraints? 
• And should ‘hot air’ from Russia and other countries with economies in transition be 
seen a problem in relation to emissions trading? 
The answer to these questions depends on the weight that is put on an economic 
effectiveness viewpoint compared to an equity viewpoint. 
From an economic effectiveness viewpoint, the problem can be formulated in the following 
way: The global climate cares about the total level of emissions (in fact the accumulated 
level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere) and not about ‘hot air’. ‘Hot air’ could be seen 
as a way to distribute the permits between countries so that the number of countries that are 
willing to take on binding emissions constraints is maximised. By making a larger number 
of countries participate the total level of emissions will be lower, and at the same time, the 
overall costs of reducing climate change will also be lower (Barrett, 1998).  
Especially the whole discussion about ‘hot air’ from Russia and other countries with 
economies in transition seems quite arrogant and misses this important point. There is 
nothing scandalous about Russia trying to sell emissions rights if the country does not 
return to its 1990-emission level in 2010. The Russian people have suffered enough 
because of the economic breakdown of the country and should they be compensated 
nobody could argue against that.  
The problem with ‘hot air’ is that even though it transfers funds to countries like Russia it 
will also make it cheaper for the industrialised countries to comply with the Protocol. From 
an equity viewpoint, reductions of emissions should take place in the rich and industrialised 
countries that are mainly responsible for the greenhouse gases accumulated in the 
atmosphere today. Developing countries should not have a cap on emissions but should be 
allowed to increase their emissions in the future as they see fit. Obviously, this line of 
                                                           
2 As a consequence, (Pizer, 1999) suggests that the Kyoto Protocol should include provisions on a 
tax instrument rather than a quantity instrument. 
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argument leads to the conclusion that developing countries should not take on binding 
emissions targets. Furthermore, flexibility mechanisms should be kept at a minimum 
because they will tend to spread out the geographical location of emissions reductions and 
consequently reduce the costs of emissions reductions in the industrialised countries.  
Both these limitations will, however, make the participation of some of the industrialised 
countries less likely and as such could seriously challenge the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Furthermore, they will tend to reduce the environmental effectiveness of the 
Protocol because emissions will tend to rise in the areas that do not have a binding 
commitment. 
The debate on ‘hot air’ is brought into the practical implementation of the Kyoto-protocol 
through the definition of the wording in the protocol that the flexible mechanisms should be 
“supplemental to domestic action”. After difficult internal negotiations the EU in May 1999 
presented a concrete proposal on the interpretation of ‘supplemental’. The proposal is quite 
complicated consisting of three different formulas to calculate a ceiling to the use of the 
mechanisms, but the general result is that approximately half of the reductions must be 
domestic.  
The G-77 and the green NGOs argue that the proposal leaves too much room for the 
flexibility mechanisms, where as the ‘Umbrella’ group is strongly opposed to any 
restrictions to the use of the mechanisms. This is just one of many examples of remaining 
issues to be resolved before the international framework for implementing the Kyoto 
protocol is in place. 
At CoP4 in Buenos Aires in 1998 the so-called “Buenos Aires Plan of Action” set the 
agenda for resolution of a long list of unresolved issues. Not surprisingly, there are many 
unsolved questions regarding the flexible mechanisms. The conclusions on the negotiations 
are planned to take place at CoP6 in Den Haag in November 2000. It is not likely, however 
that all the issues regarding the Kyoto mechanisms will find their solution. At best the 
process will stay alive and progress will be achieved in limited areas. 
There are still major differences in the point of view between the three main groups in the 
negotiations: EU and the accession countries, USA and the rest of the Umbrella-group and 
finally the G-77, the developing countries. 
These differences make it still very uncertain whether the Kyoto-protocol will be ratified at 
all. Most critical is the attitude of the US Congress that has made a ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol contingent on “meaningful participation of developing countries”. The G-77 on 
their side maintains that the threat to the climate stems from emissions from the 
industrialised countries, therefore it is the responsibility of these countries to achieve the 
necessary emission reductions. In this ‘clash’ the EU tries to mediate and keep the process 
alive. 
In the rest of the report it is an underlying assumption that the Kyoto-protocol will enter 
into force as planned. At least it is expected that the Kyoto-protocol will continue to form 
the basis for the climate policy in the EU. This seems a robust assumption. Taking into 
account the huge challenge of getting the USA to ratify the Kyoto protocol it is not very 
likely that the climate policy in the EU will become more stringent than the present. On the 
other hand, the political leaders of EU have committed themselves so strongly to the goals 
of the Kyoto-protocol that it will be difficult to abandon the targets even in the case that the 
USA does not ratify.  
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2.5 A closer look at emissions trading 
The emission targets according to Annex B are sometimes referred to as assigned amount. 
Each country has been assigned with the right to emit an amount of CO2 equivalents. 
Emission trading transfers “assigned amount units” (AAU). Such transfers can take place 
under the provisions of Article 3.10.and 3.11 assuring that the amount transferred will be 
added to the buyer’s assigned amounts and deducted from the seller’s assigned amounts. 
Figure 2.2 below depicts two possible trading options for Annex B Parties (inter-
governmental trading). The first option illustrates bilateral trades where no formal market is 
established, while the second option has included a formal market. 
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Figure 2.2: Inter-governmental trading 
In contrast to JI and CDM, such transfers do not necessarily have to be based on actual 
emission reductions from projects. Emission reduction units and certified emission 
reductions may be interchangeable with assigned amounts, but clearly have a different 
background, and possibly different characteristics. (Jepma, 1998). 
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Figure 2.3: Private party trading 
An emission-trading program like the one depicted in Figure 2.3 B is known as a cap and 
trade programme. In a cap and trade program issues such as baselines and allocation of 
allowances are dealt with in the initial phase of establishing the overall program. Allowance 
trading can then proceed without the need to revisit these issues in individual trades, greatly 
reducing the need for government oversight. Credit trading (JI and CDM), on the other 
hand, is project based, and requires that these issues are analysed and certified for each 
trade. Each project must establish its emissions baseline, reduction plan and enforcement 
mechanisms. This system requires a process of verification and government oversight as 
well as continued monitoring. As a result, the institutional requirements in a cap and trade 
program and in a credit-trading program are quite different. Moreover, inter-governmental 
trading differs from the “bubble” approach as specified in Article 4 because the latter pre-
determines the transfers and acquisitions of assigned amounts within the voluntarily-formed 
group prior to the beginning of the commitment period (UNCTAD, 1998). 
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Needless to say, our focus will be on a cap and trade type program. Furthermore, there is a 
need to distinguish between inter-governmental trading and trading involving private 
parties as well. While Article 17 opens up for trading between Parties (inter-governmental 
trading) it is not fully clear whether it also opens up for international trading between 
authorised legal entities. In fact, the Kyoto Protocol leaves most of the major questions 
concerning how an emission trading system should actually function unanswered. Some 
may be solved at CoP6. 
2.6 Allowing private party emission trading 
The problems concerning private party emissions trading are, of course, quite central to this 
report. The following is merely intended to give an introduction to some of the issues that 
will be dealt with in more detail later in the report. 
2.6.1 The allocation process 
All existing emissions trading programs have involved private parties. The reason for 
involving private parties is that they are the ones who actually have control over emissions, 
and by giving them the right to trade they can profit directly from emissions reduction 
activities, thus providing them with strong incentives for seeking cost-effective abatement 
measures. These incentives will not be effective in an inter-governmental trading scheme, 
unless the incentives are provided by some other regulatory measures3. 
If international trading among private parties (inter-source trading) is allowed, the first 
important question that needs to be addressed is how the overall permits of an Annex 1 
country should be allocated within the country itself. The translation of a country’s national 
commitment into individual parties’ commitments may prove to be a very contentious issue 
as valuable economic rights are being allocated. 
A serious complication concerns the fact that Governments can allocate the permits in a 
way that favours domestic sectors that are exposed to international competition or sectors 
that are considered strategically important. Furthermore, if some countries allocate the 
permits to some sectors by means of grandfathering while others use auctions, this could 
also be used in a trade-distorting manner. 
As noted by Zhang (1998), the allocation process itself represents the establishment and 
distribution of private property rights over emissions, and itself lies outside the mandate of 
the WTO. However, given the great concern about international competitiveness the 
allocation of permits does have the potential to bring parties into conflict with the WTO 
provisions. 
Even more complex issues include whether multinational companies could trade within 
their own firms across international borders. This is a topic that has received considerable 
attention lately following British Petroleum’s proposal to develop an internal emissions 
trading system (Browne, 1998). 
Once the admittedly troublesome allocation process is over, the workings of a cap and trade 
system could be fairly simple. Again, it is useful to distinguish between a project-oriented 
system and a cap and trade system (see Figure 2.3). In a project-oriented system (Option A) 
                                                           
3 For example, allowing emissions trading within the national borders is one way to provide these 
incentives. Of course, the possibilities for seeking cost-effective opportunities will be somewhat 
limited, especially in countries with small and open economies. 
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every single trade has to be certified4, which includes verification of the baseline and the 
size of the emissions reductions. This is not necessary in a cap and trade system (option B), 
as the authenticity of each allowance is built into the structure of the program (defined in 
the allocation process).  
2.6.2 Compliance issues in relation to private party trading 
It is useful to distinguish between what the requirements are for monitoring and verification 
when trading between Parties is allowed and when trading is allowed between private 
parties as well, private parties here being electric utilities and large industrial sources. If 
there is no trading between countries most of the existing national inventories of the Annex 
1 countries will probably be adequate (Rypnski, 1998). The only problem is that regulatory 
data are different from information gathering for purely statistical purposes, because the 
stakes are higher for the companies involved and therefore the incentive structure is 
different. That is to say, if there is widespread use of self-reporting of emissions by 
companies there need to be significant penalties for cheating. If governments are allowed to 
trade with each other obviously it will be necessary to keep track of the trades and the 
resulting changes in assigned amounts of the individual countries as well. If the monitoring 
of a country’s emissions is credible in the first place the extra monitoring of trading activity 
should pose no real problems. However, the quality and/or frequency of monitoring may be 
greater for emissions trading than it generally is under the Protocol. Finally, if the right to 
trade permits between individual companies is allowed, each country will have to specify 
criteria for compliance for the companies involved, possibly subject to approval by the 
trading partners. For emissions monitoring purposes the national inventories will have to be 
partitioned in order for this to work.  
Liability is straightforward for allowance trading because all covered sources need simply 
show that they have sufficient allowances to cover their emissions at the end of the 
compliance period. There are some compliance issues to be addressed if private parties are 
allowed to trade though. For example, what will happen if the overall country objectives are 
not met while sector targets are met? 
If each country properly manages measurement, monitoring, verification and enforcement 
of reductions, then the only additional risk introduced by trading is possible seller country 
non-compliance. This is difficult to deal with because remedies against non-compliance 
will not take effect until the next compliance period (Jepma, 1998). Also, there is no 
international framework that can effectively punish countries for non-compliance5. Any 
mechanism that is included in the Protocol to ensure compliance carries with it a trade-off 
against national sovereignty for all countries. The Kyoto Protocol does not give the 
international expert review teams explicit authority to inspect private facilities. 
Nevertheless, the Protocol does not prohibit such practises, and it is possible that 
participation in emissions trading could require a heightened level of supervision by 
international authorities. Possible mechanisms to deal with seller country non-compliance 
can be: 
                                                           
4 A project-oriented system is by no means incompatible with the existence of brokers. The World 
Bank among others is currently trying to establish itself as a broker with respect to such a system by 
bringing potential buyers and sellers together and subsequently managing the individual projects.  
5 This limits the extent to which one can transfer the US experiences with tradable permits to an 
international trading regime, since prosecution can not be carried out internationally. 
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Each buyer’s country (buyer liability): 
• Keeps track of AAUs added to its assigned amount, whether purchased by government 
or private parties6. 
• Agrees to make up the lost reductions associated with its share of assigned amounts (in 
the next compliance period). This is not the same as borrowing, because it is only used 
in case of actual seller default – it is not a buyer option7. 
• May file a claim for damages against defaulting seller country 
Each defaulting seller country (seller liability): 
• Will have its assigned amounts in the future deducted with interest 
• Will be forbidden so sell but not to buy quotas. 
It is also worth considering a system with a grace or “true-up” period after the compliance 
period has ended. This will give a Party a period of time to come into compliance after it 
has been identified as being in non-compliance. 
2.6.3 What sources can be included in a private party trading system? 
Emissions sources have traditionally been classified according to their mobility and generating 
capacity (Tietenberg, 1974): 
Table 2.3. Classification of Emissions sources. 
 Point sources Area Sources8 
Mobile sources Large cruise ships, ferries and large 
aeroplanes. 
Cars, trucks, buses and other 
transportation. 
Immobile sources Electric Utilities, refineries and other 
large industries. 
Residential houses, farmers, offices 
and other small companies 
 
The spatial distribution of sources is not important in relation to GHG-emissions so the 
mobility of sources is not a problem for the working of a GHG-emissions rights market. 
Rather, it is the size of the sources that poses the problem. A relatively large amount of 
GHG-emissions are, unlike emissions of SO2 and others, produced by the residential and 
transport sectors. Enforcement of an emissions rights market that applies to these sectors 
will undoubtedly be too expensive to be practical because the sources are simply too 
numerous. This limits the extent to which a trading system applied at the point of emissions 
(“downstream” trading system) is useful. The sources regulated through a “downstream” 
trading system would have to be limited to electric utilities and large industrial sources, 
while other sectors would have to be reached through other policy measures. 
One way of dealing with this could be to model the national trading system as an 
“upstream” system. An “upstream” system would target fossil fuel producers and 
importers, and so would reduce the number of allowance holders to oil refineries and 
importers, gas pipelines, LNG Plants, coal mines and processing plants. Implemented 
                                                           
6 Each AAU would have to be identifiable in order for this to work possibly with a serial number as 
in the US Acid Rain Program (Brian Mclean, 1998). 
7 One could also argue for a system where just the marginal buyer should be liable and not all 
buyers.  
8 The phrase “area sources” is used for relatively small emitters because in terms of meteorological 
modelling they are aggregated and treated as a single source emitting uniformly over a geographic 
area. See Tietenberg (1974). 
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effectively, an upstream system would besides being easy to administer capture virtually all 
fossil fuel use and carbon emissions in a national economy (Zhang, 1998). However, if the 
authorities for reasons of political feasibility wish to differentiate the burden of reducing 
CO2 emissions between sectors, that might come into conflict with an upstream system. 
Otherwise, a system that combines elements of an “upstream” and a “downstream trading 
system is also possible.  
At the same time, the difficulties of monitoring emissions of some greenhouse-gases may 
also limit the ability of some sources to participate in a cap and trade system. Monitoring of 
CO2 emissions from electric utilities and other large industries is fairly straightforward, 
however, monitoring of methane emissions from agricultural or land-based sources or 
biotic carbon sources is much more difficult. This could call for limiting trade to a subset of 
gases but the Kyoto Protocol would have to be further amended to partition the assigned 
amounts into two categories – tradable and non-tradable gases with separate goals assigned 
for each (UNCTAD, 1998). 
In short, private party emissions trading involving emissions of CO2 does not seem as a bad 
starting point.  
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3 Economical and political considerations 
for policy design 
This chapter will look at CO2 emissions trading between private parties from an idealised 
perspective9. The chapter is split up in two sections. First of all, we are interested in 
comparing a tradable CO2 permit system with other policy instruments in terms of 
economic efficiency. Thus Section 3.1 focuses on an economic comparison of the following 
three instruments:  
• “Grandfathered” permit system 
• Auctioned permit system 
• Emissions tax 
Secondly, we are also interested in the political feasibility of the different instruments. In 
Section 3.2, we then take into consideration that any environmental policy has to pass 
through a political decision process. A policy must be designed in a politically acceptable 
way so that it is not changed beyond recognition and away from its cost-effective design 
during the political decision-making process. 
It is not attempted to merge the two perspectives at this point, because the ways that the 
political and economical considerations interrelate obviously depend on the actual 
institutional structures and actors. 
3.1 Efficiency aspects of tradable CO2 permits 
A fundamental aspect of environmental policy is that the utilisation of scarce resources 
should be costly. That is why it should be costly to use the atmosphere as well. A free 
market without any restrictions on emissions will fail to take account of this cost and 
correspondingly result in over-utilisation of the atmosphere. Any efficient form of 
regulation must make CO2 emissions scarce, thereby raising the marginal cost of emitting 
CO2. In this way, a system of tradable allowances is really about introducing the right 
bottleneck (resource constraint) in private-party decision-making.  
The underlying assumption of this section is that the instruments are to be used to meet the 
politically specified targets in the Kyoto Protocol. This means that marginal damages (or 
benefits from reduction) are irrelevant and the comparison of different instruments will 
depend on whether or not the chosen level of aggregate emissions (i.e., the Kyoto level) can 
be achieved at the lowest cost to society. This can be stated as follows: 
The total cost of a tradable CO2 permit system (or any other instrument) is minimised (the 
system is cost-effective) when the present value of marginal abatement costs for each 
period are equalised across participants and periods, which in turn equals the permit price10. 
                                                           
9 In particular, the distributional consequences of different allocation principles are not considered 
here. The presence of other distortionary taxes in the economy could significantly alter some of the 
conclusions, in particular if revenues from CO2 taxes or auctioned CO2 permits can be used to offset 
taxes on labour or capital (known as a ‘double dividend’). See Chapter 5. 
10 The words permits and allowances will be used interchangeably.  
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In order to be able to do such a comparison it is necessary to apply a common yardstick. 
Economic theory tend to focus on static efficiency (also known as allocative efficiency 
because the focus is on how resources can be allocated efficiently within given frame 
conditions) where both price and quantity instruments alike have the potential to produce a 
least cost solution for society. However, there is no way of knowing if an optimal solution 
in a static setting will also be optimal in a dynamic perspective, which is obviously a lot 
more realistic. The concept of dynamic efficiency (also known as adaptive efficiency 
because the focus is on how able a system is in adjusting to external changes such as 
technological change and price levels) is much more blurred in comparison and provides no 
clear-cut solutions. In the following, we will start out by focusing on a static perspective 
and then move on to consider some dynamic perspectives as well. 
In Subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 we start out by considering the fundamental working of a 
tradable CO2 permit market. Starting with Subsection 3.1.3, we then move on to compare 
the working of a permit market where the permits are distributed via an auction or given 
away for free, with a tax system. In turn, the comparison focuses on the following topics: 
 Efficency aspects without uncertainty 
 Carbon leakage effects 
 Efficiency aspects under uncertainty 
 Institutional flexibility 
 Possible economic market failures 
 Dynamic incentives 
Finally, a summary of the comparison is presented with some guidelines on the best design 
of the system. 
3.1.1 Efficiency aspects between participants 
Let us return to the EU target level. The private reduction costs that follow the CO2 
reduction will vary over different countries, industries and firms according to burden 
sharing agreements and marginal reduction cost curves. Assume, for example, that a 
country has agreed in reducing CO2 by 15 % and transfers this target level to its individual 
electric utilities in the market. Compare then two individual firms with low and high 
marginal reduction costs. 
Firm F1 has a low MC1 for the units first reduced, F1 can earn money by trading, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 (left). 
Firm F1 will choose to reduce the first 15 % itself at the cost of area B. However, because 
F1 can reduce an additional 42 % at a cost per unit that falls below the price, P*, it will do 
so and sell a corresponding number of permits. The firm’s revenue from selling these 
permits corresponds to the area abcd, and its profit corresponds to abcd minus the costs 
from private reduction, D. Because the profit is greater than area B, firm F1 will earn the 
difference when a permit market is introduced. 
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Figure 3.1. Polluters with low and high marginal reduction costs 
In contrast, if the MC curve for a polluter F2 has a greater slope than the aggregate MC 
curve, then F2 will choose to buy permits. This situation is depicted in Figure 3.1 (right), 
where polluter F2 has the high marginal reduction costs of MC2. 
As shown in Figure 3.1, F2 will reduce emissions by 5 %. Hereafter, it is cheaper not to re-
duce emissions but rather to buy permits from others at price P*. The costs of buying per-
mits correspond to the area abcd. If F2 were prevented from buying these permits under 
command-and-control (CAC) regulation, for example, its costs would include area aecd. 
So, in a permit market, F2 must in total pay the areas B and abcd, but it saves the area bec 
relative to the situation where trading is not allowed. 
In conclusion, the working of a tradable permit market can ensure that marginal abatement 
costs are equalised between the participants in the market, which is a prerequisite for a cost-
effective solution. 
3.1.2 Efficiency aspects over time. 
In order to be cost-effective, the system should also be able to secure an equalisation of 
marginal abatement costs over time (in fact, an equalisation of the net present value of 
present and future marginal abatement costs).  
The inter-temporal cost-effectiveness of a tradable permit system is linked to the flexibility 
in the timing of emissions. Allowing private parties the freedom to choose when to abate 
can significantly reduce the costs of abating. However, if the Authorities want to be certain 
that an environmental target is reached then the question of borrowing emissions 
allowances from future allocations and using them today becomes a contentious issue. As 
mentioned earlier, the Kyoto Protocol also puts restrictions on borrowing allowances from 
the future. 
The following set-up can illustrate the effect of restrictions on borrowing allowances from 
the future11. Allowances are assumed to be valid in one specific period (year) known as the 
vintage period (year). For each period there will be a total number of allowances issued to 
all the participating units. As will be discussed in the next subsection, the operation of the 
market is independent of how the allowances are distributed, in particular whether the 
allowances are given away for free to the participating units depending on some historic 
emission level, i.e. grandfathering, or whether the allowances are distributed via an auction, 
                                                           
11 The set-up is taken from Schennach (1998), who uses this model for SO2 allowances. It is cast in 
discrete time, which is a bit more intuitive.  
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as long as the industry structure is competitive12. If not all of the allowances are used in a 
given period, the difference between actual emissions and the number of allowances can be 
saved and used in future periods. The industry(ies) included in the market are now faced 
with an optimisation problem: In their own self-interest they will try to minimise the 
present value of their marginal abatement costs, however, they are constrained by the fact 
that they cannot borrow allowances from the future. It is assumed that there is a well-
functioning spot and forward market in allowances, meaning that at any given point in time 
the units can buy and sell not only allowances valid for the current period but also 
allowances for any given future period. The problem can now be stated in the following 
way:  
Min ∑
=
8
0t
[ct(at)*(1 +δ)-t]  
Subject to: St+1 = St + Yt – et, S0 given. 
  St+1 ≥ 0 (no borrowing from future compliance periods) 
Where: 
et: CO2 emitted into the atmosphere at time t from all units after any abatement has 
taken place.  
εt: The CO2 emissions that would be needed to satisfy the demand for electricity at 
time t without any restrictions on CO2 emissions. This is known as the baseline or 
“business-as-usual” emission level. The baseline level of emissions is 
counterfactual, since they cannot be observed in reality. 
at: The number of tons of CO2 abated by all units at time t; at = εt – et. 
ct(at): The industry cost of abating at tons of CO2 at time t13, which is the same as the 
price of a vintage year t permit in a well functioning permit market. 
δ: Time preference of actors in the market equal to riskless rate of interest. Assumed 
constant for simplicity.  
St: Total stock of allowances available at time t. 
Yt: Total number of allowances with vintage time t issued to all units. 
The first-order condition for this problem is the following: 
  mct+1(at+1) = (1 + δ)(mct(at) - λt), 
where mct(at) is the marginal abatement cost at time t, which is increasing in at. λt is the 
shadow price in period t associated with the constraint St+1≥ 0. If the constraint is not 
binding, λt is zero, and then the marginal abatement cost simply rises at the discount rate. If 
the marginal cost of abatement in the future, discounted to the present, is higher than the 
present marginal cost, units will be willing to save more allowances for future use, because 
by doing so, they decrease their discounted future cost by more than they increase their 
present cost. Of course, the opposite holds true if discounted marginal abatement cost is 
lower than present cost. Incentives to save more or less will persist until the discounted 
                                                           
12 As noted earlier, in this chapter we are not considering the presence of other distortionary taxes in 
the economy and thus the possible redistributional effects of the instruments 
13 To focus on inter-temporal efficiency it is assumed that marginal abatement costs are equalised 
across all participants in any specific compliance period, so ct(at) represents the industry cost of 
abatement at time t. 
Chapter 3. Economical and political considerations for policy design 
Risø-R-1184 (EN) 45 
 
marginal cost is equalised across all times (Schennach, 1998). Or in other words, incentives 
to save more or less allowances will persist until the discounted forward price of an 
allowance, (1 + δ)-nmct+n(at+n), is equalised across all periods (for n = 0, 1, …, ∞; n = 0 
being the spot price equal to the industry abatement cost at time t = 0, mc0(a0)). 
On the other hand, when the constraint is binding, say between period t and t+1, no 
allowances will be carried over between the two periods. This means that λt > 0 and the 
marginal cost increase at a rate less than the rate of interest. The units would like to borrow 
allowances from the future but are prevented from doing so by the non-negativity 
constraint. In other words, a restriction on borrowing limits the freedom of timing of 
emissions reductions and as such will limit the proper working of the market. 
In conclusion, if the tradable permits market is free of restrictions, the price of a vintage-
year t+n allowance at time t will equal (1 + δ)-n(mct+n(at+n) = mct(at), so the discounted 
allowance price is equalised across periods. If the borrowing constraint becomes binding 
the price of a vintage year t+n allowance at time t will be less than the price of the vintage-
year t allowance.  
3.1.3 CO2 emission control by quantity or price. 
To what extent is the efficient inter-temporal allocation obtainable by using other incentive-
based environmental instruments, i.e. a tax? In fact, if we assume ideal competitive 
conditions and still disregard time-dependent phenomena like technological innovation and 
uncertainty, i.e. the actors have perfect foresight, then there is a clear symmetry between 
controlling emissions by price (tax) and controlling them by quantity (tradable permit).  
This symmetry can be seen from the following set-up taken from Pezzey (1992). First, 
consider the emissions control by price, where each firm has to pay:  
µ*(e - eb) 
where 
µ = the scarcity rent (tax) set by the authorities (in EUR/ton of CO2 
emissions), which is the same for all firms.14 
e = emissions of CO2 within a given period measured in tonnes/time. 
This is under the firm’s control and as such may vary from firm to 
firm and over time. 
eb = the baseline emission right within a given period measured in 
tonnes/time, which is given as a property right to each existing firm 
by the authorities. eb may vary from firm to firm but does not 
change over time. This distribution rule is known as grandfathering. 
 
If there is no baseline emissions rights given away to private parties by the authorities (eb = 
0), then we have the traditional pollution charge where firms have to pay for all their 
emissions. The factor µ  is chosen to equal the industry’s marginal abatement cost15, thus 
achieving short-run efficiency16. If on the other hand a firm is given a positive baseline, and 
its emissions are less than its baseline (e < eb), then the firm receives a subsidy from the 
authorities and vice versa if e > eb. Pezzey refers to this scheme as a charge-subsidy 
                                                           
14 Ideally, for CO2 this should involve not only all firms but also all emissions sources in the world. 
15 In this world of perfect foresight the Authorities know the true marginal abatement costs of the 
industry. 
16 As is usually the case, short run refers to a situation where the firms that exist in an industry are 
given, while long run allows for entry and exit of firms.  
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scheme. It is the control by price equivalent to a grandfathered tradable permit market. In 
fact, both a price and a quantity type of instrument can involve a varying degree of private 
ownership in the atmosphere, which is illustrated in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Control by price or quantity? 
 Emission rights owned by firms 
 
  
Zero 
 
Intermediate 
Free market level of 
emissions 
Price Pure charge 
 
Charge-subsidy* Pure subsidy 
Quantity Sold or auctioned emission 
permits 
Grandfathered emission 
permits 
Granted and bought back 
emission permits* 
Source: Pezzey (1992). * These instruments are usually not considered. 
The criterion for achieving long-run efficiency is that private opportunity cost of production 
is equal to social opportunity cost of production. This is achieved when the opportunity cost 
to any firm of producing output q and emissions e is equal to C(q, e) + µ*e, where C(q, e) is 
the explicit cost of production excluding emissions taxes and subsidies and µ*e is the 
implicit cost of emissions. 
Long-run efficiency is obviously fulfilled for both a price and a quantity instrument if firms 
do not own any emissions rights at all, since the opportunity cost to any firm is exactly C(q, 
e) + µ*e. It is not immediately apparent that this will also be the case with a grandfathered 
emission permit scheme or a charge-subsidy scheme. The condition for achieving long-run 
efficiency under a grandfathered emission permit scheme or a charge-subsidy scheme is 
that eb is a full property right. This means that new firms entering the industry are not given 
emissions rights (eb = 0), while existing firms that leave the industry keep their emissions 
rights and receive a subsidy of µ*eb in perpetuity. Under these entry-exit rules, the 
opportunity cost to any firm of producing output q and emissions e rather than closing 
down production (or not starting production in the first place, in the case of a new firm) is 
the sum of: C(q, e), the explicit cost of production excluding emissions taxes and subsidies; 
µ*(e - eb), the cost of emitting the amount e to the atmosphere; and µ*eb, the income stream 
that would have been generated had the firm chosen to close down. The net opportunity 
cost to the firm is then 
C(q, e) + µ*(e - eb) + µeb = C(q, e) + µ*e 
so long-run efficiency is achieved. The baseline emissions right eb disappears from the 
formula, so it has no effect on marginal production costs or resource allocation. Of course, 
the actual out-of-pocket payments are lower in the case of grandfathering than in the case 
where no emissions rights are given away to existing emitters: 
Out-of-pocket costs when using grandfathering    = C(q, e) + µ*(e - eb) < 
Out-of-pocket costs when no rights are given away   = C(q, e) + µ*e 
Owning eb emissions rights simply increases the wealth of firm owners by lowering the 
average costs of production. 
So, in this highly idealistic world there is complete symmetry between price and quantity 
instruments. This symmetry does not hold, though, in a more realistic setting. This is what 
we turn to next.  
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3.1.4 Carbon leakage effects 
Market based instruments like a CO2 tax or CO2 permits work through the changes in 
relative prices that they bring about throughout the economy. These changes in relative 
prices in turn cause behavioural changes of producers and consumers alike. The 
fundamental ways in which a CO2 tax as well as a tradable CO2 permit work to reduce CO2 
emissions are the following: 
• Less CO2 per unit produced because the cost of CO2 intensive inputs to production will 
be relatively higher. 
• Less consumption of CO2 intensive goods because the consumer prices for CO2 
intensive goods will be relatively higher. 
• Less production of CO2 intensive goods within the regulated area or sectors. 
As we just saw in the previous paragraph, in a world without uncertainty the first two 
effects will be similar under any permit scheme and any tax scheme. Both types of 
instruments will provide the same marginal incentives to take measures against CO2 
emissions throughout the regulated area, which is the efficient way to deal with the issue. 
The third effect, however, has to do with the fact that the regulated area does not cover all 
sources and gases. This effect is not desirable as long as the production of CO2 intensive 
goods relocates somewhere else without resulting in any CO2 reductions on a global scale. 
This effect is known as carbon leakage.  
The problem of carbon leakage is very much the same under a system using a CO2 tax and 
a system using tradable CO2 permits as the marginal costs of production will be equally 
higher within the regulated area or sector. The sources that are included in the regulation 
can avoid the increase in marginal costs by investing in production capacity outside the 
regulated area, which makes the country or countries that have undertaken the carbon 
regulation relatively worse off without resulting in any CO2 reductions overall. Importantly, 
the carbon leakage effect will still be present even if the permits are grandfathered to 
existing sources. That is to say, the opportunity cost expressed as the difference between 
the marginal cost of production for a firm (source) operating under the regulation and a firm 
operating outside the regulation, is the same under grandfathering and an equivalent CO2 
tax. This assumes, however, that if a firm close down some production plants, it will still be 
entitled to the permits that were initially assigned to it. If that is not the case, a system using 
grandfathering will tend to preserve the initially polluting plants, because the firm cannot 
gain so much from closing down and reallocate the production, since by doing so, it is not 
entitled to keep the permits and the revenue stream generated thereby. 
So, grandfathering CO2 permits to emitters is not equivalent to exempting firms from the 
CO2 tax altogether. A grandfathered permit market will still entail a substitutional effect 
away from the polluting activity, while tax exemptions will switch the demand towards the 
sectors that are exempted from the tax, which is exactly the reaction that such a tax should 
avoid.  
International carbon leakage will be greater the greater are the between-country differences 
in marginal costs. This is especially a problem between countries that have undertaken a 
binding commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and countries that do not have 
such a commitment. In relation to the Kyoto Protocol this is primarily a problem between 
industrialised countries (Annex B) and development countries without a commitment, 
although a few development countries have taken on a voluntary commitment. However, if 
trading in CO2 permits between countries with binding commitments is restricted, there can 
still be significant marginal cost differences between these countries as well, which can also 
lead to carbon leakage. As noted by (Barrett, 1998) the problem of carbon leakage is two-
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folded: it will drive up the costs for the controlled sources and at the same time reduce the 
benefits because the total emissions will be higher.   
With regard to a trading system solely for the electricity sector in the EU a potentially much 
larger problem is carbon leakage to the rest of the EU economy. Electricity competes with 
other energy carriers, i.e. different fuels and heat, as input to production in other sectors and 
in final consumption. If other sectors are not included in the market (or regulated by a CO2 
tax app. equivalent to the permit price) the marginal costs of using combustible fuels as an 
input to electricity production will be higher than for other sectors. This could be the case if 
the electricity sector is used as a buffer for fulfilling the overall commitment of the EU 
Member States. The resulting CO2 emissions reductions could be very costly. 
3.1.5 Efficiency aspects under uncertainty 
There are some crucial differences between a price instrument (tax) and a quantity 
instrument (permits) when we consider the uncertainty in the CO2 reduction costs. A CO2 
tax will entail uncertainty about what the total level of emissions will be while keeping the 
price fixed, while a permit system will fix the total amount of emissions but entail 
uncertainty about the costs (price of the permits). This distinction is important because as 
long as there is no realistic “end-of-pipe” solution to the reduction of CO2 emissions the 
cost of reducing emissions to a certain level will be highly uncertain. 
To get to the desired level of emissions by using a CO2 tax a trial and error method can be 
deployed. Trial and error when fixed capital is at stake can be very costly, though. This is 
not just because of the overbuilding penalty either. It will often be true that getting to 
emission reduction level x by first building to remove x/2 and then adding another x/2 
capability will be more expensive than going to x directly (Russell and Powell, 1996). Also, 
the nominal value of the tax has to be changed from time to time to keep the real value of 
the tax unchanged. Changing the size of a CO2 tax at the EU level will however be a very 
complicated political process, as there are large differences in carbon intensity between the 
electricity sectors in the EU countries. 
With respect to a CO2 permit scheme the uncertainty about the overall costs should be 
reflected in the design. In effect, it is important that an emissions trading scheme allows for 
flexibility in the timing of emissions reductions. Banking of unused permits is important for 
improved efficiency when regulatory targets are such that marginal reduction costs are 
rising over time faster than the relevant interest rate. This has been the case in the US Acid 
Rain Program because of the tightening of the regulatory standards in the year 2000 with 
the beginning of Phase II (all boilers larger than 25 MWe will be included). On the other 
hand, if costs of reducing emissions are high in the short-term and expected to be lesser so 
in the longer term it will be attractive to allow borrowing of permits from future allocations. 
As noted by (Fischer et al. 1998), this could occur because the composition of energy-using 
capital is more flexible in the longer term than in the shorter term, and because tougher 
short-term requirements provide relatively less opportunity to embed technical 
improvements over time. If carbon permits can be borrowed from the next commitment 
period, unnecessary short-term costs from excessive capital obsolescence can be avoided 
and there will be greater prospect for incorporating new technological innovations over 
time. In this way unexpected fluctuations in energy prices or economic growth can also be 
smoothed out over time. 
The reason for including a borrowing constraint is to ensure that the intended emissions 
reductions will actually result from the permit scheme. If unlimited borrowing of permits 
from future allocations is allowed there could be a potentially large time inconsistency 
problem. This has to do with the fact that the political decision process is notoriously short-
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term by nature. This is particularly problematic with respect to the climate change issue 
since the timing of costs and benefits is such that the costs of reducing emissions will be 
visible today while the potential benefits will be visible in a time horizon of a 100 years 
from now. The regulators who enforce the market must be consistently committed to the 
problem of climate change and not put similar weight to other factors like economic growth 
and job creation. That is not credible. This creates incentives for emitters for letting their 
emissions run uncontrolled and claim that their particular firm has experienced strong 
organic growth and thus is not able to restrict their emissions to the pre-specified level. The 
further they deplete their future allocations of permits the less credible is it that the 
regulators will actually be able or willing to impose sanctions because the costs to society 
of imposing the sanctions will run higher. Furthermore, it is hard for the authorities to know 
up-front whether a particular timing of emissions will lead to a steady state or whether it 
involves an ever-increasing debt-burden in the future. There are some counteracting forces 
as well, though. Firms that have depleted their future allocations of permits to a large extent 
might be identified as being dirty in the public eye, which could tend to lessen the problem 
with borrowing.  
The Kyoto Protocol establishes five-year compliance periods and within each compliance 
or budget period the market participants are free to borrow or bank allowances. There is a 
borrowing constraint only between compliance periods. In any case, the length of the 
compliance period will be a trade-off between inter-temporal flexibility and ecological 
effectiveness (ensuring that the reductions are realised). 
So, borrowing of permits from future allocations raises a number of difficult questions. 
However, in the absence of borrowing the costs to control emissions could run higher, 
which will also create a credibility problem for the regulators. So, too much flexibility can 
be regarded as a problem with regard to eventual compliance but so can too little flexibility. 
In any case, this needs to be carefully considered in relation to a CO2 permit market for the 
power sector. 
Again the model considered by (Schennach, 1998) will provide a useful illustration. By 
introducing uncertainty into the model we must replace the perfect foresight assumption 
with expectations about the future. Assuming that the electricity producers are risk-neutral, 
they now try to minimise the sum of their expected discounted costs:  
 
Min {E0[∑
=
8
0t
[ct(at)*(1 +µ)-t]]} 
subject to: St+1 = St + Yt – et, S0 given. 
  St+1 ≥ 0 (no borrowing between compliance periods) 
where: 
Et[.]  is the expectation value given all the information known at time t.17 
µ = r + ρ, where r is the riskless interest rate and ρ is the asset-specific risk 
premium. 
 
The solution to this control problem can be shown to be the following: 
                                                           
17 This formulation abstracts from transactions costs, notably that information gathering is costly at 
each point in time. 
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  Et[mct+1(εt+1 - et+1)] = (1 + µ)(mct(εt - et) - λt) 
As long as we have banking, so that λt = 0, we equalise the present value of the expected 
marginal cost of abatement across periods. There is still full flexibility over time, and the 
optimal path can still be obtained. However, the no-borrowing constraint has changed a bit, 
which can be seen by iterating the equation: 
mct(at) = λt + (1 + µ)-1Et[(mct+1(at+1))] 
= λt + (1 + µ)-1Et[λt+1 + (1 +µ)-1 Et+1(mct+2(at+2))] 
= ∑−
=
1
0
n
s
(1 + µ)-sEt[λt+s] + (1 +µ)-nEt[mct+n(at+n)] 
This shows that the discounted forward price, (1 +µ)-nEt[mct+n(at+n)], will be less than the 
spot price of allowances, mct(at), if there is a possibility of an empty bank (the market for 
permits being well-functioning otherwise). The market participants would have liked to 
demand more permits from future allocations but are prevented from doing so by the non-
borrowing constraint resulting in relatively higher spot prices. This last equation can be 
rearranged to show: 
  Et[mct+n(at+n)] = (1 + µ)n mct(at) - (1 +δ)n∑−
=
1
0
n
s
(1 +µ)-sEt[λt+s] 
If units assign a positive probability to an empty bank, the expected price will rise at a rate 
less than µ. In fact, the downward correction in the expected price rises with the probability 
of an empty bank. So in a way the units are a bit more pessimistic than under perfect 
foresight in that it is the expectation of an empty bank and not an actual empty bank that 
will make the constraint binding. The units will be more inclined to save allowances when 
there is a possibility of an empty bank. 
The main point of the foregoing is that it is the expectations of the market participants that 
drive the allowance price. If new information becomes available at a certain time this will 
immediately change the entire price path in the future. As also noted by (Schennach, 1998), 
the market can, for instance, absorb an unexpected downward fluctuation around the 
expected trend in electricity demand by saving more allowances than expected, thereby 
smoothing the effect of this chock on allowance price. An unexpected upward fluctuation 
of the same size, however, can only be absorbed by a use of allowances from the existing 
bank. This is true if the compliance period is short, but if the compliance period is longer, 
i.e. 5 years as in the Kyoto Protocol, there is always the possibility of smoothing the effect 
of the upward shock by borrowing from within the compliance period. Due to the fact that 
the market cannot borrow from future compliance periods the shock-absorbing capabilities 
will be less in case of an upward shock than a downward.  
The opportunity to mitigate the cost of error is an attribute that is not indicated by the usual 
analyses of emissions trading which assume perfect foresight, nor is it an attribute shared 
by regulatory mechanisms that operate by other means than the use of allowances 
(Ellerman, 1998). 
3.1.6 Institutional flexibility 
As noted above, it is not to be expected that the cost of the greenhouse effect will be known 
with any great certainty now or in the near future. Accordingly, assigning the correct 
amount of emission allowances or choosing the right tax level is practically impossible. 
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Rather, any regulative system that tries to deal with this problem should be able to deal with 
uncertainty and changing expectations over time. 
Tradable CO2 permits are property rights, which can be bought and sold. That such permits 
hold any value at all is a result of the political and legal framework that makes it so. The 
working of a permit market is intrinsically linked to the credibility and stability of this 
political and legal framework. This limits the ability of a permit market to cope with 
changing the amounts of permits allocated, e.g. as a result of new information on the 
critical stock of CO2 (greenhouse gases) allowed in the atmosphere. However, in the real 
world changes in assigned amounts will only result from lengthy international political 
debates, and as such these changes can be phased-in over time.  
An emissions tax is not likely to deal with uncertainty in any effective way. At each point 
in time, the authorities, in setting the level of the tax needs information on future scientific, 
technological and economic development, which adds to an already existing informational 
overload in meeting environmental standards.  
The following simple example taken from Schneider and Wagner (1998) can illustrate this. 
If new evidence comes up on increased global warming, the market participants, especially 
market speculators, will bet on lower permit allocations in the future. This will immediately 
raise the price of permit-futures, incite banking of permits and stimulate increased efforts of 
mitigation. Some of these responses might also occur with taxes. For instance, some 
investment may be reduced due to expected higher or lower tax rates. However, taxpayers 
can neither advance nor postpone their payments. Thus they cannot react to changing 
expectations in the short term. In fact, it is rather plausible that some long-term investments 
are rejected since cash-flow return on investment is too low compared to a setting with 
tradable permits. Dynamic efficiency will thus be lost due to this sluggishness of the tax 
policy18. In other words, tradable permits can be more responsive to changing scientific 
knowledge than taxes. The same is obviously true for technological progress and other 
changes in economic parameters like economic growth or inflation. 
3.1.7 Possible economic market failures of a permit system  
There are a variety of possible reasons why firms might fail to reap the apparent gains 
available from the trade of CO2 permits, including: 
• Market power in the permit market 
• Strategic interaction between the output market and the permit market 
• Grandfathering as barrier to entry 
• Private transaction costs 
In turn, we will now consider these possibilities 
Market power in the permit market 
The possibility that not all participants in an emission-trading scheme will be price takers 
and that some will be large enough to exercise market power can have significant impacts 
on the working of the market. As we have seen, When all participants are price takers the 
cost-effectiveness of the system does not depend on the initial allocation of permits. 
However, when there is market power present the ability of the monopolist to exercise 
                                                           
18 This sluggishness stems from the fact that there a number of political barriers to changing the tax 
rate up and down on a short notice. 
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market power depends on his initial allocation of permits, so the traditional result where 
considerations of cost-effectiveness are separable from considerations of equity (how the 
permits are distributed) is not valid in this case. So, if some sort of grandfathering is being 
used as a distribution principle the present value of marginal abatement costs can fail to be 
equalised across periods and participants as a result of market power. That said, it must also 
be stressed that the whole notion of market power in the permit market is definitely more 
relevant when Nations rather than private parties are engaged in permit trading. 
To illustrate the potential problems that can be encountered with a grandfathering scheme 
we will consider a set-up taken from (Hagem and Westskog, 1996). They consider a 
monopolist that sells permits to a group of small buyers or, alternatively, a monopsonist 
that buys permits from a group of small sellers. Using this set-up, they then compare how 
this affects the working of the two following permit systems: 
• A system where the permits entitle the holder to emit a certain amount of CO2 over the 
whole length of the compliance period with no restrictions on the allocation of 
emissions between the different sub-periods within the compliance period. Trade is 
arranged at the beginning of the period. This system is referred to as a flexible permit 
system. 
• A system where there are restrictions on emissions in each sub-period. The permits 
entitle the holder to emit a certain amount of CO2 in each sub-period, and trade is 
arranged at the beginning of each sub-period. A permit bought in the first period has a 
value for the holder in each of the following sub-periods. This is referred to as a 
durable permit system. 
Intuitively, under the flexible permit system each participant will be able to distribute 
abatement costs effectively across periods. When market power is present in the permit 
market, however, this relative advantage of the flexible permit system can be lost due to 
larger differences in marginal abatement costs across participants. In other words, the 
durable permit system has a relative advantage in terms of avoiding the abuse of market 
power and thus equalising abatement costs across participants. The reason is that if the 
monopolist holds back permits in the initial sub-periods to drive up the permit price he will 
have incentives to lower the price in the later sub-periods to sell more units. Assuming that 
the buyers will be able to foresee this, they will be willing to pay less for the permit today. 
In this way, a durable permit system will limit the inefficiencies stemming from the use of 
market power. Hence, there is a trade-off between reducing the exercise of market power 
and allowing for flexibility over time.  
If the monopolist is a seller of permits, then, in a flexible permit system, the inefficiencies 
stemming from the use of monopoly power will increase the more the initial allocation 
favours the monopolist, i.e. the more permits he is given compared to the rest. Likewise, if 
the monopolist is a buyer of permits (monopsonist) decreasing the initial allocation of 
permits to the monopsonist will also increase inefficiencies due to the use of market power. 
In conclusion, the more the initial allocation of permits deviates from a cost-effective 
distribution of abatement across participants, the lower is the cost of the durable permit 
system compared to the flexible permit system19. However, the inclusion of private parties 
                                                           
19 In the preceding set-up the monopolist charges a constant price for all permits sold. As noted by 
(Munro et al., 1995), however, the only reason why the monopolist would do this is because he 
cannot successfully price discriminate or, more fundamentally, because the costs of organising price 
discrimination outweigh the gross profits achieved. For example, with a small number of potential 
buyers, each purchasing a sizeable fraction of units sold organisational costs are greatly diminished. 
It is a well-known result from industrial economics that perfect price discrimination achieves a 
socially optimal allocation of resources. However, all the benefits from trading will accrue to the 
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in any trading scheme will drastically increase the number of participants and as such limit 
the scope for exercising market power in this way.  
Strategic interaction between the permit and the output market. 
As we have seen, the argument for efficiency of a tradable permit market is intuitive in 
perfectly competitive markets. In such markets the price that clears the market for emission 
permits equalises marginal abatement costs. However, the implication of tradable emission 
permits may crucially depend on industry market structure, especially if the firms that 
compete in the output market are the same firms that trade in the permit market. This is 
especially a problem for grandfathering. 
Generally, when strategic interplay between the permit market and the output market is 
possible, grandfathering will not result in the minimisation of marginal abatement costs. In 
such a case, a firm that receives a favourable allocation of permits can, by holding on to 
these permits, expand its own production at the expense of other firms. The other firms will 
now find it harder to underbid the first firm since their production is constrained by the 
amount of permits. They would now have to lower their emissions to output ratio 
presumably at a very low cost in order to expand their market share. Clearly, this will not 
result in an equalisation of marginal abatement costs and thus permit prices between 
participants, and as a result the cost-effective reduction in emissions will be realised.  
In conclusion, strategic interplay between the permit market and the output market can be a 
real problem for grandfathering. However, we have to distinguish between whether or not a 
formal marketplace for trading emissions permits has been set up or not. If there are only 
very few participants and setting up a formal market is not deemed feasible, then the buyers 
and sellers will all know each other and consequently be able to use this knowledge 
strategically. If, on the other hand, there are enough participants to set up a formal 
marketplace for permits, buyers and sellers will not know the identity of each other. Then 
the problem goes away.  
Grandfathering as a barrier to entry 
On a related note, if the industry structure is not competitive, grandfathering can also be a 
barrier to entry. 
This can be seen from the following reasoning. Assume that the industry structure is not 
competitive due to the presence of economies of scale. Economies of scale mean that there 
is a minimum efficient scale of production necessary to generate rents to cover the fixed 
costs. If in addition this minimum efficient scale is a significant proportion of the total 
industry demand, the market can sustain only a small number of firms. In this way, the 
presence of fixed costs has the potential to generate an imperfectly competitive market 
structure by limiting entry (Tirole, 1990). Of course, the threat of entry by other firms may 
still serve to discipline the established firms so the degree of imperfect competition will 
depend on the concrete case at hand. 
If emissions permits are grandfathered to an existing industry with large fixed costs, the 
permits can serve as an extra barrier to entry. First of all, entrance into the industry may be 
restrained because potential entrants need a large share of permits to meet the minimum 
efficient scale of production. Knowing this, the existing firms may be reluctant to sell 
                                                                                                                                                                  
monopolist. Monopoly or monopsony is only a potential source of inefficiency when the numbers of 
agents on the other side of the market makes price discrimination impracticable 
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excess permits to newcomers. Secondly, as we saw before, the existing firms may be 
reluctant to sell permits to each other, because by doing so, they can force competitors to 
close down some or all of their plants if they are not able to create the necessary rents. On 
the other hand, given a reasonable auction design, auctioning emissions permits guarantees 
immediate access to the market for any new firm20. In other words, the auctioning of 
permits will not tend to further the already present market failures to the same degree.  
In conclusion, grandfathering can be an extra barrier to entry if other market failures are 
present. However, it is clear that the larger the actual number of participants in the permit 
market and the more evenly distributed the permits are, the less will be the possible 
problems of market abuse related to grandfathering.  
Private transaction costs 
(Munro et. al, 1995) make the following assumptions about the nature of transaction costs 
in a permit market: 
• Transaction costs are increasing in the number of firms that have to be party to any 
particular deal. 
• Transaction costs are increasing for a firm, the larger the number of potential partners it 
has to contact to set up a deal. 
In a frictionless world it is clear that the more firms participating in a permit market the 
better. At first sight it seems, however, that the presence of transaction costs will put an 
upper limit to the number of participants that is it practical to include. However, it is 
necessary to make a distinction between whether or not a formal marketplace for trading 
CO2 permits has been set up. There are fixed costs of setting up a formal market, which 
create an externality across permit market participants. With a few possible traders the 
fixed costs of setting up a formal market place may be too large. If, however, the number of 
possible market participants is large then these set-up costs can be overcome. 
No formal marketplace 
In a market with few participants each individual firm can consider all possible trades quite 
easily. Also, each firm may have better knowledge of the marginal abatement costs of the 
other firms, which would suggest that a market with few participants is superior to a market 
with many participants. So, the problems with transaction costs are most pertinent when 
there are many traders but not so many that a formal market can be set up. 
In the absence of a formal market the sequential nature of individual trades can be a big 
problem, since there is no way of knowing that the “right” parties will make a deal. As 
noted by (Munro et al., 1995), the sellers with the lowest reservation prices and the buyers 
with the highest willingness to pay are likely to be the most active searchers for deals and 
as such are likely to make deals with each other. This could mean that other buyers and 
sellers, i.e. parties with higher reservation prices and parties with lower willingness to pay, 
would not be able to make deals. 
Asymmetric information would also pose a problem in the case where no formal market is 
established. When the same firms have to deal directly with each other several times, they 
may be reluctant to let their bids and offers reflect their true costs in the beginning, since by 
doing so they could earn more money. In contrast, in a formal and impersonal permit 
trading system with many participants there are no incentives for firms not to let their bids 
and offers reflect their true private information.  
                                                           
20 See for example (Cramton and Kerr, 1998a, b) or (Svendsen and Christensen, 1998). We will 
leave it to later chapters.  
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With formal marketplace 
The presence of a formal market or broker can drastically reduce the transaction costs of the 
individual firm. However, even with a formal market there can still be positive transaction 
costs. One cost is the commission fee paid to the market maker or broker for rendering their 
services. A second type a transactions costs is the search costs incurred from deciding 
which broker to use and the search costs incurred if the firm decides instead to act as its 
own broker. A third transaction cost is the cost of having to negotiate a contract and the 
accompanying terms of sale. Search costs could be noticeable in the beginning but may 
decline over time as firms become more experienced with executing transactions in the 
permit market (Bailey, 1996).  
The presence of transaction costs in a formal permit market will result in qualitatively the 
same price effects as observed in a permit market with uncertainty and a restriction on 
borrowing. In Subsection 3.1.5 it was shown, that if there is a possibility of an empty bank, 
then the discounted forward price of permits will be less than the spot price of permits 
because the firms will be inclined to save more permits. In the same way, the presence of 
positive transaction costs will result in an extra benefit from holding a stock of permits on 
hand, called a convenience yield, which is the transaction cost saved from not having to 
make additional transactions and/or undo the transaction just done (Bailey, 1996). This will 
heighten the spot price of a permit compared to the discounted forward price21, because 
saving more and holding more permits on hand becomes more attractive. 
So, the presence of transaction costs can not surprisingly prevent the equalisation of 
marginal abatement costs across periods. Furthermore, private transaction costs are only a 
problem for tradable permit systems and not for a tax instrument, so there is a danger of 
over selling such a system unless the details have been carefully dealt with (Russell and 
Powell, 1996). The extent to which private transaction costs are a real problem depends on 
the magnitude, which will be considered in the subsequent chapter dealing with the 
American experience with primarily the Acid Rain Market.  
3.1.8 Dynamic incentives 
Much of the foregoing has analysed CO2 externalities in a static context. Static in the sense, 
that the state of technology is exogenous. In such a case, the choice between different 
environmental policies is determined entirely by their ability to allocate resources in a cost-
effective manner without giving much thought to how this effective allocation might 
change over time. That is to say, the analysis is concerned with how markets operate and 
not how markets develop.  
However, in a dynamic context the state of technology is endogenous, and environmental 
policies can also affect welfare through their effect on the incentive to invest in 
environmental research and development (R&D). As noted by (Parry, 1996), this dynamic 
efficiency effect arises because, in the absence of any policy intervention, the level of 
environmental R&D in the private sector is likely to be sub-optimal for two reasons. First, 
firms lack incentives to adopt cleaner technologies if they are not rewarded for pollution 
reduction (the usual environmental externality problem); second, firms may not take into 
account spillover benefits to other firms that may copy or learn from their innovations (the 
usual externality in the R&D literature).   
There is a potential asymmetry between how an emissions tax and a tradable permit system 
using grandfathering will influence on these matters even under competitive conditions. 
                                                           
21 This is known as weak backwardation in the term structure of permit prices. 
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The asymmetry between the two schemes stems from the different mechanisms by which 
innovation rents are generated. Under an auction, firms are willing to pay for a new 
emissions-reducing technology because it will reduce their tax liability. Therefore, the rents 
earned by innovators ultimately come at the expense of government tax revenues. Under 
grandfathering, firms adopt cleaner technologies if they can use the resulting spare 
emissions permits to increase their own output or sell to other firms. That is, a diffusion of a 
cleaner production leads to an expansion in production; and the rents to the innovator come 
from the surplus created by this extra production and at the expense of rents to the initial 
permit holders. In theory at least, this causes a crucial problem: it may be optimal for an 
innovator to restrict diffusion of a new technology to limit the fall in permit price, and 
hence the reduction in the amount other firms will pay to adopt the technology (Parry, 
1996).  
Clearly, the effect that an innovation has on the emissions to output ratio plays a crucial 
role here. We can distinguish between two cases: one in which the innovation is marginal 
and only has a small impact on the emissions to output ratio and one in which the 
innovation is drastic and fundamentally changes the emissions to output ratio. 
Drastic innovation 
If the permit design allows for appropriate flexibility in the timing of emissions, the 
forward price of permits will always reflect the underlying expectations of the market 
participants. In this way, the permit price will always provide the necessary incentives for 
the market participants to reduce their emissions to the required level. However, there are 
no incentives to abate further than that. Secondly, if borrowing of permits from future 
allocations is allowed, it will result in lower incentives of permit holders to uptake cleaner 
technologies in the short term, because the shadow price on emissions (the price of the 
permits) will be lower in the short term. In any case, new information about technological 
innovations will result in an uncertain drop in permit prices, which may work to limit the 
incentives to develop new technologies. If the innovation is really drastic involving a major 
cut in the emissions to output ratio this can result in a major drop in permit prices, which 
means that the private return to innovation will be significantly lower under grandfathering 
than under emissions taxes. 
A tradable permit system using auctions will place itself in between a system using taxes 
and a system using grandfathering. Under such a system, the rents to the innovator will 
come from the surplus that is created from the extra production at the expense of 
government tax revenues. An innovator still has an incentive to restrict diffusion of a new 
technology to limit the fall in permit price, and hence the reduction in the amount other 
firms will pay to adopt the technology. However, the fall in permit price leads to a 
reduction in tax liabilities and not to a reduction in rents to the initial permit owners. This 
will lead to a higher willingness to pay for new technology under an auction than under 
grandfathering. 
Marginal innovation 
If the innovation only has a marginal impact on the emissions to output ratio, then the 
introduction of this new technology will only have a negligible effect on permit price. In 
this case, the incentives to innovate will not be very different under the two schemes. 
However, it is also interesting to compare the dynamic incentives of firms to adopt cleaner 
technologies in a permit system with no trading and a permit system with trading. The 
following figure can be used to for that purpose. It is assumed that permit prices will not 
change as a result of adopting new technology and as consequence the incentives to adopt 
new technology under a tax system or under a permit system are the same. The horizontal 
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price line in the top and bottom figure is therefore the resulting price in a tradable permit 
system or, alternatively, the size of the tax.  
Under a permit system with no trading the firm must achieve emissions reductions by the 
size of Q*. There are two technologies represented by the marginal reduction costs lines 
MC0 and MC1 where MC1 is the cleaner technology in that the costs of reductions are 
lower. The marginal emissions costs are assumed to be linear and increasing in the size of 
reductions. The economic incentives to adopt the cleaner technology under a permit system 
with no trading is clearly equal to the size of the area A in the top graph and the area A+B 
in the bottom graph (see Figure 3.2).  
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Source: Malueg, 1989. 
Figure 3.2. Incentives to adopt new technology 
If the firm is given the opportunity to trade in permits at price p we must distinguish 
between whether the firm will be a buyer or seller of permits. The top graph depicts a seller 
of permits. This firm will choose to reduce its emissions by an amount equal to Q’ and sell 
the extra permits at price p. So the incentives to adopt new technology are now equal to the 
area A+B, which is higher than the incentives with no trading. In the bottom graph the 
situation is reversed. This firm will choose to abate an amount less than Q* and buy permits 
to cover the last emissions reductions. So when a firm is a buyer of permits its incentives to 
adopt the cleaner technology is equal to the size of the area A, which is less than with no 
trading. 
Of course, this result only reflects the way a permit market works. Any firm that has 
relatively high emissions reductions costs will use the permit market as a cheap alternative 
and consequently do less reductions of their own. To what extent this is a real problem, 
however, depends on what constitutes the right amount of innovation. The buyer’s lower 
incentives to reduce emissions by themselves could be a problem if, on average, firms that 
are buyers in the permit market are firms that are quite energy efficient to begin with and as 
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such are also the firms that move the technological frontier. This remains quite speculative, 
however. 
In conclusion, both types of tradable permit designs can result in lower innovation rents 
than the tax scheme, especially if the introduction of new technology involves a major drop 
in the emissions to output ratio. Furthermore, the problem is worse when grandfathering is 
used as a distribution principle. 
3.1.9 Concluding remarks 
The results of the comparison are summarised in the following Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2: Summary of comparison between different instruments. 
 “Grandfathered” permit system Auctioned permit system Emissions tax 
Efficiency aspects 
without 
uncertainty 
Is able to achieve the cost-
effective reduction of CO2 
emissions; if no borrowing 
costs will run higher 
Is able to achieve the cost-
effective reduction of CO2 
emissions; if no borrowing 
costs will run higher 
Is able to achieve the cost-
effective reduction of CO2 
emissions 
Effect on carbon 
leakage 
Marginal cost in regulated 
area increases due to 
opportunity cost (no out- 
of-pocket cash flow)  
Same marginal cost 
increase in regulated area 
but due to tax payment. 
Same marginal cost 
increase in regulated area 
due to tax payment 
Efficiency aspects  
under 
uncertainty 
Self-adjusts to given total 
amount of permits; is able 
to mitigate errors but less so 
with no borrowing  
Self-adjusts to given total 
amount of permits; is able 
to mitigate errors but less so 
with no borrowing. 
Requires price adjustment 
to maintain feasibility 
Institutional 
flexibility 
Limited ability since value 
of permits derives from 
stable framework; changes 
in permit allocations must 
be phased in 
Limited ability since value 
of permits derives from 
stable framework; changes 
in permit allocations must 
be faced in 
Can be lost due to 
sluggishness in tax policy 
Private 
transaction costs 
Potentially thin markets. 
Details have to be carefully 
dealt with. 
Transactions costs lower 
than grandfathering None 
Dynamic 
incentives 
Path of prices hence 
incentives unclear; 
Innovation rents low 
Incentive to innovate larger 
than grandfathering 
Incentive to innovate larger 
than under an auctioned 
permit system22 
Special problems 
The initial allocation of 
permits + possible extra 
barrier to entry. 
Gov’t revenue: Recycle or 
reduce other taxes 
Gov’t revenue: Recycle or 
reduce other taxes. 
 
In an idealised setting the efficient working of a tradable allowance market will hold 
irrespective of whether the allowances are distributed freely to the existing producers, i.e. 
grandfathering, or whether the allowances are distributed via an auction. 
                                                           
22 This assumes that the tax is not changed in the face of a major innovation. 
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In a more realistic setting, the analysis suggests that an auctioned CO2 permit scheme with 
comprehensive coverage of CO2 emissions is the most effective. The scheme must, 
however, allow for flexibility in the timing of emissions, preferably with the possibility of 
borrowing as well as saving of CO2 emissions. The tax system will not be able to respond 
effectively to uncertainty in the level of emissions. 
Grandfathering can be expected to be the least effective option. Given that the target group 
for the permit market is reasonably large the grandfathered permit market will not create a 
barrier to entry, however. 
3.2 Political market failure 
As noted in the beginning of the chapter, this section will take into consideration that any 
environmental policy has to pass through a political decision process. A policy must be 
designed in a politically acceptable way so that it is not changed beyond recognition and 
away from its cost-effective design during the political decision-making process. In 
particular, this section deals with how different actors, specifically large energy-intensive 
industries and environmental groups, are muster their opposition to specific policy designs. 
3.2.1 Target group 
A single instrument is hardly appropriate for all sources. The choice of target group must be 
based on both the contribution of emissions by that group and whether control is 
administratively feasible. As such, the benefits connected with individual control must be 
weighed against the administrative costs. The administrative costs of, for example, 
controlling every single car owner or housekeeper are likely to exceed the potential gains to 
them from an individual control system that lowers emissions reduction costs. The transport 
and household sectors contain numerous small sources, and for this reason they may be 
rejected as a target for individual CO2 emission control systems. Larger stationary sources, 
such as electric utilities, are of rather more interest. These larger, stationary sources will 
typically be regulated and controlled already, so that a permit market could build on the 
existing administrative infrastructure without adding further administrative costs. Also, by 
regulating electric utilities, the main part of the total emissions are ‘caught’. The 
administrative choice of this target group is reinforced by the fact that well-organised 
interest groups, like electric utilities, have strong lobbying power, as we shall see in the 
next section. 
Concerning exports of electricity to countries outside the EU, e.g. Norway, the bubble 
model from Denmark may be applied. Here, two SNOx bubbles are in effect for the two 
consortia in the electric utility sector, ELSAM and Elkraft. To protect exports of electricity, 
only net numbers are considered. Similarily, when net exports are positive in the market 
which we consider here, the CO2 surplus should be added to the permit holdings of ELSAM 
and Elkraft.23 
3.2.2 Lobbyism 
What will be the role of the State and the main interest groups in environmental regulation? 
First, it is important to distinguish between organisations inside and outside the market. 
Second, it is important to know what kind of regulation will lead to a politically acceptable 
                                                           
23 Svendsen (1998b). 
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outcome, that is a politically acceptable equilibrium between the State as tax collector and 
the main organised interests. 
The State, the Market and the Political Arena 
The main organised actors in environmental regulation are the democratic state (regulator), 
the polluting industry, and the environmental groups.24  
The State’s objective is suggested to be the maximisation of tax revenues when considering 
its constituency. The use of ‘green taxes’ is an innovation in tax collection because it results 
both in the provision of a collective good (environmental improvement) and in the 
collection of state revenue. If a small country like Denmark were to introduce green 
taxation on global pollutants, such as CO2, State revenue could then be used for lowering 
other distortive taxes, for example income taxes on labour. Lowering distortive taxes on 
labour could bring about higher employment and increased national income (higher tax 
revenue) over time. 
In a democracy, the State is counteracted by interest groups. A balance of power exists. 
Lobbying by interest groups in the political arena affects the final design of a given policy 
and determines thereby the resulting economic outcome. The democratic State cannot just 
pursue the economic interests of the majority. In order to achieve political acceptability, 
reduce conflict and consequently implement rules of legislation, it must also mediate 
among the main organised interests. 
Let us look closely at the difference between industrial and environmental groups organised 
in the market and the political arena, respectively, to understand past behaviour and predict 
future behaviour. How will the main actors lobby? What are their interests? In what way 
can they be expected to affect environmental regulation? 
Organisation takes place both in the market (market groups) and outside the market (non-
market groups). This distinction is important because the attitude of a group member 
toward the size of the group differs. In the market, a firm strives for monopoly. It seeks to 
create barriers to entry – to keep new firms from coming in and sharing the market – and it 
tries to get as many rivals as possible to leave the industry. In contrast, a non-market group 
member seeks to maximize group membership. Rather than bringing about more 
competition, larger membership means lower costs for the individuals already in the group. 
Again the free-rider problem occurs, just as in the market place: it is not rational for the 
individual agent or firm to sacrifice time and money to support a lobby organisation to 
obtain government assistance for the industry. For this reason, non-market groups often 
choose to make membership compulsory. 
This difference in the desires of the two groups is caused by the type of collective good and 
its benefits. In the market, the collective good is that of higher profits. All firms in an 
industry have a common interest in higher profits. Higher prices can be charged, however, 
only if fewer units of output are supplied. Therefore, organisations may operate in both the 
market (to raise prices by restricting output) and in the political arena (to further other 
common interests). Along with the incentive to exclude competitors, there is, paradoxically, 
an incentive to include competitors as well, because the larger the group, the more likely it 
is to influence government policy. Market action encourages exclusion of both existing and 
potential competitors, whereas political action encourages the inclusion of other firms: 
‘whether a group behaves exclusively or inclusively depends upon the nature of the 
objective the group seeks’ (Olson 1965:39). Once a group becomes large enough to succeed 
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politically, it will typically become exclusive. At this point, it is in the interest of the 
existing members to exclude new entrants.25 
When an interest group has accomplished the task of organising for collective action, it will 
try to steal as much money as possible from, for example, the treasury and redistribute as 
much as possible from the taxpayers to itself. A typical lobbying group in the US, for 
example, represents 1 % of the national income. It follows that the group will only stop 
redistributing to its clients when the reduction in its share of national income is 100 times 
as great as the amount it wins in the redistributional struggle. In contrast, if the interest 
group tries to influence policy in the interest of society as a whole, the group will only 
receive 1 % of the benefits, but will bear all the costs. 
If the lobbying group is bigger in size, it will stop the redistribution at an earlier point. For 
example, a group that represents 50 % of the national income will stop redistributing to 
itself when its share of the national income is reduced by twice the gain. Similarly, the 
group will get half of the benefits from better policies, so that it pays to promote policies 
that increase the group’s share of the national income by more than twice of its costs of 
undertaking this action. In this way, less redistribution will take place than in the case of the 
group that represents only 1 % of national income. If the smaller group is strong enough to 
win its desired favours in the political arena, its individual members stand to gain much 
more from the redistribution. 
In contrast, in non-market situations, the benefit from a collective good is not fixed in 
supply. The collective good is inclusive. Assume that an environmental organisation 
achieves the common goal of better environmental quality. Then everybody will benefit, no 
matter how many members there are in the group. Members have no incentive to exclude 
each other. Therefore, bargaining or strategic interaction is much less important in inclusive 
groups. An individual in a non-market group that prospers may even have an incentive to 
pay a larger share of the cost of the collective good. Also, in an inclusive group, it is not 
essential that every individual participates, because lack of participation does not take away 
benefits from those who do participate.26 
The incentives facing industry and environmental groups are summarised in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3. Market and Non-Market Groups 
 Common Goal 
(Exclusive) 
Market 
(Inclusive) 
Non-Market 
Electric utility industry 
 
Higher price Monopoly Lobbyism 
Environmental Groups Improved 
environment 
n.a. Maximise mem-
bership 
 
Attitudes toward Environmental Regulation 
When considering what kind of environmental regulation the main organised actors – the 
State, electric utility industry, and environmental groups – would each choose, three options 
are considered relevant: first, traditional command-and-control (CAC) regulation, where 
proportional roll-backs for individual sources are defined; second, an emission tax on all 
emitted units; and third, a grandfathered permit market, in which polluters are given their 
initial distribution of permits for free, according to historical emissions. One can therefore 
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26 Ibid. 
Chapter 3. Economical and political considerations for policy design 
62 Risø-R-1184 (EN) 
 
presume that the State would choose environmental taxes in an effort to maximize state 
revenue.  
What kind of regulation would industry choose? The distribution of benefits and costs from 
regulation can either be concentrated in a small, narrowly defined part of society (small 
groups) or spread out over a large and more general part of society (large groups). This 
distribution of costs and benefits from regulation determines the incentive for political 
actors to organise. 
If we look at the electric utility industry in a competitive setting, there is a strong incentive 
to promote permit markets because the trading of permits can lead to lower pollution-
reduction costs and more flexibility in responding to consumer demand than is possible 
with traditional CAC regulation or emission taxes. Also, electric utility industry can be 
expected to demand regulation that creates the collective good of barriers to entry for 
potentially competing producers. This is the case when using grandfathering. Existing 
sources are given permits for free whereas new sources are forced to buy their way into the 
market. 
3.2.3 Taxation without refund 
What are the costs of environmental regulation to the regulated parties? This question is 
important because the answer may determine the political feasibility of any proposal, no 
matter how well-designed it may be. The intention here is to make a cost comparison 
between a tax and a grandfathered permit market, and to use the case of CO2 taxation in the 
EU. The negotiated 8 % target level from the Kyoto negotiations will be used as an 
illustrative example. 
Nobody knows the exact position and slope of the marginal CO2 emissions reduction curve 
for the EU industry. Assume that these marginal costs (MC) decline linearly as the quantity 
of CO2 emissions (Q) rises, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
Q
$
MC
92%      100%
P*
A B
C
0
 
Figure 3.3. Cost comparison between a tax and a grandfathered market 
Assume, now, that the correct CO2 tax to accomplish the 8 % target reduction level is the 
price P*. What are the aggregated costs under a tax and a grandfathered permit market, 
respectively? 
Let us first consider the case without any tax refund to sources. In Figure 3.3 total costs 
under a CO2 tax will be the areas A and B. Polluters will reduce 8 % of their emissions at a 
cost to them of area B and pay the tax on each of the units they continue to emit for a total 
tax bill of area A. In contrast, the explicit costs to the polluter in a permit market will be B 
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only. A tax requires the polluter to pay for all units emitted, whereas under the permit 
market, the polluter receives the right to emit the targeted level of emissions. 
Take a closer look at the costs associated with the 8 % CO2 reduction. In a permit market 
permits will be transferred among polluters. Polluters will reduce or increase their in-
dividual CO2 emissions until all firms’ marginal reduction costs are equal to the permit 
price. Consequently, the total reduction costs to industry will be the area B when the permit 
price is P*. 
In contrast, the tax payments under a tax regime are the area A whereas B is the level of 
private reduction costs for the industry: the costs to industry under this approach include the 
tax payment, A, plus private reduction costs, B. If the sum of areas A and B is divided by 
area B, it shows up that taxation without refund is 24 times more costly to polluters than the 
permit market. 
The sum of areas A and B can now be divided by area B. The triangle and the rectangle 
areas can easily be calculated by using P* and Q* (level of reduction).27 This gives us: 
(A+B)/A = 2/Q* - 1 
This formula shows the distributional effect when considering tax or permit market at a 
target level, here denoted by the proportional number, Q*. 
Consider the distributional effects following different target levels. In Denmark, a target 
level of 20 % cut in CO2 emissions applies (from 1988 to 2005). For Q* = 0.2, we get the 
result that taxation is nine times more costly than the grandfathered permit market. 
The reduction target level from the UN conference in Kyoto, Japan (December 1997), is 
also an illustrative example. Here, the industrialised countries voluntarily agreed on 
reducing CO2 by 5 % from 1990 to 2012. In this case, for Q* = 0.05, it can be calculated 
that taxation without refund would be 39 times more costly to polluters than the permit 
market! In the case of the EU CO2 target level, the negotiated 8 % target level from the 
Kyoto negotiations can also be used as an example. When Q* = 0.08, the permit market is 
24 times cheaper to polluters than a corresponding tax without refund. Another example is 
the US Acid Rain Program, which aims to reduce SO2 emission by 50 %. In this case, for 
Q* = 0.5, taxation would be three times more costly to the polluters, provided that the MC 
curve is linear. 
3.2.4 Taxation with full refund 
As we saw in the previous section, the polluter must pay for all emitted units under a tax 
solution. In this way, the tax solution without refund may involve enormous increases in 
costs to polluters, and this lowers the political acceptability of the tax. The tax represents a 
transfer payment from the viewpoint of society, but it is an operating cost for the firm. 
Why, then, is the tax met with political opposition in practice? Why cannot the tax revenue 
be refunded in a politically acceptable way? The problem is that the refund must be 
independent of the pollution. Otherwise, the incentive to reduce pollution would be 
removed; that is, it would not matter to the polluter how much he discharged or emitted, 
because all of the money paid in taxes would be refunded. If, for example, a source is given 
back its CO2 tax payments, then it will have no incentive to reduce CO2 emissions at all. 
                                                           
27 (A+B)/A = B/A + 1 = P*(1-Q*)/ ½P*Q* + 1 = (2 – 2Q*)/Q* + 1 = 2/Q* – 1. See Svendsen et al 
(2000). 
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Still, one could argue that increased production costs under the tax solution could be 
avoided by constructing other types of general refund systems not linked to emission, for 
example in the form of a reduced tax contribution to labour market services, or a reduced 
company tax. However, energy-intensive polluters will, as potential losers in a small group, 
more aggressively oppose taxation with the argument that their competitiveness will 
weaken; labour-intensive polluters may, as potential winners in a large group, fail to seek a 
taxation and refund system because they may not organise. Therefore, the refund system 
can hardly be modelled such that it would satisfy the small group of potential losers. 28 
This political asymmetry against taxation with full refund may be explained by the size of 
the group and may be illustrated in the following way. Consider first a group consisting of 1 
million identical, small and labour-intensive polluters, where the total value of a tax refund 
to the group is $1 million and the total cost of providing it through lobbyism is $100.000. 
Further assume that the value of the refund, if provided, would be shared equally among all 
the members, so each would receive a benefit valued at $1. This is the case, for example, if 
each member in the large group pays $2 in CO2 tax and receives $3 in general refund. 
Although the group as a whole would get benefits worth $1 million (ten times the $100.000 
invested in providing the good), the net benefit to any individual member who chooses to 
provide the good on his or her own is clearly negative. In the absence of organisation, the 
good will therefore not be provided. This group would thus be classified as ‘large’ and the 
collective good of tax with full refund will not be provided. 
Now consider another group that has only five identical energy-intensive members. This 
group wants to avoid taxation with full refund because they pay much more in taxes (due to 
high CO2 emissions) than they get back from a general refund system. So if this ‘small’ 
group loses the same amount that the large group gains, each member will experience a 
benefit valued at $200.000 from preventing a tax with full refund. This is the case, for 
example, if each member in the small group pays $400.000 in CO2 tax but receives only 
$200.000 in general refund. If the costs of successfully lobbying against taxation is 
$100.000 again, each individual member’s net benefit is $100.000. Therefore, this 
collective good of avoiding green taxation will now be provided for the small group even in 
the absence of organisation, see Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4. Individual net gain from a general refund system. 
 Pro tax  
(labour-intensive) 
Con tax 
(energy-intensive) 
Number of firms (identical) 1 million 5 
Total tax payments $2 million $2 million 
Total general refund $3 million $1 million 
Total gain $1 million $1 million 
Individual gain $1 $200,000 
Total lobbying cost $100,000 $100,000 
Individual net gain Negative $100,000 
 
In this way, the small group of large and energy-intensive firms holds a stronger position 
than the large group of small and less energy-intensive firms and because of this opposition 
within the well-organised industry lobby, it is hardly possible to impose a CO2 tax high 
enough to achieve the 20 % target level in Denmark on industry as a whole. 
Concerning unorganised and numerous CO2 emitters, such as the transportation sector and 
households, it is reasonable to expect that they will not protest in an organised manner 
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against taxation. This argument follows the logic developed for large groups in this section. 
The taxpayers are only affected by the tax at the margin, and calculated individual benefits 
from starting organising interest group opposition are expected to be smaller than the costs 
of doing so. Again, it does not pay the individual taxpayer to protest and provide the 
collective good of avoiding CO2 taxation. 
It follows that it is easier to impose green taxation on households (large group) than 
industry (small group with energy-intensive firms) due to differences in lobbying power. 
Therefore, public choice theory does not predict uniform green taxation but differentiated 
green taxation where the tax level will be high for households and low (or non-existing) for 
industry. 
3.2.5 Enforcement 
Control systems rely on precise monitoring and well-functioning sanction mechanisms, 
typically based on the economic incentive of fines. If these two conditions are not met, 
sources may find it profitable to cheat. Also, local authorities may have strong free-rider 
incentives to protect their ‘own’ firms against strict control, so some kind of central control 
is needed. 
How will an economically rational source consider its option of cheating? What should be 
the size of the fine per unit? To establish a well-functioning fine system, the expected fine 
(including the risk of detection) must always be set higher than the tax (or the permit price). 
Local firms may be given substantial room for cheating in this kind of system because local 
authorities may accept violations in the interest of attracting industry (and a larger tax base) 
to their area. 
3.2.6 Concluding remarks 
The grandfathering of CO2 permit rights may be the most politically feasible solution for 
regulating CO2 in the EU and in the world at large. Taxation without refund is shown to be 
24 times more costly to polluters than the grandfathered permit market when considering 
the 8 % target level as agreed upon in Kyoto. 
Furthermore, the worst-hit CO2 emitters are large and capital-intensive firms, which, as part 
of a privileged group, are able to protest quickly and with success. This behaviour contrasts 
with that of the latent group of potential net winners, which are typically numerous and 
small service firms unable to organise. So even if the tax were refunded in a transparent and 
general way as a monetary transfer without reducing the number of jobs, the political 
opposition against CO2 taxation would probably persist because capital-intensive firms, 
which are also the most energy-intensive, are normally the largest and can organise for 
collective action – they may behave as a single collective actor or small group Therefore, 
the political opposition against CO2 taxation is likely to stay asymmetrically in favour of 
potential losers, in this case the electric utility industry in the EU. The overall problem is 
that potential winners cannot organise their lobbying powers to counteract the potential 
losers in the political decision-making process. Electric utilities must therefore, as a well-
organised group with lobbying power, be expected to choose a grandfathered permit 
market. It is the solution that leaves them with a maximum of flexibility, lowest possible 
reduction cost and a barrier to entry. 
These theoretical suggestions on how to fill the gap between economics and politics in 
designing cost-effective and politically attractive instruments point to the use of a permit 
market in relation to well-organised interests. In contrast, a CO2 tax should be applied to 
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non-organised interests, such as households and the transportation sector. These interests 
are not well-represented in the political arena because the individual benefits from 
organising interest-group opposition are smaller than the added costs of doing so. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that taxation is the only practically applicable solution in this 
case, as we deal with rather small amounts of emission per economic entity. Also, in the 
case of tradable permits for households, transaction costs would form a large share of the 
total permit cost, and it would be difficult to apply effective measures of control. 
In Chapter 5 we shall focus on the collection of data on this potential CO2 market in the 
EU. It is useful to describe the target group, distribution rule, enforcement system and 
market structure more fully and to calculate the expected market price. Such research can 
help uncovering the risk of strategic behaviour in the potential CO2 market, to estimate 
potential cost savings, and to identify the level of fines needed to deter violations of quota 
limitations. This potential CO2 market for electric utilities in the EU, matching the design 
of the US Acid Rain Program (as presented in Chapter 4, has not yet been discussed among 
academics. 
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4 The US Experience 
4.1 Introduction 
In the US, the Acid Rain Program (ARP) is now well-established. It is the first large-scale 
and long-term environmental program to rely on tradable permits. This landmark 
experiment comes at a particularly important time ‘since emission trading is under serious 
consideration, with strong US backing, for use to deal with global climate change’ and ‘the 
economic stakes in climate change surpass those in acid rain by several orders of 
magnitude’.29 
The ARP allows the 1,000 major electric utilities all over the US to trade SO2 permits. Such 
permit markets have been attractive to the political main actors in the US because of 
“grandfathering.” Grandfathering means that the property right to historical emission rights 
have been transferred for free. In this way, the polluter receives the right to emit the 
targeted level of emissions and must only pay for the emission units that must be reduced. 
This fact lowers costs to polluters compared to a tax system where the polluter must pay for 
all units emitted. For example, the ARP aims to reduce SO2 emission by 50 %. Because 
permits have been grandfathered, the polluters only have to pay for the 50 % reduction. The 
other half is kept for free as historical emission rights. Alternatively, if the polluters had 
been taxed, then they would have to pay not only for their own 50 % reduction. They would 
also have to pay taxes for all units emitted in the other half as well.30 
Svendsen (1998a) has analysed how the three main political actors in the US (environ-
mental groups, private industry and electric utilities) preferred permit markets over other 
instruments. This result was to be expected for private industry, which wants to reduce 
costs and create a barrier to entry. Although this was not originally expected for 
environmental groups, these groups had recently learned from experience that the cheaper 
regulation could be for industry, the higher reductions in emissions industry would be ready 
to accept. The traditional opposition from environmental groups to licenses to pollute and 
the maintenance of a goal of zero pollution had reinforced the administrative problems in 
the early stages of the US permit market programs by blocking well-defined property rights 
to permits. With respect to the US electric utility sector, the recent rise of competition in 
that sector gave even these traditional monopolies an incentive to prefer permit markets 
over traditional and complex Command-And-Control regulation. 
Now, the assessment here intends to focus on the performance of the market. The question 
is: Does the ARP work in practice? Is the tradable permit system a useful tool to policy 
makers in Denmark and the EU?31 To answer this question, it is necessary to develop an 
assessment model. 
                                                           
29 Schmalensee et al. (1998:53). See also the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1996). 
30 It was shown in Chapter 3 that if the marginal reduction cost curve for SO2 reduction is linearly 
decreasing, then a tax solution (without refund) is three times more costly to the polluters than the 
grandfathered permit market. 
31 Svendsen (1998d). 
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Four main conditions must be fulfilled to ensure that the market is working. First, the 
market structure must be competitive in order to generate correct price signals. Second, 
property rights must be well-defined. Third, property rights must be well-enforced and 
fourth, the costs of making transactions, “transaction costs”, must be low.32 As the design of 
a policy will determine performance in practice, the assessment model is constructed so 
that: design is described; the actual performance of the market and the auction is described, 
and finally, the actual transfer of property rights to the permits, is analysed. 
4.2 Design 
The design of the permit market is described by using a set of five variables. The first 
variable is a set labelled target level. It contains information about the pollutant and the 
reduction goal; the period in which the program is applied; the program’s location; and the 
potential cost savings from using a permit market rather than, for example, a traditional 
CAC approach for achieving a given target level. The second variable is the target group. It 
contains information on who can take part in the trading; the number of sources; the 
concentration of permit holdings among sources; and the variation in marginal reduction 
costs. The third variable is labelled distribution rule. This variable defines how the permits 
are distributed. The fourth variable is that of trade rules. A trade rule is a restriction on trade 
that limits the property rights conveyed by a permit. Some trade rules may be necessary for 
reaching the defined target level and for ensuring that no ambient standards are violated 
while trade takes place, that is that ‘hot spots’ are not created. The fifth variable, connected 
to the trade rules, is labelled control system. The control system defines how the regulator 
intends to monitor and sanction violations of the rules. 
The target level is 50 % SO2 reduction of the 1980 level by the year 2000. Trade has been 
allowed since 1990 and the 50 % reduction is to take place with a two-step devaluation. In 
phase I, which started in 1995, ‘dirty’ utilities in the mid-west must reduce emissions to 
75 % of their 1985 level, and in phase II, which starts in the year 2000, these ‘dirty’ 
utilities, as well as the cleaner ones, must reduce emissions to 50 % of their 1985 level.33 
So, most of the trading can be expected in the year 2000, when a larger number of utilities 
will be significantly affected. 
The potential cost savings are massive. ICF (1989) concludes that trading will cut yearly 
reduction costs by about 30 %, compared to the costs for a CAC policy. Rico (1995) -
predicts that reduction costs will be lowered by 50 %. The latest estimates are even more 
optimistic. Burtraw and Swift (1996) indicate that if all potential trades take place, then the 
program will result in 70 % cost savings compared to CAC. 
As mentioned, the reduction will take place in two phases. Phase I started in 1995 and 
includes the dirtiest 111 SO2-emitters, those with greater than 100 MW net capacity and 
1985 emission rates equal to or exceeding 2.5 lb/mmBtu. In the year 2000, phase II will 
involve an additional 900 utilities with greater than 25 MW net capacity and 1985 SO2 
emission rates greater than 1.2 lb/mmBtu. In total, about 1000 electric utilities will be 
covered by the program after the year 2000. The 1000 plants are owned by roughly 200 
public, utility companies, which will be the trading partners in the market.  
                                                           
32.See Svendsen (1998a;1998c) concerning this analytical framework and for a total review of the 
US experiences on tradable permit systems. 
33.In actual numbers, Title IV of the Clean Air Act is designed to achieve a 10-million-ton annual 
SO2 reduction from 1980 levels by the year 2000. Of this reduction, 8.5 million tons are to come 
from electric utilities, GAO (1994:2). 
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It was an administrative and political decision to include in the trading program only 
electric utilities with a net capacity greater than 25 MW. The affected utilities emit about 
80 % of the total SO2 emission in the US, and they are already heavily regulated on the 
state level. The target group includes the main emitters and to incorporate smaller sources 
would be a difficult task for administrators. In addition to the target group, the ARP allows 
all other interested participants to take part in the market such as brokers, coal companies 
and environmental organisations. At a later stage, the EPA plans to additional large 
industrial polluters to ‘opt-in’ and take part in the market. The marginal reduction costs 
vary significantly among sources in the target group.34 
In starting up the market, the initial distribution rule is grandfathering. In this case, the basis 
for distribution is the historical use of fossil fuels in the period 1985–1987.35 By basing the 
distribution rule on fuel input, utilities that have recently invested in SO2 reduction are not 
punished by a relatively smaller allotment. If, for example, two utilities use the same 
amount of fuel, each of them will get the same number of SO2 permits even though one of 
them has installed a scrubber and, therefore, emits only half as much SO2. Variations in the 
use of fossil fuels are smoothed out by using an average over the three-year period, from 
1985 to 1987. 
The ARP ignores the risk of hot spots created by SO2 emissions. No ambient standards are 
expected to be violated for two reasons.  
First, total SO2 emission will be reduced by 50 % in a 10-year period (from 1990 to 2000). 
And, since damage from acid rain is due to cumulative emissions rather than the level of 
emissions in a given year, fluctuations will neutralise each other. Second, the older and 
“dirtier” utilities, which are primarily located in the west, have lower marginal reduction 
costs than do the newer and cleaner utilities in the east. One can therefore expect eastern 
utilities to buy permits from western utilities. Since the wind direction is west-to-east, this 
is likely to improve environmental quality in the eastern areas where the problem of acid 
rain is most acute and hot spots would otherwise be most likely to occur. 
Should an individual utility in the eastern zone want to sell permits, it may not be allowed 
to sell them to a source in the western zone because then the ambient standards in the 
eastern zone could be violated. For example, a utility in New York should not be allowed to 
reduce emissions and sell its permits to a utility in Ohio. Such trade could decrease the 
environmental quality in the eastern zone and perhaps violate the ambient standards in the 
Adirondacks, Canada, and other sensitive non-urban regions. 
In this hypothetical case, the State of New York has to make its own decisions, because the 
EPA will not review individual trades. States will still apply the most stringent technology-
based standards for new or modified sources and will prohibit new sources from 
circumventing the standards by trade. 
An extra ‘safety valve’ mechanism has been added to the ARP in order to stimulate the 
market and to prevent the market price from turning out to be so high that the market does 
not work. The US Congress has therefore created a special reserve pool in which 3 % of the 
total permit quota (approx. 300,000 permits) is withheld. Its purpose is to ensure easily 
accessible permits for new sources. This pool is distributed through direct sale at a fixed 
price and through an open auction. Direct sale includes up to 50,000 permits a year. The 
fixed price is $1500, or twice the expected equilibrium price in the market (EPA 1991). 
Surplus permits not sold are sold together with the remaining permits at a yearly auction to 
                                                           
34Svendsen (1998a; 1998c). 
35 The years 1985–1987 were thought to be three representative years without recessions.  
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the highest bidders. This auction mechanism is applied at the Chicago Board of Trade and 
is further discussed in Section 4.4 
Sources must themselves report the trades to the EPA, which only checks the aggregated 
annual figures. Because electric utilities are large and already heavily regulated units, it is 
furthermore possible to use a continuous emissions monitoring system (CEMS), which 
monitors both SO2 and CO2 emissions. All affected utilities must pay for and install the 
CEMS themselves. The cost of such a monitor is about $120,000 annually.36 The CEMS 
gives the EPA accurate data on tons emitted and makes it possible to run the ARP 
effectively from the federal level. 
The EPA has developed a computer-controlled bookkeeping system for this specific control 
task and has combined it with an efficient penalty system. If two electric utilities trade 
permits, they are obligated to inform the EPA, which then registers the transaction. If one 
of them has superseded its permit, a fine of $2000 per ton SO2 is assessed, and the extra 
tons emitted must be reduced the following year.37 
4.3 Market Results 
Permit market results are characterised by a set of five effect variables. The first variable is 
labelled trade activity. It contains the number of trades; the price generated by the market; 
and whether a high concentration of buyers or sellers poses a risk of incomplete 
competition and strategic behaviour. The second variable is cost savings. It contains 
information on the cost savings resulting from trade and the trade option compared to the 
situation without trade. The third variable is labelled innovation. It reveals dynamic 
information about market-stimulated innovation and investments in new reduction 
technology. The fourth variable is labelled transaction costs. It reveals how big the 
transaction cost are, that is the costs of ‘making market transactions.’ These may include 
costs such as bargaining costs, broker compensation, fees, the expense of collecting 
information relevant to the transaction, and the expense of finding a trade partner and 
acquiring administrative approval. The fifth variable is environmental impact. It indicates 
whether any impact can be measured at present, and, if so, whether any receptors are 
violated 
Through the end of 1999, over 9,300 transfers moving 81.5 million allowances were 
reported to the EPA. 62 % of these allowances (50.4 million) were transferred within 
organisations (internal trades). The remaining 31 million allowances (38 %) were 
transferred between organisations (external trades).38 
This market activity has succeeded in generating prices, see Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1 displays the supporting data for the SO2 Allowance Price Chart. Prices reported 
by the brokerage firms (Emissions Exchange and Cantor Fitzgerald) and the Fieldston 
Publications' market survey are rounded to the nearest whole dollar. 
Prices have fluctuated as discussed in the next two sections. At the moment (March 2000), 
price has stabilised at $136. A detailed comparison of market and spot auction prices is 
given below in Section 4.4. 
                                                           
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 EPA (2000): http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/ats/qlyupd.html 
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Table 4.1. SO2 Allowance Prices, US $ 
Month/
Year 
Emissi
ons  
Ex-
change 
Cantor 
Fitz-
gerald 
EBS 
Field-
ston 
Publica
tions 
Month/
Year 
Emissi
ons  
Ex-
change 
Cantor 
Fitz-
gerald 
EBS 
Field-
ston 
Publica
tions 
Month/
Year 
Cantor 
Fitz-
gerald 
EBS 
Field-
ston 
Publica
tions 
8/94 150  145 150        
9/94 150 147 150        
10/94  145 145 150        
11/94 145 144 145        
12/94 142 135 140        
1/95 141 138 137 1/97 97 97 96 1/99 208 206 
2/95 136 135 135 2/97  106 102 99 2/99 200 215 
3/95 133 133 133 3/97  115 110 111 3/99 210 217 
4/95 132 132 132 4/97 113 115 115 4/99 208 210 
5/95 132 132 132 5/97  94  98 100 5/99 212 211 
6/95 132 131 130 6/97 89 90 93 6/99 212 210 
7/95 130 130 130 7/97 87 88 90 7/99 211 198 
8/95 130  130 130 8/97 89 91 91 8/99 194 190 
9/95  127 126 128 9/97 101 104 92 9/99 189 187 
10/95 125 122 128 10/97 105 104 102 10/99 187 172 
11/95 119 117 120 11/97 104 107 110 11/99 167 161 
12/95 105  109 111 12/97 98 100 102 12/99 149 152 
1/96  92 95 98 1/98 96 98 98 1/00 138 136 
2/96  74 79 81 2/98 101 101 101 2/00 137 136 
3/96  70 69 83 3/98 104 113 105 3/00 136 136 
4/96 81 76 85 4/98 133 139 134    
5/96 79 79 84 5/98 140 148 138    
6/96  81 80 83 6/98 --  189 193    
7/96  82 81 82 7/98 --  197 188    
8/96 83 82 82 8/98 --  189 208    
9/96 88 87 86 9/98 --  169 177    
10/96 92  90 86 10/98 --  176 183    
11/96  91 92 92 11/98 --  189 194    
12/96 91 90 94 12/98 --  196 195    
Source: http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/ats/pricetbl.html  
Actual cost savings are estimated to be 40 % compared with CAC. The potential 70 % 
savings have not been realised yet, in particular because all external trades have not yet 
taken place.39 The incentive to minimise costs has grown stronger in recent years as a result 
of competitiveness in electricity production and strong pressure from consumers for lower 
prices.40 
Another indicator is the market price from March 2000 ($136). It is less than one-fifth the 
market price of $750 that EPA projected in 1991 (EPA 1991). The costs of participating in 
the program are thus much lower than expected. 
As Table 4.1 showed, market prices have dropped steadily in the last couple of years. This 
is primarily due to innovation. 
Market prices have dropped steadily due to innovation. Four main reasons may be listed. 
First, the emergence of low sulphur coal is a major low-cost option for compliance. Prices 
of low sulphur coal have dropped 40 % in real terms between 1983 and 1993 due to 
improvements in the productivity of surface mining. Second, a reduction in the cost of rail 
transport of low sulphur coal has lowered rates as much as 50 %. This is due to major 
investments in new infrastructure and to innovations. Third, the technology of blending low 
and high sulphur coal has been improved. Fourth, the costs of installing and maintaining a 
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40 See Svendsen (1995). 
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new scrubber have fallen by 50 % during the early nineties. Also other options such as 
energy conservation, efficiency management and electricity despatching have played a 
role.41 
Transaction costs are low because sources report their trades directly to the EPA, which 
only checks the aggregated annual figures. The only administrative requirement is that 
utilities must report in advance what they are going to do and must send in compliance 
plans in advance for every year. Also, the price signals from the annual SO2 auctions lower 
transaction costs. Brokerage fees lie around 5 % which, compared to other tradable permit 
systems in the US, is low. 
In 1995, phase I utilities emitted 40 % less than their permits allowed them to. This is a 
dramatic overcompliance that provides an opportunity for earlier ecological recovery.42 
This  extra reduction has probably taken place because utilities are risk averse and like to 
hold a reserve. No hot spots have been created by the program so far. 
4.4 Auction Results 
As mentioned above, a revenue-neutral auction is used to distribute about 2 % of the 
permits in circulation. The EPA SO2 auction is the first auction ever to be applied in 
environmental regulation. It will guide the design of future regulation such as CO2 
reduction within the US itself, Europe and worldwide, as discussed in the recent United 
Nations conference on climate change in Kyoto, Japan. Likewise, a European CO2 market 
could be linked to an auction for the reasons mentioned below which both aims to make the 
permit market work and to make the design politically attractive. 
The US Congress chose to use the auction as a mechanism to stimulate the SO2 market for 
two reasons. First, it ensures the availability of permits and makes it possible for new 
sources to buy their way into the market. Second, it gives a clear price signal for SO2 
permits to the market and may thereby reduce transaction costs. 
4.4.1 Revenue-Neutral Auction 
The notion of a revenue-neutral auction was first suggested by Hahn and Noll in 1982.43 In 
such an auction, all revenue is returned to the polluters according to a distribution rule. The 
distribution rule considered here is grandfathering. Every polluter gets its historical 
emission rights for free and must offer these rights (or some part of them) for sale in an 
auction. The political appeal of this system, compared to that of a traditional auction or a 
tax, is obvious: the revenue is refunded to all polluters participating in the program. All 
economic transactions take place among the polluters themselves. All interested parties 
may bid at the auction by specifying the number of permits they desire at each of the 
different prices. Potential buyers must in this way give the auctioneer their individual 
demand schedules for permits. 
Revenue-neutral auctions can be divided into two types: discriminative and non-
discriminative. The basic difference is that in a discriminative auction, there are several 
prices and the bidder pays what he bids, whereas in a non-discriminative auction, there is a 
                                                           
41 Klaassen and Nentjes (1997:399), Burtraw and Swift (1996:10419), Burtraw (1996) and GAO 
(1994:4). 
42 Burtraw and Swift (1996:10414). 
43 Svendsen (1998a) and Svendsen and Christensen (1999).  
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single price, that is, the bidder pays the minimum or clearing price. This difference has an 
important implication for the size of the revenue. The two types of auctions can be depicted 
graphically, as in Figure 4.1, which depicts the difference in revenue generated when 
bidders bid their true value. 
 
Source: Svendsen and Christensen (1999). 
Figure 4.1. Revenue in Non-Discriminative and Discriminative Auctions. 
 
Assume that q* of the permits in circulation are auctioned off. In a non-discriminative 
auction, the auctioneer will gather all individual bid-schedules and set the minimum price, 
p*, as the single-price equilibrium where the (revealed) aggregated demand schedule for 
permits, D, meets the inelastic supply schedule, S. Because all winning bids pay the 
equilibrium price, p*, total revenue from the non-discriminative auction is area A.44 
When the auction is revenue-neutral, all payments are refunded to the contributing pollu-
ters, so total payments equal exactly the total revenue. If authorities withdraw permits from 
the market for the auction, then sources will receive the revenue from the sale. Suppose a 
source offers 100 permits and that the auction price is $100 per permit, that source will then 
receive $10,000.45 
In contrast to the non-discriminative auction, a discriminative auction is multi-priced. The 
bidder pays what he bids, which allows the auctioneer to price-differentiate. If sources do 
not have any information about the expected equilibrium price, their bids will follow the 
demand curve, D. By this, revenue from the auction is maximised. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the extra revenue is illustrated by the triangle B. Revenue will be 
largest in the discriminative auction (A + B). In this case revenue will be returned to 
sources according to the average price, which is higher than the equilibrium price, p*. In 
this case revenue will be returned to sources according to the average price, which is higher 
than the equilibrium price, p*. 
                                                           
44 Each bidder pays the auctioneer p*qi , where qi is the number of permits demanded by the ith 
source. The collective payment is a summation of individual payments Σp* qi . 
45 Let q0i represent source i’s initial contribution of permits to the auction. Because q* represents 
both the total number of permits offered and the total number sold at the auction, it must be so that 
Σq0i = q*. Revenue is then returned in such a way that each polluter receives a payment equal to the 
market value of their initial contribution of permits at the auction, p* x q0i . If qi represents the 
number of permits purchased by source i at the auction, each bidder makes a net payment of (qi – q0i) 
p* to the auctioneer. If qi > q0i , the polluter is a net purchaser of permits and pays more than he 
receives. If qi < q0i, the polluter is a net seller and receives more than he pays. In sum, Σp*(qi – q 0i) 
= O. 
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In practice, the situation may differ from the hypothetical cases described above. Because 
only some of the permits are auctioned off, sources may have some knowledge from the 
permit market of what the expected equilibrium price will be. Therefore, they may bid in 
relation to their expectations rather than in relation to their marginal reduction costs. In both 
auction types, the bidders would then bid lower and attempt to get the permits cheaper than 
in the market, where it is always possible to buy.46 A ‘two-price’ signal to the market 
whereby the minimum and average prices differ is non-desirable because it raises 
transaction costs. The seller wants to sell at the average price, whereas the buyer wants to 
buy at the minimum. 
4.4.2 Empirical Results (spot auction performance) 
In the early market, buyers could not buy at the spot auction clearing price which was $131 
in 1993 and $150 in 1994. Information on market prices in 1993 and early 1994 is scarce, 
but all reported prices were above this level. The first price reported by the Emission 
Exchange Corporation in mid-1993 was $170, and their price remained at or slightly above 
this level until May 1994. The trade press also reported data on a few other private 
(bilateral) transactions in 1993, where prices spanned from $178 to $20547. 
Empirical evidence suggests the emergence of an efficient allowance market, obeying the 
law of one price, around the middle of 1994 (see Schmalensee et al., 1998). No single 
authorised registration of market prices for SO2 allowances takes place. Three private 
organisations have independently kept track of vintage prices on a monthly basis from mid-
1994: Cantor Fitzgerald, Emissions Exchange and Fieldston. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the relationship between the reported market prices in the auction 
month (March) and minimum prices at the auction. In calculating the grey, black and white 
columns are used the vintage prices reported by Cantor Fitzgerald, Emission Exchange and 
Fieldston respectively. The applied market price in March 1993 and March 1994 is the 
$170 reported by the Emission Exchange. This is probably a rough estimate, since 
information was scarce. With respect to the data from 1999 the latest published market 
prices were used, namely the February prices reported by Cantor Fitzgerald and Fieldston 
(see Table 4.1 above).48 
                                                           
46 Vickrey (1961). 
47 Svendsen and Christensen (1999). 
48 Christensen and Svendsen (1999). 
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Source: Christensen and Svendsen (1999). 
Figure 4.2. How much market prices exceeded minimum prices at the auction (in percent). 
Figure 4.2 shows that in the auctions of 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 there was 
practically no difference between market and auction spot minimum prices. Two qualitative 
remarks should be made. First, In March 1996 Fieldston did report a significantly higher 
market price than the two others. This was at a time where the permit price had reached a 
historically low level, so in absolute terms the difference is not that large. Fieldston 
reported $83 whereas Cantor Fitzgerald and Emission Exhange reported $69 and $70 
respectively. Second, In March 1998 the inverse relationship emerged: the spot auction 
clearing price was above the market price. In 1998 two buyers, Cantor Fitzgerald and the 
Allowance Holding Coorperation, won 99.98 % of the total spot auction sale. The Cantor 
Fitzgerald share of totals was 73.33 % and as a matter of fact they bought it at prices which 
have later proven to be quite a bargain. The 1999 spot auction clearing price exceeds the 
1998 spot auction clearing price by almost an order of magnitude: it was $115 in 1998 and 
$201 in 1999. 49 
In March 1998 Cantor Fitzgerald also did report a vintage price which was some 8 % above 
the vintage prices reported by Fieldston and Emissions Exchange, and Cantor Fitzgeralds 
winning bids at the auction was very close to their own reported vintage price. Perhaps 
Cantor Fitzgerald was simply better at foreseeing that prices would tend to rise. An 
alternative interpretation is that Cantor Fitzgerald bought the permits as part of a strategy to 
rise prices by dominating the market. This does not seem likely, since the auction is now 
only a small part of a huge market. 
The relationship between average prices paid at the spot auction and minimum prices paid 
at the spot auction is illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
                                                           
49 Ibid. 
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Source: Christensen and Svendsen (1999). 
Figure 4.3. How much average prices at the auction exceeded minimum prices at the 
auction (%). 
It is remarkable how similar the pattern in Figure 4.3 is to the pattern in Figure 4.2. The 
figures show that in the early years of 1993 and 1994 the market price and the average price 
both exceeded the minimum price by some 10 –20 %, and since 1995 there has been hardly 
any difference between the minimum price, the average price and the market price. From 
1995 and onwards the similarity of patterns is the result of a strong clustering of bids at the 
auction around the prevailing outside market price. From mid-1994 the traded volume on 
the market escalated, see e.g. Joskow et al. (1998, p.677), so that by March 1995 the 
auction price was more or less determined by the outside market price, and should as such 
not be interpreted as a price signal.  
So, in the important starting phase, a non-discriminative auction would probably have 
generated more ‘correct’ price signals. If the auction mechanism is to be used, e.g. in a US 
or European CO2 market, the recommendation is to use a non-discriminative design (single-
priced design). This solution may be a politically plausible way to secure that new sources 
can enter the market and to give a single price signal to a CO2 market in the important 
starting phase.  
4.5 Property Rights 
Finally, property rights to the permits must be fully transferred to make the market work. 
Utilities are fully allowed to bank permits, to shut down plants and use the related permits, 
and to take each of these actions without individual approval. Furthermore, the CEMS 
control system in the ARP makes it possible to enforce property rights clearly. 
However, the risk of sudden regulatory intervention is present in the ARP. Permits may be 
confiscated without compensation or may be devaluated without notice. Note that the 
distributed permits do not represent a permanent right. A permit gives the right to emit one 
ton per year and is subject to renewal every year by the regulator. 
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Clean Air Act states clearly that the EPA or the Congress is authorised to terminate or limit 
the use of permits without compensation.50 Such regulatory uncertainty connected to the 
future value of the permits is difficult to quantify and incorporate in the permit price. A 
critical concern then is whether the electric utilities have the full property right to dispose of 
the SO2 permits. If not, the future value of the permits will become uncertain and utilities 
will then hesitate to participate. In other words, the question is whether authorities will tend 
to use the constitutional right to confiscate permits in practice. Arbitrary regulatory 
interventions are not likely to occur in the near future for two reasons. First, even though 
authorities reserve the right to formalise the property right of the permits, it seems unlikely 
that unannounced confiscations will take place in the short and well-defined devaluation 
period, given that both environmentalists and utilities have approved the program.51 
Second, the influential and well-organised utilities will resist permit confiscation, and so 
will any other holder of permits, for example, speculators. In general, the favourable 
political climate, the definition of a devaluation period, and the absence of significant trade 
restrictions all suggest that electric utilities in practice may gain the full property rights of 
the grandfathered SO2 permits. 
However, administrative matters for dealing with the property rights from the gains from 
trade are not settled yet. The Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) must settle administrative 
practice rules for determining how to treat costs and revenues from trade as soon as 
possible. There is one PUC in each state and the 50 PUCs are organised under the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The FERC has not settled the rules yet. This 
uncertainty inhibits trade because the PUCs are waiting for utilities to trade, whereas the 
utilities are waiting for the PUCs to describe how their costs and revenues will be treated.52  
4.6 Conclusion 
The results of the assessment are summarised in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Acid Rain Program  
Market Results  
Trade Activity High. Through the end of 1999 over 9,300 transfers  (81.5million 
allowances where 62 % were internal and 38 % were external trades). 
Market price per ton SO2: $136 (March 2000). 
Cost savings 40 % compared to CAC. Market price in March 2000 about five 
times lower than expected. 
Innovation High 
Transaction costs  Low 
Environmental effect  40 % overcompliance in 1995. No hot spots and environmental 
improvement. 
 
The overall conclusion is that the US Acid Rain Program (ARP) has performed well. A 
competitive market structure and auction mechanism have succeeded in generating 
extensive trade activity and prices. Property rights to permits have been well-defined and 
well-enforced and transaction costs are low.  
The main reason for low transaction costs in the ARP is the fact that this program ignores 
source location and the risk of creating hot spots by trade. Individual administrative control 
                                                           
50. Clean Air Act of 1990, Title IV, §403(f). 
51. Svendsen (1998a; 1998c). 
52. Ibid. 
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procedures for each trade were unnecessary because of favourable geographical and 
meteorological conditions and the 50 % SO2 reduction. This new policy design is therefore 
recommendable for future environmental regulation, especially for cases in which source 
location may be ignored.  
The annual SO2 auction also lowered transaction costs. Empirical evidence from the early 
years showed that the minimum (i.e., the clearing) price at the auctions was approximately 
10 % lower than the outside market price which was approximately equal to the average 
price paid at the auctions. Since 1995, however, the minimum price seems to be determined 
by the outside market price. The winning bids at the auction are clustered around the 
outside market price, implying that the average price paid is only slightly higher than the 
minimum price. Therefore, the auction has by now been made superfluous by the market. 
However, if there is a risk that the market should break down in the future, running the 
auction is still justified. 
An important purpose of the auction was to “kick-start” the market by delivering a price 
signal to the market. In the early years a non-discriminative design would have yielded a 
single price signal which the discriminative design did not. And in the later years the 
market has been well functioning, so there has been no need for a price signal. Therefore, 
the policy recommendation is that the non-discriminative SO2 auction is a very useful tool 
for lowering transaction costs and kick-starting an immature market. As such, it should be 
applied by policy makers, for example, when establishing future CO2 markets. 
In the EU, a potential CO2 market for electric utilities, matching the design of the ARP, has 
not yet been described. This it what we will try to do in the next chapter.  
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5 A qualitative evaluation of a CO2 permit 
market for the EU power sector 
5.1 Introduction 
The European Community and its Member States will upon ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol legally bind themselves to the reduction of the basket of six greenhouse gases. For 
the EU this requires the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 8 % below 1990 levels in 
the commitment period 2008 to 2012. As mentioned earlier, the EU has agreed on a Burden 
Sharing Agreement that reallocates this obligation between the Member States through the 
provisions of Article 4 in the Kyoto Protocol. Given that there is no global authority to 
regulate the utilisation of the atmosphere, the possible role of the EU as the only 
international organisation that has signed the Kyoto Protocol is important to examine in this 
respect. 
Furthermore, the EU has adopted a position that seems to acknowledge that the developed 
world does have a certain responsibility to reduce its own emissions, by suggesting that 
there should be a concrete ceiling on international emissions trading. The extent to which 
the developed countries will be able to buy their way out of their emissions obligations via 
cheap imports of permits from developing countries will therefore be limited. Again, this 
will force up the cost of reducing CO2 emissions within the EU all things being equal, 
which may run counter to matters concerning the competitiveness of the EU industry. 
Therefore, it is necessary to exploit all low-cost opportunities for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions within the EU.  
Indeed, the goal must be to establish a common regulatory system that will equalise 
marginal reduction costs across all Member countries if not globally. In the actual process 
of getting such a system underway, however, it is necessary to consider a whole range of 
economical and political issues. We would like to establish whether or not the electricity 
sector is a suitable starting point for a tradable greenhouse gas permit market in the EU and 
also how such a market most suitably can be formed. Obviously, an initial trading scheme 
for the electricity sector should be constructed in such a way that the geographical and 
sectoral scope can easily be expanded. 
Section 5.2 will start out by highlighting the climate change challenge in the EU and 
discuss whether or not CO2 emissions are a sensible starting point for a market for 
emissions trading. We then move on to consider how CO2 emissions can most effectively 
be capped. Specifically, we look at the different virtues of an “upstream” permit system and 
a “downstream” system. In Section 5.3 we then turn our attention to the political economy 
of a CO2 permit market. Here we will use a public choice framework to analyse some of the 
political conflicts and difficulties by presenting the viewpoints of different stakeholders and 
taking into account their respective possibility to influence the political process. Section 5.4 
discusses how the design of a CO2 permit market for the power sector can most suitably be 
formulated. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes. 
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5.2 Climate Change in the EU: The nature of the problem 
It is useful to distinguish between the greenhouse gases that are related to energy 
consumption and the ones that are not. The most important impacts of energy on climate 
change are emissions of CO2, which are entirely energy related and, to a much lesser 
degree, of other greenhouse gases, such as methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), which 
also have important non-energy sources such as agriculture and industry. The other 
greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto protocol (Hydrofluorcarbons (HFCs), 
Perfluorcarbons (PFCs), Sulphur hexafloride (SF6)) are not related to energy use as such 
(European Commission, 1998). 
A tradable CO2 permit scheme must first and foremost be seen in an energy policy context, 
because the implementation of such a scheme influences deeply on other targets for energy 
policy such as security of supply and competitiveness. Furthermore, the implementation of 
such a scheme will entail a profound redistribution of resources in society in general, which 
needs to be considered.  
Ideally, the coverage of emission sources and gases must be complete in order to assure that 
all low-cost opportunities for reduction are included. However, there are a number of 
factors that point to an emission-trading scheme covering only CO2 emissions from the 
power and steam sector as being a sensible starting point, including: 
• CO2 emissions are by far the largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and will 
remain so for any foreseeable future; 
• CO2 emissions stems almost entirely from fossil fuel use, which is most easily 
monitored; 
• Many low-cost CO2 emission reduction opportunities are within the power sector. 
In turn, we will now turn our attention to these three issues. 
5.2.1 Contribution of CO2 to greenhouse gas emissions 
Several analyses have been made on estimating the “business as usual” greenhouse gas 
emissions in the future. In Table 5.1 we have presented the data from The Shared Analysis 
Project, Vol.11. The data for 1990 and 2010 in this study is mainly derived from the Second 
National Communications of the Member States and the EU to the UNFCCC. The 
projection of emissions in 2010 is derived from the “with measures scenario” proposed in 
the national communications. The “With measures scenario” describes the development of 
GHG emissions assuming no additional changes of present policies, i.e. assuming that the 
measures decided by the Member States until mid-1997 will be executed53.  
                                                           
53 For further elaboration of assumptions and methodology we refer to the Shared Analysis Project, 
Vol.11. 
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Table 5.1: Expected development of Greenhouse Gas emissions, 1990-2010.  
Mt CO2 
equivalent CO2 CH4 N2O 
Total 
halogenated 
gases 
All GHG 
 1990 2010 1990 2010 1990 2010 1995 2010 1990/95 2010 
EU-15 3365 3507 481 355 383 315 64 90 4292 4267 
Target 3190 (-5.2 %) 355 (-26 %) 315 (-17.6 %) 90 (+40 %) 3949 (-8.2 %) 
Source: The Shared Analysis Project, Vol. 11.  
As can be seen from Table 5.1, the total emissions in the European Union (EU-15) from the 
basket of 6 gases amounted to approximately 4.292 Mt CO2 equivalence in 1990/1995 
(1995 is used for HFC, PFC and SF6) and is expected to fall to 4.267 Mt CO2 equivalence 
in 2010. The main reason for this is that emissions of methane and nitrous oxides are 
expected to fall by 26 % and 17.6 % respectively, due to a number of “no-regret” options 
for these gases. It should be noted, that some of these options are considered “no-regret” 
from a greenhouse gas policy perspective because they are not motivated by climate 
protection policy but by other policies such as waste reductions policies. 
The uncertainties involved in such an analysis are very large, however. As an example, a 
study by (Coherence, 1998) projects a CH4 emissions reduction in the EU-15 by only 8 % 
between 1990 and 2010. Another study by (Ecofys, 1998) is mainly supportive of the 
reductions of methane emissions found in this study but emissions of nitrous oxides are 
projected to increase by 13 % compared to the 1990-level54. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that non-anthropogenic sources of methane and nitrous oxide have a significant 
contribution to total emissions, by over 28 % and 32 % of the total emissions respectively 
(Ecofys, 1998). 
The emissions of CO2 are expected to increase its share from 78 % to 82 % in 2010, which 
clearly illustrates the importance of CO2 emissions in the future. 
Furthermore, The Shared Analysis Project, Vol. 11 highlights the fact that cheap emissions 
reduction opportunities of other greenhouse gases are likely to reduce the CO2 emissions 
reductions that are necessary to comply with the Kyoto Protocol (the study suggests a 5.2 % 
reduction of CO2 compared to the 1990-level). In other words, a uniform reduction of all 
greenhouse gases is not likely to lead to a least-cost response.  
About 95 % of all CO2 were energy related in 1990. The total level of energy related 
greenhouse gas emissions amounted to 3.220 Mt CO2 equivalent, of which 3.068 Mt was 
CO2. Methane is the second energy related greenhouse gas accounting for 108 Mt CO2 
equivalent, while N2O accounted for 43 Mt (The European Commission, 1998). 
In fact, energy-related CO2 emissions contributed around 75 % to total GHG emissions in 
the EU in 1990. To get an idea of how the sectoral distribution of energy related CO2 
emissions are expected to develop, it is useful to look at another undertaken by the 
European Commission (Shared Analysis Project, 1999, Vol. 5). As before, the baseline 
projection of CO2 emissions is meant to illustrate how greenhouse gas emissions would 
develop if no specific policy to control emissions were undertaken (a so-called “business-
as-usual” scenario). This requires a whole range of assumptions about how the economy 
                                                           
54 The differences are mainly due to different projections of Nitrous Oxides emissions from car 
catalysts. The study by (Ecofys, 1998) also includes a baseline where current technical available 
measures are implemented (at very low cost), which will reduce emissions of Nitrous Oxides by 
18 % in 2010 compared to 1990.  
Chapter 5. EU model: A qualitative evaluation of a CO2 permit market 
82 Risø-R-1184 (EN) 
 
evolves, since the carbon intensity of an economy at any particular time reflects the 
interaction of technology, social structures and relative prices. The results of the baseline 
analysis are based on the following main assumptions55:  
• The liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets will proceed in line with EC 
directives and is assumed to fully develop in the second half of the first decade; 
• The restructuring is enabled by mature gas-based power generation technologies that 
are efficient, involve low capital costs and are flexible regarding plant size, co-
generation and independent power production. 
• No new policy measures will be undertaken in order to meet the Kyoto commitments; 
• Energy policies that aim to promote renewable energy (wind, small hydro, solar energy, 
biomass and waste) are assumed to continue, involving subsidisation of capital cost and 
preferential electricity selling prices; 
• On-going infrastructure projects in some Member States involving the introduction of 
natural gas are assumed to gain full maturity in the first half of the first decade after 
year 2000; 
• Electricity generation investments are determined on the basis of long run marginal 
costs. Furthermore, countries like Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal 
remain non-nuclear countries. Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and 
United Kingdom do not further expand their nuclear capacity. Finally, for France and 
Belgium the assumption of further nuclear expansion, on the basis of economic criteria, 
is adopted beyond 2010. The lifetime of nuclear power stations is assumed to be as long 
as 40 years. 
• Fuel price assumption based on the Poles model (see Table 7.3.) 
The baseline analysis results in the following development in CO2 emissions (see Figure 
5.1). 
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Figure 5.1: CO2 emissions under baseline scenario, EU-15. 
                                                           
55 For a more comprehensive coverage of assumptions we refer to The Shared Analysis Project, 
1999. 
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This scenario results in 3298 mill. tonnes of energy-related CO2 emissions in the year 2010. 
If we assume a uniform reduction of all greenhouse gases, which means that emission of 
CO2 has to be reduced by 8 % compared to the 1990 level, the average yearly CO2 
emissions exceed the limit by some 468 Mt (taking the year 2010 to be indicative of the 
whole period 2008-2012). In other words, the CO2 emissions have risen by 7.6 % in 2010 
from the 1990 level compared to a reduction by 8 % that is required by the Kyoto Protocol. 
Of course, if other greenhouse gases can be cost effectively reduced by more than 8 %, the 
required reduction of CO2 will be less than 8 % but most certainly an increase in CO2 
emissions is not compatible with the Kyoto target. In fact, if we take the baseline level of 
CO2 emissions using the Primes model and combine it with the greenhouse gas reduction 
potentials in the Shared Analysis Project, Vol. 11, the cost-effective reduction of CO2 is 
suggested to equal a 6.2 % reduction of CO2 emissions in 2010 compared to 1990 levels56. 
It is clear that extraordinary measures will need to be implemented and a “business as 
usual” approach is no longer sufficient. Interestingly, the CO2 emissions have actually 
fallen from 1990 to 1995 due to an economic setback in the EU and some fuel switching, 
which illustrates that the link between economic growth and CO2 emissions is still very 
strong.  
The foregoing figure also shows that the transport sector is critical in the short term. The 
transport sector (road and air) is currently the fastest growing sector in the majority of the 
EU economies and also the fastest growing contributor to CO2 emissions. The growth in 
CO2 emissions from the transport sector is expected to be reversed over time (after 2015) 
due to improvement in energy intensity and a shifting of economic activity towards the 
service sector and high value added manufacturing activities, which tends to be less freight 
intensive. In the longer term (after 2010) production of electricity and steam is expected to 
be the fastest growing contributor to CO2 emissions due to decommissioning of nuclear 
plants and increasing use of electricity in most sectors of developed economies. Overall, the 
link between economic growth and CO2 emissions is expected to become weaker. 
In conclusion, CO2 is expected to remain by far the most important contributor to the 
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The power and steam sector is 
expected to be a significant contributor of CO2 emissions in the future (about 37 % in the 
year 2010), however, measures to control emissions of CO2 cannot be confined to the 
power and steam sector only. 
5.2.2 Monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions 
With regard to the monitoring of emissions, it was mentioned that emissions stemming 
from fossil fuel use is most easily monitored. The following Table 5.2 illustrates the 
different origins of the various greenhouse gases: 
                                                           
56 As noted in Vol. 11, the level of baseline emissions of CO2 are lower than in the baseline level of 
emissions based on the Primes model (Vol.5), due to the fact that the baseline level of emissions in 
Vol.11 includes measures decided up to the Kyoto Conference.  
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Table 5.2. Greenhouse gas emissions – different source categories 
 CO2 CH4 N2O PFCs HFCs SF6 
Fossil carbon:       
- Combustion X X X    
- Diffuse emissions X X X    
- Feedstock X X X    
By-product emissions X X X X X  
Consumption of chemicals   X X X X 
Biological processes:       
- Landfills  X     
- Agriculture  X X    
- Forests X      
Source: Audun Rosland, Norwegian Control Authority (SFT). 
Only emissions of CO2 are almost entirely energy related57, while other energy related 
greenhouse gases (methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O)) have important non-energy 
sources like agriculture and industry. As it turns out, this makes CO2 an excellent starting 
point for an emissions trading scheme, because the uncertainties involved in the 
measurement of CO2 are considerably lower than with the other greenhouse gases, which 
can be seen from the following Table 5.3: 
Table 5.3: Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Roughly estimated uncertainty level 
CO2 ± 1-5 % 
CH4 ± 30-60 % 
N2O ± 30-100 % 
HFCs ± 10 % 1) 
PFCs - 30 %, + 50 % 
SF6 ± 5 % 
1) Based on consumption (potential emissions). The data for the real HFC emissions are far more 
uncertain. 
Source: Audun Rosland, Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT). 
Of course, it is not clear from the outset how much uncertainty can be handled in a permit 
market. However, since the value of tradable permits is intrinsically linked to the credibility 
of the whole system it seems sensible to start with a system that is fairly simple to monitor. 
5.2.3 Options for CO2 reduction 
It is well known that many low cost opportunities for reducing CO2 emissions are present in 
the power sector. At present there do not exist any well-defined “end-of-pipe” investment 
opportunities with respect to the reductions of CO2 emissions. This reduces the 
opportunities for CO2 emissions reductions in the medium term to the following areas: 
                                                           
57 Of course, increasing forest growth will increase the CO2 uptake over a period of time. However, 
seen over the whole lifecycle of the forest there is no effect on CO2. 
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• Reducing the use of fossil fuels with high carbon content 
• Fostering the alternatives, i.e. renewables and more energy efficient technologies. 
• Adapting the overall energy system, including the reduction in energy demand through 
behavioural changes. 
The first two points relate to the supply-side. The IPCC emission factors for the main fuels 
used are 94.14 kg of CO2/GJ for hard coal, 72.6 kg of CO2/GJ for crude oil and 55.8 kg of 
CO2/GJ for natural gas. This means that the proportion between the carbon intensity of gas 
and that of coal is less than 1:2. Keeping the US experience with the US Acid Rain 
Program in mind, it is worth noting that the same proportion with regard to SO2 emissions 
is of the order 1:100. This means that the effect of fuel substitution is more limited with 
regard to CO2 emissions, although still of significant magnitude. In sum, the crucial 
differences between the most common emissions from burning fossil fuel is: 
• Difference in emission intensity between gas and coal 
• SO2: 1 to 100  
• NOx: 1 to 10 
• CO2: 1 to 2 
• Combustion controls (the percentages are indicative)  
• SO2: 98 % reduction 
• NOx: 90 % reduction 
• CO2: no option currently available. 
Due to the lack of viable “end-of-pipe” solutions for the reduction of CO2, the ability of a 
Member State to stabilise CO2 emissions through the reduction of fossil fuels depends on its 
economic and energy structure in the base year (1990). The dependency on fossil fuels in 
different sectors can be seen from the following Table 5.4 
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Table 5.4: Carbon intensity (tn of CO2/toe) in different sectors across EU countries, 1990. 
 
Total 
Public 
Thermal 
Power 
Generation 
Autoprod. 
Ther. Power 
Generation
Energy 
Branch Industry Transport 
Tertiary-
Domestic 
Austria 2.1 3.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.8 1.4 
Belgium 2.2 3.5 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.9 2.2 
Denmark 2.9 3.6  2.0 2.0 3.0 1.2 
Finland 1.8 3.7 1.0 1.8 1.4 2.9 1.1 
France 1.6 3.4 3.6 1.8 2.2 2.9 1.7 
Germany 2.7 3.9 3.5 1.7 2.3 2.9 2.2 
Greece 3.1 4.0 2.8 1.9 2.4 3.0 1.5 
Ireland 3.0 3.5 3.4 1.4 2.5 3.0 2.8 
Italy 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.9 1.9 
Luxembourg 3.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 3.3 3.0 2.2 
Netherlands 2.3 3.1 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.9 2.0 
Portugal 2.3 3.6 1.8 2.3 2.0 3.0 1.0 
Spain 2.3 3.9 3.0 2.4 2.1 2.9 1.5 
Sweden 1.1 2.6 0.5 0.9 1.0 2.8 0.9 
United Kingdom 2.7 3.8 3.2 2.2 2.3 2.9 2.0 
Source: Eurostat, 1997 
Of course, there are notable differences in the size of public thermal power generation 
between the individual Member States, which do not show up in this table. However, it is 
clear that public thermal power generation is overall most dependent on fossil fuels with a 
high carbon content (coal) followed by transport (oil). On the face of it, this will make fuel 
switching in the power sector a very likely option for reduction of CO2. 
Also, the scope for improving energy efficiency and reducing emissions are greater in the 
energy intensive sectors (power, metals, building materials, paper etc.) than the labour 
intensive sectors (e.g. electronics, services). The power sector in particular can have a 
potentially big impact through the penetration of renewable energies like wind, solar, 
biomass etc. and increased use of combined heat and power plants (CHP plants). 
As, an illustration of the importance of the power and steam sector, we will use a recent 
study by (Capros and Mantzos, 1999) using the Primes model. For an elaboration of the 
methodology we refer to Appendix B. The Primes model allows the construction of 
marginal CO2 abatement cost curves for individual sectors. In the figure below, the 
marginal abatement costs in the power and steam sector is compared with the marginal 
abatement costs in all sectors taken together. Clearly, a lot of low cost opportunities exist in 
the power and steam sector (mainly fuel switching) and the two marginal abatement cost 
curves show an almost identical path up till about 50 Mt of avoided CO2 emissions. 
However, the figure also illustrates that forcing a lot of emissions reductions on the 
electricity and steam sector without taking similar measures towards other sectors is not a 
good solution.  
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Source: Capros and Mantzos, 1999. 
Figure 5.2. Marginal abatement cost curves for CO2. 
In summary, focusing on CO2 emissions seems to be a sensible starting point for an 
emission-trading scheme. Naturally, opportunities for reducing emissions of the other 
greenhouse gases need to be exploited as well, but this could be done by other policy 
measures. The question remains, however, what type of emissions trading system can most 
effectively capture CO2 emissions. 
5.2.4 Upstream vs. downstream systems 
An emission trading system can be designed either as an upstream or a downstream system. 
An upstream system will target fossil fuel producers and importers as regulated entities, so 
it would reduce the number of allowance holders to: oil refineries and importers, gas 
pipelines, LNG plants, coal mines and processing plants (Zhang, 1999). In this way, an 
upstream system catches all fossil fuels going into the economy. A downstream system on 
the other hand, will target those entities that actually burn the fuels and emit CO2 into the 
atmosphere. This includes all sectors in society where notably the household and transport 
sectors include a vast number of emitters. 
Generally, to be most efficient environmental policy needs to be focused directly on the 
unwanted ‘bad’, the emissions. The proponents of an ‘upstream’ system argue, however, 
that this argument does not apply to CO2, at least not until such time as technology for 
large-scale ‘scrubbing’ and storage of waste CO2 become economical. In the absence of 
such technology, there is approximately a one-to-one correspondence between the carbon 
content of fossil fuels going into combustion and the CO2 emitted. This means that it is 
possible to regulate CO2 emissions by limiting fossil fuel use, which is why an ‘upstream’ 
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system that catches all fossil fuels that enter the economy should be preferred (Fischer et 
al., 1998). 
In other words, it seems that effective price incentives for producers or consumers to alter 
their behaviour throughout the economy can be reached by using an upstream system. This 
argument hinges on one very crucial assumption, though. The product and factor markets 
need to be reasonably competitive in order for an upstream system to have the same 
ultimate effects on fossil fuel and other prices as a downstream system (Fischer et al., 
1998). The ongoing restructuring of the electricity and gas markets in the EU could work in 
this direction, but the very uneven implementation of the liberalisation directive can by no 
means guarantee this. Secondly, it can also be questioned whether or not indirect price 
incentives are sufficient to produce a least-cost response. In a static and perfectly 
competitive world an upstream system can provide a least-cost-response. As noted by 
(CCAP, 1998), however, if it is believed that direct incentives are a necessary adjunct to 
indirect price signals to stimulate innovation, a downstream approach would have appeal. 
Specifically, a downstream system including the electricity sector would target the sector 
with the best chances of coming up with a successful “end-of-pipe” solution to the 
reduction of CO2 emissions.  
That said, the case for an upstream system remains a strong one. A downstream system will 
need to target a whole range of sectors, which contain too many small sources to be suitable 
for an emission-trading program. In other words, the administrative burden using a 
downstream system will put an upper limit on how many sectors can be included. Needless 
to say, that some sectors would need to be targeted through the use of other policy 
instruments, which greatly increases the possibility of sources ‘leaking’ from the system.  
As we shall see, the major challenge to the upstream system is political. The simplicity and 
transparency of the system, which really are its best features, can prove to be an 
insurmountable political hurdle.  
5.2.5 Cost incidence of CO2 permits 
A CO2 permit scheme, regardless of whether a downstream or an upstream system is 
chosen, will raise the costs of carbon-intensive products. The costs borne by sources 
included in the permit market can be pushed forward to consumers via higher prices or 
backwards to inputs of production via lower workers wages, capital losses and lower 
energy prices58. In this way, a CO2 permit scheme is broadly consistent with the principle of 
polluter pays. Sectors with a high dependency on carbon intensive inputs coupled with 
large irreversible capital investments (i.e., sectors that are big polluters and where it is 
costly to reduce pollution) are likely to suffer more. In general, the extent to which the costs 
borne by market participants can be pushed on depends on the short and long run slopes of 
supply and demand curves (Kerr and Cramton, 1998). 
Much of the debate on emissions trading concerns the issue of transferring the ownership of 
the atmosphere from the Commons to private parties. In fact, ownership is being transferred 
from the Commons to either the taxpayer, under taxes and auctions, or to the recipients of 
grandfathered permits.  
The initial allocation of allowances to private parties involves the privatisation of a 
common right, namely the right to emit CO2 into the atmosphere. In this respect, 
grandfathering can be seen as giving rise to serious distributional problems. Before any 
                                                           
58 Of course, in case of an ‘upstream’ system, the only way that costs can be pushed backwards is to 
workers and owners of capital since energy is the output. 
Chapter 5. EU model: A qualitative evaluation of a CO2 permit market 
Risø-R-1184 (EN) 89 
 
legal provision for the limitation of CO2 emissions has entered into effect, anybody has the 
right to emit CO2 into the atmosphere. If total CO2 emissions are now to be restricted and 
allocated by means of grandfathering, then the scarcity-induced profits will accrue only to 
those that made use of their right to emit CO2 in the past, and not to those that held the 
same rights but simply did not make use of it (Schneider and Wagner, 1998). That is to say, 
the wealth effects of changing the ownership of the atmosphere only benefit the capital 
owners.  
The introduction of a CO2 permits market will inevitably put a price tag on CO2 emissions. 
This price tag might show the price zero if the ‘business-as-usual’ emissions are lower than 
the total amount of permits but otherwise this introduction will entail a positive price on 
CO2 emissions.  What this means is that CO2 permits will now serve as an input (cost) to 
production in line with other input factors such as labour and capital. As noted by (Kerr and 
Cramton, 1998), this will have distributional effects through the whole of society that 
consist of two parts, the effect that arises through changes in prices and returns to factors, 
and the wealth effects of changing ownership of resource.  
The changes in prices and returns to factors are the same no matter what distributional 
principle is used, i.e. whether auctions or grandfathering is being used. Using 
grandfathering will however transfer some ownership of the atmosphere to the companies 
that are awarded the permits. In this way, the stockholders in the power sector will get 
relatively wealthier if permits are grandfathered to the power sector. Of course, the 
introduction of the carbon regulation will have a negative impact on the value of the rest of 
the company’s assets, since capital investments in fossil fuel plants are largely sunk. So, 
giving away the permits for free is a way to compensate these stockholders.  
The point is, however, that these stockholders are not the only ones that will be affected, 
since the costs borne by sources included in the permit market can be pushed backwards 
and forwards in the economy. As noted, the extent to which this will happen depends on the 
supply and demand conditions in general, so it is not immediately clear that the regulated 
sources will be the most adversely affected.  
The slope of the demand curve for electricity depends upon how sensitive demand is to 
changes in electricity prices, also known as the price-elasticity of consumers. So, the 
question is what influences on the price-elasticity of consumers. Consumers do not demand 
electricity as such but rather they demand the derived services from using electrical energy. 
Naturally, some customers will be more inclined to move or substitute their consumption of 
electricity as a result of relative price changes than will other consumers. The main factors 
that determine the size of the price-elasticity of the individual consumer are the presence of 
relevant substitutes to electricity (the substitutional effect) and the overall impact that the 
cost of electricity has on the budget of the consumer (the income effect). Electricity used 
for heating have relatively close substitutes, which ceteris paribus will lead to a more price-
elastic demand. Postponing the consumption of electricity to another time of the day, e.g. at 
night, is also a substitute for consumption now, which especially some firms may find 
advantageous. The income effect is of much greater importance for firms compared to 
households, which will also result in a larger price-elasticity for companies. Not 
surprisingly, estimates of the price sensitivity of demand vary depending on the region, 
country, time of year and type of customer, but in general, suggest that if prices rise by, say, 
10-15 % as a result of CO2 regulation, demand could decrease by anywhere from 1 % to 
6 % or more in response to that price change. 
Undoubtedly, part of the cost impact on a company that owns fossil fuelled power plants 
can be offset via higher electricity prices. This will, however, strongly depend on the actual 
location of the power plant. In the following figure we have tried to illustrate the possible 
ways that costs are channelled upstream and downstream in the economy. 
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Figure 5.3: Likely cost incidence of a CO2 permits market 
In the longer run, this could mean that households are likely to pay a higher price premium. 
However, since household energy consumption is less carbon intensive than many 
industrial processes the overall cost burden will be larger for these industries especially in 
the short run. None of these sectors will be compensated if the CO2 permits are awarded 
gratis to the power companies. An auction, on the other hand, could potentially redistribute 
the funds in a much more flexible way. 
The possible alternatives that these consumers are presented with will depend upon the way 
the liberalisation process of the electricity sector moves ahead. Clearly, there are still some 
noticeable differences in the way the individual Member states have chosen to implement 
the Liberalisation Directive. First of all, there are still large distinctions between the speed 
and extent of the liberalisation process. As concluded in (Shared Analysis Project, Vol. 8), 
there are generally two different paths in implementing the EU directive: 
• A first group of countries (UK, Finland, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
Netherlands), of course led by the countries that liberalised their electricity market 
before the Directive, is allowing all or a major part of the final consumers to become 
free of choosing their supplier. 
• A second group of countries (France, Italy, Portugal, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland 
and Luxembourg is allowing a share of eligible consumers that is near the minimum 
threshold required by the EU 
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The second group of countries is also to a much larger extent dominated by the former 
regulated monopolies. The differences can persist for many years to come.  
Also, the introduction of a CO2 permit market will have a profound impact on the fuel 
markets. Coal being the most carbon intensive fuel is likely to be affected by a price drop 
following the introduction of a CO2 permits market (depending on what goes elsewhere in 
the world, of course). This will have a negative impact on activity and employment in this 
sector, which is not easily relocated elsewhere in the economy. This will add to the already 
mounting pressure on indigenous fuel sources in the EU. 
Most general equilibrium models that compare the costs to society by distributing the 
permits via an auction (or an equivalent CO2 tax) and distributing them via some sort of 
grandfathering conclude that the possible savings using an auction are much larger (Jensen 
and Rasmussen, 2000; Kerr and Cramton, 1998). This is so, mainly because the revenue 
created from an auction can be used to offset other distortionary taxes in the economy, e.g. 
labour taxes, since CO2 from the outset is a better tax base than labour. Furthermore, the 
permit owners will be largely over-compensated when the permits are given away for free. 
So the presence of other distortionary taxes in the economy very much reinforces the 
economic efficiency results from Chapter 3 with regard to grandfathering. Auctioning 
permits is unambiguously more efficient than grandfathering. There is no guarantee that the 
revenue will actually be used to reduce taxes on labour or capital, though, but unless the 
entire revenue is wasted the result still holds true. 
An auction also has the flexibility of separating the issue of allocation from the issue of 
distribution in that the Government can choose to redistribute some of the revenue to those 
firms that have been most adversely affected. When using a grandfathered system both 
these issues will be determined by the initial allocation of permits. A similar view has also 
been presented by (Abare, 1998) stating that the most market based approach to allocating 
permits initially is to auction them. Auctioning removes any need for the issuing authority 
to balance various equity and efficiency considerations in deriving the allocation rule. In 
actual schemes in the United States, initial free allocation of permits has been the dominant 
allocation rule. However, none of these schemes has operated on such a scale that revenue 
raised by auctioning permits could have made a significant contribution to displacing other 
taxes. 
In conclusion, the introduction of tradable CO2 permit market will have a profound impact 
on competition and return to factors throughout the economy. The changes in prices and 
returns to factors are the same no matter what distributional principle is used, i.e. whether 
auctions or grandfathering is being used. Grandfathering will however transfer some 
ownership of the atmosphere to the companies that are awarded the permits, so the wealth 
effects of changing the ownership of the atmosphere only benefit the capital owners. This is 
problematic in two respects. As suggested by several studies, there are large welfare gains 
if the revenue is used to reduce other taxes in the economy rather than being given away for 
free to the existing emitters. In other words, auctioning permits is unambiguously more 
efficient than grandfathering. Secondly, from a perspective of fairness grandfathering is 
also problematic because it does not reflect the fact that every citizen has the same right to 
emit CO2 into the atmosphere. 
5.3 The political economy of a tradable CO2 permit market 
The intention of this section is to try to analyse the possible ways in which the effective 
design of a tradable CO2 permit market can be affected by the interactions between private 
corporations, Member States and the Institutions of the European Community. The 
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underlying assumption is that actors’ interaction are guided by considerations of self-
interest in that they attempt to achieve their goals, such as maximising their resources, in a 
specific context of institutional rules (Héritier, 1999). The goal is to point to an effective 
design of a tradable permit market that stands a chance of being implemented as well. 
Subsection 5.3.1 briefly discusses some of the economic and political challenges that 
influence on the climate policy options in the EU. In Subsection 5.3.2 we move on to 
consider some of the institutional constraints that face a federal system like the EU in 
relation to climate policy and Subsection 5.3.3 considers how the different institutions in 
the European Community interact within this context. We then consider the positions of the 
different Member States towards climate change policy and the preference over policy 
instruments in Subsection 5.3.4. Subsection 5.3.5 then does the same with regard to major 
interest groups in the EU as well as considering if any rules or regulations are in place that 
can be considered a result of effective lobbying. Finally, Subsection 5.3.6 concludes. 
5.3.1 Contingencies on EU energy and climate policy 
The struggle over a common EU energy policy has taken many turns. Energy policy has 
been characterised by strong conflicts between a common policy, on the one hand, and 
diverse national interests on the other. In some respects it is the same conflicts that are at 
play with respect to a common climate policy, in as far as climate policy is inherently 
linked to energy policy. 
In general, there are three goals of EU energy policy, also known as the energy policy 
triangle: 
 increase competitiveness of European businesses through low energy prices  
 secure a stable and diverse supply of energy to the EU  
 limit the impact that human activities have on the environment (secure environmental 
sustainability) 
The political focus on these pillars has changed over time and will continue to do so, 
largely as a result of changes that are external to the EU. Furthermore, the policy level that 
is deemed to be most appropriate in dealing with the issues is likely to change as well. 
Economic and political challenges 
Two general trends since the late 1980s have affected the focus of energy policy in the 
European Community.  
First of all, the economic environment has become increasingly inter-dependent. Increasing 
international trades and direct foreign investments have brought along increased 
competition for many sectors and services. At the same time, the changes in the political 
environment, through successive rounds of GATT and WTO negotiations as well as the 
completion of the Single Market in Europe, has worked to reinforce this process. As a 
consequence of these changes in the economic and political environments, the room for 
National Governments to manoeuvre has been considerably narrowed. International factor 
mobility (i.e., capital and labour mobility) constrains the capacity of National governments 
to regulate processes of production and to tax the profits from production because investors, 
tax payers and consumers alike are now presented with the option to exit the regulated area 
(Scharpf, 2000a). 
The impact on energy policy in the EU is likely to have been two-folded. First of all, the 
budgetary costs of protecting national energy markets to secure energy supply and in turn 
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preserve regional employment has become more pressing. Together with the falling oil 
prices in the 1980s, this has tended to downplay the security of supply dimension in the 
1990s. Secondly, the case for a supra-national energy policy response has become stronger. 
The changes in the policy environment has reinforced the use of market mechanisms as the 
favoured instrument to increase effectiveness and thereby competitiveness of national 
industries. This means that market distortions and trade barriers created by National 
Governments have come under pressure. As a result, the most important changes in the 
energy sector in recent years are related to the internal market directives on the electricity 
and gas markets.  
Importantly, even though the restructuring process of the electricity markets still have a 
long way to go, these changes happened despite the fact that there are large differences in 
the socio-economic structures of the Member States. As a consequence, changes in the 
overall policy environment will not have the same impact on different Member States. In 
fact, the tension between national interests and the EU is the main reason why energy did 
not become a field of common policy during the Treaty revisions of Maastrict and 
Amsterdam. Nevertheless, the lack of overlapping interests between Member countries 
cannot explain the elements of common energy policy that has been implemented since the 
late 1980s. Important new EU energy policy initiatives seem to have been driven by the 
Commission which has exploited institutional rules to take the initiative, to redefine the 
energy sector in relation to the internal market, environmental policy and foreign policy 
(Andersen, 2000). Especially legal rules relating to competition and the internal market puts 
a number of legal restraints on the policy options that are open to individual Member States 
which has been exploited by The Commission. 
The second trend is the arrival of the climate change issue on the international political 
agenda in the 1990s. Obviously, this has had the effect of putting environmental 
sustainability in focus. Due to the global nature of the climate change problem and due to 
the close connection between energy related greenhouse gas emissions and economic 
growth in general, there are clear benefits from a globally or at least internationally co-
ordinated response to the problem. Achieving a fully co-ordinated global solution to the 
problem of climate change is, however, going to be difficult, as there is no global institution 
that can regulate such an agreement. The problem is that climate change mitigation is a 
public good, which makes the underlying constellation of country interests very much like a 
prisoner's dilemma. Each party will have an economic incentive to free-ride on a co-
ordinated agreement, for in doing so each can gain more by avoiding steep mitigation costs 
than it loses from its own small slice of greenhouse-gas abatement (Barrett, 1998). 
This could lead to the pessimistic conclusion that whenever international co-operation 
really matters, co-operation is not possible. At least, this is still a major challenge to the 
future negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol. However, in a European context, the signing of 
the Kyoto Protocol has clearly opened up a “window of opportunity” for the European 
Commission (Héritier, 1999). The Kyoto Protocol applies external pressure to the EU and 
to the Member States, which can be used to widen the European agenda and to press on 
with policy-making. The case for European policy-making builds on the principle that the 
independence of the European Commission can help to enforce an effective solution to the 
climate change problem between the Member States. By means of delegating power to an 
independent agent (principally the European Commission), the independent agent can 
sanction the Parties that are not in compliance with the co-ordinated agreement and thus 
prevent some of the problems concerning collective action among the Member States.  
In other words, the climate change issue also seems to reinforce the case for a supra-
national policy response in the EU.  
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5.3.2 Institutional dimensions of energy and climate policy in the EU 
Consensus requirements in the EU  
The European Union is characterised by a complex interrelation between institutional and 
other actors at EU, national, and sub-national level, which makes the institutional structure 
of the EU akin to a federal system characterised by “multi-level governance” (Scharpf, 
2000a). As noted by (Schmidt, V.A. 1999), European federalism is a “balancing act” 
between the representation of territorial and non-territorial interests, with territorial interests 
much more fully embedded in every institution than in other federal systems (notably the 
United States): 
• National governments appoint the judges of the European Court of Justice and the 
commissioners of the EU Commission;  
• National ministers compose the Council of Ministers;  
• National electorates elect members of the European Parliament; 
• National governments are involved in the enforcement as much as the initiation of 
"federal" policies through regulations enforced by national governments and directives 
that are transposed into national law by National parliaments.  
Obviously, there will be a contest for decisional power between the different levels of 
Government. As many Member States are markedly different with respect to their 
institutional structures (i.e. federal like Germany or unitary like France and the UK) this has 
made some countries quite unwilling to delegate decisional power to the Community level. 
Furthermore, these differences in institutional structures can leave considerable 
discrepancies in the actual implementation of EC directives by the Member States.  
A number of issues with respect to cross-border environmental policies can make matters 
complicated. First of all, the interest constellation, which evolves from the anticipated costs 
and benefits of climate change, is re-distributive and therefore conflictual. Climate change 
mitigation is a public good and as such the Member States have a common interest in 
providing it. Yet on the other hand, there are significant differences with regard to the 
anticipated benefits of mitigating climate change, and the distribution and ability to bear the 
cost of emissions abatement (Héritier, 1999).  
This is likely to influence on the possible ways in which policies can be implemented. The 
positions of Member States will vary depending on the economic interests at stake, the 
degree of environmental consciousness, the stringency of domestic environmental 
legislation and the level of economic development (Héritier, 1999). 
In such a setting, the possibilities of reaching an agreement at Community level depend on 
the degree of consensus that is required to reach an agreement. In multi-actor systems with 
high consensus requirements, innovators will be at a competitive disadvantage in 
interactions with the beneficiaries and defenders of status quo (Scharpf 2000). In other 
words, unanimous decision rules have a strong conservative bias. For example, all attempts 
to introduce a common CO2 tax in the EU have been blocked because single member 
countries oppose the taxes.59 It is possible for one single member country to block such a 
common decision because the EU unanimity rule for fiscal measures applies to the CO2 tax. 
Importantly, the consensus requirements in matters relating to environmental policy and 
matters relating to energy policy are different. First, environmental policy, in contrast to 
                                                           
59 Svendsen (1998a). 
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energy policy had become part of the Treaty of Rome through the single act reform in 1987. 
After Maastrict (1994) it was possible to make decisions in the area of environmental 
policy based on majority decisions by the Council of Ministers, although there were 
exceptions for measures involving fiscal matters (Andersen 2000).  
In fact, Article 175 (old 130s) of the EC Treaty says that decisions relating to taxation 
(fiscal measures), spatial planning and energy policy are only to be taken unanimously. 
However, measures relating to Article 175 as well as the harmonisation efforts specified in 
Article 95 (old 100a) due to the construction of the common market are to be taken by 
qualified majority. This can leave some possibilities in the hands of the Commission in any 
case, because they can try to change the Treaty basis for a decision, thus changing a 
unilateral decision to a decision taken by qualified majority (Héritier, 1999). 
Shared competence and the subsidiarity principle 
The European Community, being at the top level of the federal governance structure in the 
EU, is a unique legal entity. It is an international organisation which only has the powers 
given to it by its constituting Treaty, the EC Treaty, and any legislation based upon that 
Treaty. All other powers remain in principle with its sovereign Member States. In order for 
the Community to be able to act it needs to indicate a specific legal basis for its actions 
(Lefevere and Yamin 1999). 
Obviously, the federal governance structure constrains the possible policy options of the 
Member States as well as the European Community. A distinction can be made on the basis 
of whether competence in a specific area is exclusive to either the Community or the 
Member States, or whether it concerns a shared or mixed competence.  
In the field of environmental policy and legislation the division of competence, both 
externally and internally, between the Community and the Member States is generally seen 
as a shared competence. This also applies to climate change. As a result the UNFCCC has 
been ratified by the Commission as well as by the Member States and similarly, the EC as 
well as the Member States are signatories to the Kyoto Protocol (Lefevere and Yamin, 
1999). 
Shared competence between policy actions at Member State level and at the EU level is, in 
terms of the legal provisions, mainly a question of interpretation of the provisions in the EC 
Treaty dealing with subsidiarity and the provisions dealing with efficiency of the internal 
market.  
It is generally accepted that concerns over excessive centralisation of decision-making and 
over the expanding competence of the Community at the expense of Member States formed 
a significant part of the motivation for introducing subsidiarity into European law (de 
Búrca, 1999). The subsidiarity principle has become a more integral part of the 
Community’s legal and political culture in the 1990s, culminating in their inclusion in the 
EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam. A political statement is now contained in Article 1 
of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), stating that decisions have to be taken as 
closely as possible to the citizen. Its specific legal form is to be found in Article 5 in the 
Treaty of the European Community (TEC):  
“The Community shall act within the limits of its powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas, which do not fall within 
its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member states and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
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Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary 
to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”  
The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are further elaborated in Protocol No. 30 
to the EC Treaty, which sets up further guidelines to be examined in determining whether 
the Community (principally the Commission) should take action in the areas of shared 
competence. Specifically, paragraph 5 in the Protocol sets out three guidelines to consider 
whether or not it is appropriate for the Community to take action: 
 Whether an issue has transnational aspects which cannot satisfactorily be regulated by 
Member State action; 
 Whether Member State action or lack of Community action would conflict with Treaty 
requirements; 
 Whether action at Community level would produce clear benefits of scale or effect. 
These guidelines do not provide a hard legal context to the concept of subsidiarity as the 
guidelines are clearly open to political contestation. However, with regard to the 
establishment of a tradable CO2 permit market in the EU some fairly clear-cut conclusions 
seem to emerge. First of all, in terms of the transnational aspects of the issue, cross-border 
environmental pollution such as emissions of greenhouse gases is an obvious candidate for 
Community action. With regard to the second point, the conflict with Treaty requirements 
concerns the need to correct distortion of competition and the need to avoid disguised 
restrictions on trade (specifically, this concerns the economic provisions of the EC Treaty 
concerning competition, state aid and approximation of laws). The various ways in which 
CO2 permits can be allocated to specific enterprises and sectors clearly has the potential of 
being in conflict with these provisions, given that National Governments could have an 
incentive to favour certain industries that are exposed to international competition. 
Furthermore, Member States might be tempted to discriminate against foreign-owned 
enterprises compared to nationally owned enterprises. Finally, given the large differences 
between energy economic structures of the Member States and consequently large 
differences in the costs to mitigate climate change clear benefits of scale or effect could 
easily be identified as well. 
The possible conflict with Treaty requirements can be expected to be the main driver 
towards action at Community level. In the words of (de Búrca, 1999): “The aspect of 
expansion and centralisation of Community action which is not apparently taken into 
account by the legal formulation of the subsidiarity principle is that there is a bias towards 
integration inherent in some of the economic provisions of the Treaty…”. Especially 
European competition law through Article 86 (old Article 90) in the EC Treaty allocates 
far-reaching rights to the European Commission. In particular measures taken by the 
Member State Governments, in the form of financial aids or in the granting of special 
rights, can be overseen and regulated by the Commission quite independently. This gives 
the Commission the unusual ability to issue its own directives aimed at all Member States 
while other bodies, including the Council of Ministers, do not have any formal decision 
rights under this provision. The Treaty lacks procedural prescriptions for the use of Article 
86, providing the Commission with a very powerful instrument against state interventions 
(Schmidt, S.K., 1998). 
Likewise, Articles 94 and 95 dealing with the approximation of laws also have the ability to 
be used in adopting measures which seem to widen the reach of Community law. As further 
noted by (de Búrca, 1999), the problem is that the terms of the articles are premised on 
concepts which are extremely open-ended and in themselves the subject of political 
contestation. The ‘Internal market’ is a very general notion and its ‘proper functioning’ 
could mean many things, depending on how strong a vision of the internal market is being 
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adopted. The interpretation of Treaty provisions and thus the vision of the internal market 
that is being adopted is in the hands of the European Court of Justice. 
In fact, The European Court of Justice is the actor who may most effectively constrain the 
Commission. When called upon it can limit the powers of the Commission just as much as 
the Governments can through a Treaty revision (Schmidt, S.K., 1998). In this respect the 
European Court of Justice clearly has a political and thus policy-making role as well60. The 
Court of Justice has generally been reluctant to allow the concept of subsidiarity to play any 
great role, however. (Shaw and Wiener, 1999) note that if there is an emerging common 
agenda in the Court of Justice about the concepts of subsidiarity and flexibility, it appears 
to be in a general reluctance to allow these principles to fetter the judicial role. Obviously, 
this confirms the enforcing role of the Commission in terms of the economic provisions61. 
In conclusion, a clear role for Community action can be identified. Given the nature of 
some of the economic provisions in the EC Treaty and the rulings of the European Court of 
Justice in subsidiarity case law, the Commission seems to be in a strong position to 
negotiate a co-ordinated policy response at the Community level. Negotiated co-ordination 
may take two forms: ‘Negative co-ordination’, which merely avoids policies that would 
have negative external effects on other policy areas, whereas ‘positive co-ordination’ 
attempts to maximise the gains from co-operation (Scharpf, 2000a). Clearly, the economic 
provisions in the EC Treaty presents the Commission with a stronger case to negotiate a 
common tradable permit market agreement in terms of ‘negative co-ordination’ than in 
terms of ‘positive co-ordination’. 
5.3.3 Modes of interaction in the European Community 
The Commission 
The members of the Commission are appointed by national governments and are subject to 
approval of the European Parliament. As noted by (Kohler-Kock and Quitkatt, 1999), The 
European Commission plays a decisive role in the European process of policy making due 
to its exclusive right to initiate European legislation; at the same time the Commission 
promotes the inclusion of affected interest groups into the process of policy formulation in 
order to draw upon the expert knowledge of external actors. Furthermore, The Commission 
acts as enforcement agent of EC lawmaking. 
Furthermore, as noted by (Héritier, 1999), in a system of inter-organisational joint decision 
making such as the European polity, the actors controlling the borders between 
organisations, the ‘gatekeepers’, are powerful internally because they control the 
uncertainty arising from interactions with external organisations. In a European context the 
Commission plays this role.  
Thus, the area of climate change was a natural area for the Commission to expand its 
competence. In this perspective, the expansion of environmental policy in the EU can be 
seen as a result of functional spill-over from the internal market. By making proposals, 
facilitate bargaining and supply of organisational skills, the Commission can exercise task-
oriented leadership and promote the spill-over process (Gerhardsen, 1998).  
The role of the Commission as an independent agent suggests that the main justification of 
the civil servants in the Commission is to secure efficiency in policy measures and thereby 
                                                           
60 Supreme Court justices in the United States, despite clear evidence to the contrary, have often 
asserted the myth that the Judiciary is non-political. 
61 Obviously, this also creates problems regarding democratic accountability in the European Union. 
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making ‘the pie as large as possible’. The Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading 
presented by the Commission follows along these general lines. The scope for Community-
wide action is highlighted and the Green paper points to significant savings following a 
broad scheme compared to unilateral action by Member States. Furthermore, the Green 
Paper suggests a “learning by doing” approach starting with large fixed point sources of 
CO2, where monitoring and supervision of the system is more feasible. Clearly, the 
approach by the Commission is to establish areas where clear benefits of Community action 
can be identified while leaving as much scope for action at Member State level in 
remaining areas. That is a way to avoid deadlock in the future negotiations between the 
Member States and the Commission. 
As commissioners are not up for election, however, they resemble bureaucrats in that they 
will try to extend their tasks in order to enhance their institutional position. In this respect, 
Commissioners will try to link climate-policy related measures with other promising policy 
fields to have room for negotiation (Michelowa, 1998a). This could create a bias towards 
choosing command-and-control instruments as they tend to enhance the power of European 
decision-makers in legislation and that of national and regional bureaucracies in 
implementation, whereas the self-regulation of industry and the use of fiscal instruments 
render both obsolete (Héritier, 1999). 
The Council 
Politics, of course, does play a role in the EU, which is most evident in the Council of 
Ministers. The membership in the Council depends on the results of national elections and 
as a result of this, the politics in the Council is generally the politics of national interest 
rather than party or money per se (Schmidt, V.A., 1999). As already noted, the nationally-
elected members of the Council of Ministers have powers of approval in relation to the 
proposals by the Commission. 
Thus Council members will try to introduce climate policy measures developed in national 
interest group interaction. Depending on its composition the Council has different targets – 
e.g. the energy and finance Councils are much more reluctant concerning climate policy 
while Environmental ministers can strengthen their domestic position through the adoption 
of stringent targets (Michaelowa, 1998a).  
Both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are required to consider the 
consistency of the Commission’s legislative proposals, as well as the consistency of their 
own respective amendments and the Council of its common position, with the subsidiarity 
principle. (de Búrca, 1999). 
Finally, as noted by (Kohler-Kock and Quitkatt, 1999), The Council, although probably still 
the most important European institution in the policy-making process, is difficult to get in 
touch with due to its inter-governmental and inter-national composition. Interest groups not 
only must try to convince their own national government of the legitimacy and 
appropriateness of their demands, they also have to make sure that their interests are 
supported by a sufficient number of states, either to form a veto-minority, or to ensure a 
stable majority of EU-member states. 
The Parliament 
Only in the European Parliament could one talk about the politics of party. But here, the 
parties are still so underdeveloped and the Parliament itself so lacking in power by 
comparison with the Council or Commission, that party politics are barely at play. Instead, 
another kind of interest politics is at work, that of public interest politics focused around 
groups representing environmental, consumer, and human rights concerns. This is not so 
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much because all members of Parliament are necessarily sympathetic to such issues but 
because these issues generally have a broader public appeal and are less well represented in 
the Commission, and therefore serve to increase MEPs' political weight and to gain public 
attention (Schmidt, V.A., 1999). 
The same view is presented by (Kohler-Kock and Quitkatt, 1999), who states that although 
the European Parliament has gained importance through the expanded application of the co-
decision legislative procedure, it still has less influence on the policy-making process than 
the European Commission or the Council of Ministers. However, the EP is very interested 
in the communication with interest groups as this is a good opportunity to interact with the 
electorate and to become a “spokesman” for the voters’ concerns, although this applies 
more to NGOs than to business interests. 
Interest group influence on the policy process. 
In an area such as climate change, policy information is incomplete and contested, and 
negotiations between stakeholders are impeded by high transaction costs. Under these 
conditions, it is likely that voters or members of organised interest groups will be able to 
oppose policy changes whose immediate impact on their status-quo position is negative  
(Scharpf, 2000a). This may in turn prevent the adoption of effective policy responses. 
The policymaking processes in the European Union are somewhat similar to the pluralistic 
policy processes in the federal United States. Like the United States, the EU’s 
policymaking processes tend to be open to interest group influence in the formulation 
process, while the process of implementing the policy is more rigid and regulatory. There 
are some notable differences between the EU pluralism and that of the United States, 
however. First of all, the nature of interest group access and influence at the policy 
formulation stage tends to be more selective and controlled in the EU given the role of its 
civil servants. Secondly, the policy process in the EU is more delegatory in the 
implementation stage, given the role of Member States in transposing and administering EU 
directives (Schmidt, V.A. 1999). 
In the EU, lobbying is a highly technical affair, as civil servants make every effort to hear 
all sides and to base their decisions on purely technical and economic arguments. For 
European civil servants, the main justification for any policy is practicability and efficiency 
in promoting collective gains for the EU as a whole. For national politicians and civil 
servants, whether American or European, by contrast, the policy along with its justification 
may often sacrifice efficiency for more political goals (Schmidt, V.A. 1999). 
 But at the same time that the EU’s pluralism may be less politicised than that of the US, it 
is less “pluralistic” in the kinds of interests represented as well as in their access and 
potential influence. The EU Commission has much greater control over the entire process 
of interest representation by comparison with the US, where any interest that organises 
itself is regarded as legitimate so long as it can make itself heard. In the EU, only those 
interests the EU Commission chooses to legitimise, and thus allow into the process, will be 
heard. (Schmidt, V.A., 1999). 
There are two reasons to expect big European companies and multinationals to gain access 
to European political institutions without difficulty (Kohler-Kock and Quitkatt, 1999):  
1. not only do they represent a considerable power in terms of investment capacities and 
working places, which is difficult to ignore, but  
2. they can also – as single players – more easily adapt to the new European political 
environment than can trade associations having different members whose divergent 
interests need to be tuned before common action is possible. 
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It is further likely that European political institutions prefer to communicate with one single 
interlocutor rather than with fifteen or more different interest representatives. Therefore, 
European trade associations often aggregate and harmonise the various national or sectoral 
interests of their members and hence find it easier to gain access to European political 
institutions than national trade associations (Kohler-Kock and Quitkatt, 1999). Especially 
aggregated organised interest groups that represent a large share of the economy and whose 
members have a common agenda towards climate change mitigation are in a strong position 
to influence the policy process. 
5.3.4 The positions of Member States 
The EU Burden Sharing Agreement and possible cost impact 
The general position of National politicians in different Member States towards climate 
change policy is markedly different. This is mainly due to the differences in perceived cost 
impact of climate change policies as well as being a reflection of National voters' interest in 
the climate change issue. Differences in cost impact is mainly due to the different income 
levels of Member States, the different opportunities for reducing CO2 emissions and 
different economic growth patterns in the future.  
These variations between Member States are reflected in the EC climate policy process. 
According to (Ringius, 1999), three distinct groups of member countries each play a 
significant role with regard to EC environmental policy: 
 A first group, which might be labelled the ‘rich and green’ member countries, consists 
of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Generally, the 
‘rich and green’ respond quickly to environmental problems by setting ambitious 
targets ahead of others. They subsequently attempt to pressure, shame or persuade other 
member countries to imitate their level of environmental protection.  
 Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, and Luxembourg might then be labelled the ‘rich but 
less green’ member countries. Compared to the ‘rich and green’, they are less 
concerned about environmental protection and are unlikely to go first in protecting the 
environment. There is a clear tendency for this group to follow rather than lead others 
in the environment area. The main reason that they resist strong environmental 
measures are concerns about the economic cost of environmental protection, lack of 
strong domestic support and demand for environmental protection, or both. 
 The cohesion countries62 constitute the third group that significantly influences EC 
climate policy. These member countries, which might be labelled the ‘poorer and least 
green,’ act mostly as laggards in EC climate and environmental policy. The cohesion 
countries oppose aggressive environmental policy because of their comparatively low 
level of economic development, low administrative capacity, and low public 
environmental awareness.  
Another study by (Aaheim and Bretteville, 1999) has looked at the different interests in 
cutting CO2 emissions within the EU based on the assumption that interests occur as a 
result of different perceptions among stakeholders as to what the costs of cutting emissions 
might be. Sector-based comparisons of the larger countries within the EU suggests that 
                                                           
62 The Cohesion countries are Member States with a GDP lower than 90 % of the average GDP in 
the Member States. Because of this, the cohesion countries are entitled to financial support from the 
Community to ensure economic development. Today, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland belong to 
this category (Gerhardsen, 1998). 
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conflicts arising from announcing emission cuts are likely to be moderate in Germany, the 
Netherlands and United Kingdom, while the possibilities for conflict in France, Italy and 
Spain are significantly higher. They conclude that the differences to a large extent can be 
found by the options for reducing emissions in the electricity sector.  
Despite these large differences in the attitudes towards mitigation of climate change, the 
EU Member States have nevertheless managed to agree on the Burden Sharing Agreement. 
The Council has listed up a number of national circumstances that have been taken into 
account when deciding on the Burden Sharing Agreement. The distribution of 
responsibilities takes account of national circumstances and capabilities in sectors such as 
electric power generation, internationally oriented energy intensive industry, transportation, 
light industry, agriculture, households and services. Finally it takes account of the potential 
for energy efficiency improvement (Gerhardsen, 1998). 
If we accept the grouping of Member States in the three groups listed above, it should be 
expected that the Burden Sharing Agreement represent a transfer of responsibility from 
Member States with a low willingness to pay for climate change mitigation to Member 
States with a high willingness to pay. In the following Table 5.5 we have shown the total 
abatement costs in percentage of GDP of individual Member States where the shaded areas 
represent the costs corresponding to meeting their Burden Sharing targets if all the 
emissions reductions are done domestically.  
Table 5.5: Total abatement costs in percentage of GDP, 2010. 
14 24 38 55 76 100 128 159
AU 55 89% 0,01% 0,03% 0,06% 0,10% 0,15% 0,21% 0,32% 0,39%
BE 105 95% 0,01% 0,03% 0,07% 0,14% 0,24% 0,40% 0,66% 0,93%
DK 53 88% 0,02% 0,04% 0,09% 0,16% 0,25% 0,34% 0,49% 0,63%
FI 51 103% 0,03% 0,10% 0,13% 0,21% 0,38% 0,53% 0,70% 0,88%
FR 352 103% 0,01% 0,02% 0,04% 0,06% 0,13% 0,21% 0,34% 0,46%
GE 952 81% 0,01% 0,03% 0,07% 0,14% 0,24% 0,37% 0,52% 0,69%
GR 71 128% 0,08% 0,10% 0,15% 0,23% 0,35% 0,55% 0,83% 1,06%
IR 30 116% 0,02% 0,04% 0,08% 0,17% 0,28% 0,40% 0,56% 0,76%
IT 388 96% 0,01% 0,04% 0,06% 0,10% 0,16% 0,23% 0,34% 0,47%
NL 153 96% 0,02% 0,04% 0,06% 0,12% 0,22% 0,37% 0,59% 0,81%
PO 39 130% 0,01% 0,05% 0,12% 0,36% 0,50% 0,65% 0,89% 1,24%
SP 202 118% 0,01% 0,06% 0,09% 0,15% 0,27% 0,44% 0,59% 0,75%
SW 50 107% 0,01% 0,02% 0,07% 0,11% 0,19% 0,27% 0,37% 0,51%
UK 567 90% 0,01% 0,03% 0,07% 0,13% 0,23% 0,38% 0,59% 0,80%
EU14 3068 94% 0,01% 0,03% 0,07% 0,12% 0,21% 0,33% 0,49% 0,65%
Burden sharing, no trading
1990 
level, Mt
Burden 
Sharing
Carbon Value: Marginal Abatement Cost in EUR99 per ton CO2 avoided
Total abatement costs in percentage of GDP, 2010
 
Source: Report by Capros and Mantzos, 1999, to the EC Directorate for the Environment. The total 
abatement costs have been derived by calculating the size of the area below the marginal abatement 
cost curves provided in that report. The Burden sharing Target has been adjusted to correspond to an 
overall CO2 emissions reduction by 6.2 % rather than 8 % compared to the 1990 level (see 
Subsection 5.2.1). 
Several observations can be made. First of all, it is clear that the emission reduction 
percentages in the Burden Sharing target (also shown in Table 5.5) represents a transfer of 
responsibility from Member States with low willingness to pay to Member States with high 
willingness to pay compared to a situation with uniform reductions in all Member States 
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(94 % of emissions in 1990). However, despite this transfer of responsibility it is clear from 
Table 5.5 that many of the Member States who have taken on a higher emissions reduction 
target and thus shown willingness to accept higher costs of reducing emissions are actually 
projected to have low costs in meeting their target. Likewise, some countries from the 
group called “poorer and least green” are actually projected to incur relatively high costs in 
meeting their burden sharing target in 2010 by domestic measures only63. Obviously, there 
can be more reasons for this. One possibility is that the Member State negotiators have 
focused more on the emissions reduction percentages rather than focusing on cost 
estimates, since the emissions reduction percentages correspond well to the grouping of 
Member States shown above. Another possibility is that there could be a difference 
between Member States where the Ministry of Finance or Foreign Affairs has been directly 
involved in the negotiations and Member States where the Ministry of Environment has 
been involved. The Ministry of Environment is likely to put less emphasis on economic 
matters and this has certainly been the case of Holland, even though Holland has a 
relatively high willingness to pay. Finally, it should be noted that the Member State 
Governments have been involved in the estimation of the baseline level of emissions in the 
data used by Capros and Mantzos (data from The Shared Analysis Project). This could 
create an upward bias in the setting of the baseline, as Member State Governments will 
have an incentive to develop an emissions baseline that is as pessimistic as possible.  
Other explanations as to why the Member States have accepted the Burden Sharing 
agreement can also be thought of. (Gerhardsen, 1998) has noted that the reason that the 
Member States finally agreed to this transfer of competence and sovereignty is to be found 
in the interests of the major actors in the policy arena, which in the setting of a common 
climate target primarily have been the Commissions and the Council. Both the “green 
forces” and those that are most preoccupied with economical considerations had a common 
interest in setting a common EU target. 
In conclusion, the EU Member States are markedly different in terms of willingness to pay 
for reduction of CO2 emissions. The Burden Sharing Agreement represents a transfer of 
responsibility from countries with a low willingness to pay for emissions reductions to 
countries with a higher willingness to pay and as such it is a prime example of an 
internationally co-operated solution to an environmental problem. Despite the 
compensation given to some of the poorer Member States the total abatement costs still 
constitutes a burden on their economies comparable to that of other Member States. This 
could suggest that some negotiators have focused more on the emissions reduction 
percentages rather than focusing on cost estimates.  
Importantly, implementing an EU-wide tradable CO2 permit market will lower the costs of 
meeting the Burden Sharing Target for all Member States compared to domestic reductions 
alone. This favours the possibility of implementing a common tradable permit market in the 
EU. Especially Member States that are projected to have very high costs will be very 
interested in buying cheaper permits in other Member States and Member States with very 
low costs could be interested in selling permits. This suggests that Member States such as 
Holland, Belgium, Germany, France and Denmark will be relatively more interested in a 
common trading scheme than the others will. However, the flexibility mechanisms in the 
Kyoto Protocol present the Member States with other opportunities to reduce the costs in 
meeting their Burden Sharing Target. This will allow the Member States to exit to a broader 
policy arena, which will tend to reduce the zone of possible agreements at the Community 
level. 
                                                           
63 This is also true even if we compare the total abatement costs per capita instead of per GDP. 
Chapter 5. EU model: A qualitative evaluation of a CO2 permit market 
Risø-R-1184 (EN) 103 
 
The choice of policy instrument 
National politicians see climate policy as an issue among many others that becomes 
relevant only if it captures the attention of voters. Generally speaking, voters are mainly 
interested in the provision of private goods such as jobs. They become interested in climate 
change policy if urgent local environmental problems have been solved and the general 
economic situation is good. Several indicators show that the marginal utility of climate 
policy is positively correlated with income (Michaelowa, 1998b).  
Due to the complex nature of the climate change issue, the information costs of voters are 
very high, which will make voters easily influenced by lobbying. From the outset it is very 
easy for any interest group to build a case in support of its own views. Emitters lobbies will 
stress the high costs of climate policy and the enormous loss of jobs while environmental 
lobbies will stress the possibility of a climatic catastrophe and the possibility for dynamic 
job creation (Michaelowa, 1998b). Undoubtedly, the prevalence of climatic extremes like 
the 1997/98 “El Nino” will make voters more interested in the climate change issue, 
irrespective of whether or not a causal relationship between climatic extremes and climate 
change has been established.  
As a result of the high information costs of voters, politicians will try to develop a bundle 
of highly visible and easily understandable measures that benefit well-organised lobbies 
while their costs are distributed as widely as possible, preferably even shifted into the future 
or abroad (Michaelowa, 1998b). As an example, many Member States have set a target for 
the share of energy production in the future that is supposed to come from renewable 
energy sources. Such a policy is highly visible and easy to understand. Furthermore, the 
beneficiaries of such schemes are concentrated while the costs are widely distributed and in 
many cases shifted into the future. As a measure to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, 
the overall costs of these types of schemes are likely to be high. 
On the other hand, market-oriented instruments are more difficult to understand and only 
have indirect impacts that often accrue after the politicians’ term is over. Moreover, lobbies 
cannot be granted advantages as easily as in the case of regulation and the discretionary 
power of politicians is also reduced (Michaelowa, 1998b). Thus, the policy horizon can be 
expected to work against the implementation of a tradable permit scheme. In terms of 
political acceptability, a tradable permit scheme does, however, have the advantage 
compared to an emissions tax that it delivers the environmental result with certainty. As a 
result, it is easier for politicians to claim that “something is being done” by applying a 
permit scheme rather than an emissions tax.  
However, it is important to keep in mind that taxation of energy is also linked to fiscal 
interests of the Member States. Consumer taxes on import reduce the import bill since all 
Member countries except UK and Denmark are dependent on import. Furthermore, profits 
are being transferred from exporting to consuming countries (Andersen, 2000). Thus, taxes 
can in many cases be used strategically by Member States and this will tend to make 
Member States less interested in common and co-ordinated measures at the EU level.  
In conclusion, it can be expected that National politicians will have a preference for easily 
identifiable instruments such as renewable support schemes, which can be a barrier for 
successful implementation of a tradable permit scheme. This is reinforced by the fact that 
by increasing the number of policy instruments dealing with the climate change issue the 
actual costs of the climate change policies become much less transparent compared to a 
situation where only a single instrument is applied. Tradable permits do however have the 
advantage compared to emissions taxes that they can deliver an environmental result with 
certainty. 
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5.3.5 Interest groups and a market for tradable CO2 permits in the EU 
In this subsection we will go through the positions of different interest groups towards 
climate change and emissions trading, as well as focusing on whether or not any concrete 
regulation or exemptions are in force today as a result of lobbying.  
Industry lobbies make up two opposing groups: those who stand to lose from climate 
change policy and those who stand to gain from it. They are named emitters’ lobbies and 
abatement lobbies respectively 
Emitters lobbies 
Generally speaking, lobbies representing large emitters will try to keep costs as low as 
possible or even gain additional rents. This means they favour subsidies such as 
grandfathering, preferably with an emissions target that responds to organic growth of the 
company in a flexible way. Otherwise, voluntary agreements are the favoured instrument. 
Voluntary agreements are always hard to assess because it is close to impossible to know 
what would have happened to the level of emissions if the agreement had not entered into 
force (the baseline level of emissions is counterfactual). For the same reason, (Michaelowa, 
1998b) suggest that voluntary agreements allow labelling the autonomous rise in energy 
efficiency through cost-saving innovation as climate-policy-induced activity. 
We will focus our attention on some of the larger lobbying organisations representing the 
largest emitters. 
The European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) 
The European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) can be regarded as a very 
powerful lobby. They represent a huge fraction of the EU economy and their interests in the 
political market are closely aligned. All the major car manufacturers in Europe are 
members of ACEA. 
There are further indications that ACEA is well positioned to communicate with the 
Commission. For one they favour large-scale R&D-projects jointly funded by industry and 
the European Union (ACEA Policy Paper, 1997), which go hand in hand with the 
Commission’s objective of expanding the budget.  Furthermore, they are able to team up 
with the Commission in matters concerning distortive taxation on cars by Member States. 
ACEA has a clear-cut agenda in relation to fuel prices. Higher fuel prices mean fewer cars 
sold and the possible ways that the Kyoto Protocol can be implemented will clearly pose a 
threat in this respect. In 1998, however, ACEA reached a voluntary agreement with the 
Commission on the reduction of CO2 emissions from cars, commonly known as the "ACEA 
agreement". This agreement sets up minimum efficiency improvements (minimum 
requirement regarding km/litre of gasoline) for cars of various sizes and vintages. The main 
goal is to achieve an average CO2 emission target of 140 g/km for the fleet of new cars sold 
in the EU in 2008 corresponding to an average fuel consumption of 5,7l/100km (ACEA 
Press Release, 1998). The European Commission will monitor the progress. 
In this way, however, the car manufacturers will not be held responsible for emissions 
growth stemming from an increasing number of cars sold in the future. In other words, it 
introduces no absolute limits on overall emissions and in this respect it is not compatible 
with the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, any action by ACEA is made contingent on a 
number of factors (European Commission, 1998): 
 car manufacturers internationally will undertake similar action 
 the full market availability of fuels with a sufficient quality 
 the unhampered diffusion of car CO2 efficient technologies into the market 
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 impacts of the strategy on the general economic situation of the European Automobile 
Industry. 
For these reasons, the “ACEA Agreement” can be considered a very favourable agreement 
for the European Car Manufacturers. The Agreement does specify that The European 
Commission has a prerogative to introduce fiscal measures but only after taking due 
consideration of these factors. Clearly, ACEA consider this voluntary agreement to be a 
sufficient answer to the climate change challenge and hence they do not consider it 
necessary to introduce other measures to limit fuel consumption or additional fiscal 
measures (ACEA Press Release, 1998). 
The Coal Lobby 
Due to the liberalisation in the power sector and the increasing economic interdependence 
in the 1990s, the budgetary costs of protecting national energy markets to secure energy 
supply and in turn preserve regional employment has become more pressing. This has had a 
major impact on coal consumption and the European hard coal consumption has fallen by 
more than 25 % since 1990 (World Coal Institute, 1999a). 
For these reasons, there are only a small number of politically isolated domestic coal 
producers in the EU today. The relative abundance of alternative cheap fuel sources in the 
EU in the 1990s and the negative public image of the coal industry reinforce this. In other 
words, the position of the coal lobby in the EU today is weak. 
Coal, being the most carbon intensive fuel, stand to lose significantly from the Kyoto 
Protocol. The World Coal Institute, being the ‘voice for coal’ in international debates on 
energy and the environment, is very aware of this threat (World Coal Institute, 1999b).  
In a European context, the Coal Lobby has stressed the importance of the Kyoto 
mechanisms to keep the costs down. Furthermore, they have stressed the importance of a 
comprehensive approach including all greenhouse gases and sinks. In other words, the goal 
is to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and this should be done in the most flexible 
way possible. This means that there should be no restrictions on technology choice in order 
to minimise the adverse impact of the Kyoto Protocol. In this respect, implementing 
instruments that reserve a minimum market share of electricity to be sourced from 
renewables - a renewables quota - is regarded as the most damaging of any subsidy 
arrangements (World Coal Institute, 2000). Such a scheme is currently underway in the 
European Community and this seems to underline the limited political role played by the 
coal lobby today. 
Interestingly, many of the oil and coal lobbies in the USA have chosen a much more 
aggressive approach towards the climate change issue. They stress that the loss of jobs and 
the overall negative impacts on economic growth as a result of the obligations in the Kyoto 
Protocol are enormous (American Petroleum Institute, 2000). Furthermore, uncertainty with 
regard to the climate change issue should be reflected in the costs that society should be 
willing to spend on the issue. Preferably, more data should be collected before deciding to 
take any action. This difference in approaches can most likely be seen as a reflection of the 
political reality in the USA compared to the EU. 
The Gas Lobby 
Eurogas represents the European natural gas industry towards the European Union and all 
other relevant bodies at international level. Clearly, given the ‘right’ implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol, it could be a major potential business opportunity for the gas industry.  The 
carbon intensity of gas is about half the size of coal and an increased share of natural gas 
use is needed to support the Kyoto targets (Eurogas, 2000). In this respect, the gas lobby is 
almost like an abatement lobby. 
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EU should ratify the Kyoto Protocol parallel to other major Parties, particularly USA and 
Japan, to avoid the creation of market distortions. Eurogas is generally supportive of the 
Kyoto instruments, especially the project based instruments, JI and CDM, which could 
offer business opportunities for the gas industry (i.e. gas and renewables applications) 
(Eurogas, 1998). 
The EU response measures against climate change should focus on voluntary agreements 
with the gas industry together with public support for research and development into 
improved gas technologies and an increasing share of gas-fired combined heat and power 
plants. Furthermore, fuel switching away from more carbon intensive fuels than gas (i.e. 
coal and oil) must be promoted (Eurogas, 1997). 
Like the coal lobby they object to an energy tax. If taxes on energy are to be used as an 
emissions control instrument they should be structured as a carbon tax (contrary to the view 
of the coal lobby), to encourage fuel switching to gas from other fossil fuels (Eurogas, 
1998).  
Finally, they are very eager to avoid any specific measures towards the problem with 
fugitive methane emissions from the gas chain and a voluntary agreement is the right way 
to deal with the issue.  
EURELECTRIC 
Eurelectric is the association of the European Union Electricity Supply Industry 
representing it in public affairs, in particular in relation to the EU institutions, in order to 
promote its interests at the political level. 
As noted by (Greenwood and Webster, 2000), liberalisation of public sector monopoly 
sectors, classically, disintegrates the unity of homogenous business interest associations, as 
the structure of members interests changes, typically resulting in the development of 
specialist niche associations. Hence, a response to liberalisation of the electricity sector in 
Europe was the creation of specialist sectors representing electricity traders, municipal 
producers and renewable energy, rather than the monolith international electricity 
association, EURELECTRIC. 
Climate change mitigation is an area where the business interests of the Members of 
Eurelectric are very different. The opposing interests of the largest electricity producers in 
the EU become very apparent by comparing electricity production and CO2 emissions, 
which has been done in Figure 5.4 below. 
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Source:Annual and Environmental Reports from individual companies. 
Figure 5.4: Production of electricity and CO2 emissions from largest firms. 
As can be seen, there are large differences between companies with a high share of nuclear 
or hydro capacity and companies with a high share of production from fossil fuels. This 
clearly limits the ability of a lobbying organisation to influence on policies in this area. 
However, the organisation can gain some credibility in this policy area because of the lack 
of a clear-cut agenda.  
Eurelectric has been very active in the policy-making area of climate change. The view on 
emissions trading is that trading should be allowed at the company level where clear title to 
the emissions traded must be established. They suggest a ‘learning by doing’ approach to 
emissions trading where the first phase of emission trading is introduced on a manageable 
scale. Because the electricity industry is well regulated and its emissions well recorded, it 
should be among those involved in the initial stages. The initial allocation of permits should 
involve some sort of grandfathering but any allocation of permits should avoid market 
distortions and should recognise the overall benefits of a wider use of electricity.  
To promote emissions trading as a favoured instrument, Eurelectric has arranged an 
emission trading game, called Greenhouse and Electricity Trading Simulation (GETS), 
which has been run among the electricity companies. This has been done to test different 
types of permit allocations and for further exploiting the mechanisms for electronic trading 
of greenhouse gas emissions permits (Eurelectric, 2000).  
Likewise, Eurelectric is generally supportive of the other Kyoto mechanisms, JI and CDM.  
A main concern of Eurelectric is that the electricity sector will be required to reduce 
emissions much more than other sectors. With respect to CO2 emissions, the electricity 
sector should be recognised as a sector that has already done a lot, and in the long term, 
electricity offers the possibility of minimal emissions. (Eurelectric, 1998). 
Finally, it should be noted that many power companies exert a considerable influence on 
the National policy agendas due to their size and the importance of electricity prices for 
economic growth. Through the National policy agendas, the power companies can be 
expected to exert considerable influence through the Council in a European policy context 
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as well. Member States with relatively CO2 intensive production will undoubtedly opt for 
grandfathering and less stringent targets for the sector.  
Abatement lobbies 
The Renewables lobby 
Undoubtedly, the renewables lobby has gained in influence over the years although still of 
minor influence. A recent and significant development is the move of big European oil 
companies such as BP, Shell and Elf towards the renewable sector. This development show 
that they are hedging against the case of a strong climate policy in the future, a response 
that is markedly different from most of the American oil companies. Furthermore, some 
have taken on voluntary emission targets and BP has organised an internal trading scheme 
within their own company.  
In general, the renewables lobby is not particularly interested in broad market instruments 
like tradable permits. Tradable permits will result in a price premium on electricity 
produced from conventional sources, which will benefit the competitiveness of renewables. 
The size of the price premium is uncertain, however. Furthermore, given that there is a 
surplus of installed production capacity in many areas of the European Union, the 
electricity prices are expected to be low for some years to come (prices will reflect the 
short-term marginal costs of coal or gas generators). So, the price premium resulting from 
tradable permits is most likely not sufficient to generate significant investments in 
renewables in the short term.  
Renewable lobbies are much more interested in support schemes that will insulate the 
market for renewables from the market for electricity altogether. The European Wind 
Energy Association (EWEA) for one is a clear indication of this. EWEA is the only 
association representing the interests of the wind energy community at an international 
level. EWEA supports mandatory targets for renewable energies by individual Member 
States (i.e., a certain percentage of all electricity production must come from renewables). 
Furthermore, individual Member State should be allowed to maintain their National support 
schemes, thus recognising the principle of subsidiarity (EWEA, 2000a). This sort of scheme 
is sure to minimise the potential competition as much as possible, something that will 
clearly not be achieved by introducing a tradable permit market (or other common market 
measures aiming at the reduction of emissions at the lowest overall costs).  
Currently, a Commission proposal for a Directive on electricity for renewables is 
underway, which is generally in line with the views of the renewables lobby (EWEA, 
2000a). The proposal establishes indicative renewables targets for the Member States and 
suggests a slow out-phasing of the National support schemes. Rather than being a result of 
lobbying from the renewables lobby, however, the Proposal is a reflection of the 
asymmetric interests between the Member States in this issue, and the Commission has 
been forced to alter its views to avoid deadlock in the negotiations.  
Finally, the renewables lobby has proclaimed that the CDM should be reserved for 
renewable energy projects only, because all other technologies are not regarded as being 
sustainable (EWEA et al., 2000b).  
The Nuclear lobby. 
The nuclear industry has been and still is under significant public pressure in some Member 
States today. Not surprisingly, the climate change issue has provided an important 
comeback opportunity for the nuclear sector. Several of the large power companies with a 
high share of nuclear power argue vigorously for the importance of nuclear power in 
relation to the problem of climate change (EdF, EnBW, British Energy). In their 
Environmental Reports several companies report figures on how much CO2 is saved by 
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producing nuclear rather than fossil fuelled electricity (and other emissions such as NOx, 
SO2 and heavy metals).  
The nuclear industry in Europe is organised in the European Atomic Forum (Foratom). 
They present the same views. Given that nuclear energy produces 35 % of Europe's 
electricity today and that the demand for electricity is projected to grow in the years to 
come, nuclear has to be part of the solution to climate change. In order for the EU to meet 
its Kyoto targets, all the flexible mechanisms provided for in the Kyoto Protocol must be 
pursued (Foratom, 2000a). 
However, the CDM should be given particular attention. The view of Foratom is that 
nuclear energy must be included in the CDM because nuclear power meets the test for 
sustainable development as required under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (Foratom, 
2000b). Clearly, the CDM is considered to provide the best business opportunities for the 
nuclear sector but it remains to be seen whether or not nuclear power will be included. A 
tradable permit market in the EU is not of major importance to the nuclear industry because 
decisions to construct nuclear power plants in the future will be a matter of political 
acceptability more than anything else. 
Environmental NGO’s 
Compared to the size and budget of industrial interest groups, the environmental interest 
groups are only of minor importance in relation to EU policy making (Michaelowa, 1998b). 
A whole range of environmental organisations has organised their activities towards the 
climate change issue in the Climate Action Network (CAN). CAN is mainly concerned 
about international equity in the distribution of responsibilities between rich countries and 
developing countries. ‘Hot air’ is seen as a loophole for countries with high emissions per 
capita to maintain their domestic emissions level (CAN, 1999). They are not opposed to a 
tradable permit market for the EU power sector, since this can be regarded as domestic 
action within Annex B. The permits should be auctioned away, however, since they are not 
private property rights. Generally, though, CAN does not regard economic efficiency as an 
important issue, and preferably, the Annex B countries should reach their Kyoto targets by 
reducing emissions domestically only. 
5.3.6 Conclusions on options for design 
The establishment of a tradable CO2 permit market in the EU is an area of ‘shared 
competence’ between the European Community and the Member States. In areas of shared 
policymaking, the European Commission can insert a strong influence primarily through 
the internal market provisions in the EC Treaty, which delegates a lot of decisional 
competence to the Commission. This means that the European Commission can influence 
on a co-ordinated policy response through ‘negative co-ordination’, which merely avoid 
policies that would have negative external effects on other policy areas.  
As a consequence, the institutional sequence of decisions can be expected to play a strong 
role. Thus, if a decision is first taken at the European level and a framework is defined 
which will contain all subsequent national decisional processes, then options for national 
actors are reduced. If, by contrast, a decision is first negotiated within one Member State, 
the chances of manoeuvring to resolve interest conflicts are more limited at the 
supranational level, an the zone of possible agreement is reduced for European actors 
(Héritier, 1999).  
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From an efficiency viewpoint, this makes it important that the initiation of a tradable permit 
scheme in the EU is defined at the Community level from the outset. This will clearly affect 
the possible ways in which the Scheme can be expanded later on.  
The underlying constellation of actor interests in this policy area will clearly have 
implications for the possible design options as well. First of all, the burden sharing 
agreement suggests that the interests of Member States towards climate change mitigation 
are very asymmetric. Inevitably, the initial distribution of permits in any tradable permit 
system in the EU will somehow need to reflect on the burden-sharing agreement. Secondly, 
any expansion of the use of fiscal measures at Community level is strongly opposed by 
some Member States as it is still very much seen as a national responsibility. The failed 
attempts by the European Commission to introduce a common CO2 tax in the EU in the 
1990s reinforce both these points. Thus, in order to assure that all Member States find it in 
their own best interest to participate in a tradable CO2 permit scheme, it seems that the 
distribution principle from Community level to the Member State level must involve 
grandfathering. In other words, the revenue stream generated by the sale of permits will be 
fully redistributed to the Member States. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that any action at Community level is constrained by 
the alternative opportunities for reduction of emissions that are presented to the Member 
States. Thus, the flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol allow the Member States to 
exit to another policy arena, which will tend to reduce the zone of possible agreements at 
the Community level. 
In order to try to avoid deadlock in the negotiations over a common climate policy the 
principle of subsidiarity could be applied, thus leaving some conflicts unresolved at the 
Community level and shifting them to the implementation phase (Héritier, 1999). This 
would suggest that the overall framework be defined at Community level while leaving as 
much scope for subsequent Member State action as possible.  
The establishment of an overall framework for emissions trading at Community level 
should secure that the following criteria are met (Lefevere and Yamin, 1999): 
• The necessity of common criteria to the subject of private enterprises (including 
upstream versus downstream) to minimise distortions of competition in the internal 
market; 
• The necessity of a common framework for allocation of emissions allowances to 
prevent violation of the state aid rules, to prevent indirect discrimination and to 
minimise distortions of competition; 
• A common, or at a minimum, compatible, framework for monitoring, compliance and 
enforcement: conflicts between Member States can be settled within the existing 
Community dispute resolution rules; 
• The necessity to provide a common tradable unit to provide a common currency to 
facilitate Community trade; 
Two levels in the allocation of emission permits need to be considered. First of all, the 
allocation of permits to specific sectors can be carried out in such as manner as to 
advantage certain sectors that are exposed to international competition over others. In this 
way, Member States could explicitly subsidise certain sectors to advance their export 
opportunities, which could be in legal conflict with the EC rules that prohibit the use of 
export subsidies for such a purpose. Secondly, Governments could allocate the permits to 
private parties in such a way to favour domestic firms against their foreign rivals, which 
could be in violation with the EC principle of non-discrimination. 
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The potential ramifications of the allocation of permits to individual sectors by Member 
State Governments are large, which clearly establishes a need for a harmonised solution to 
sector allocation of permits in the EU. The second issue mentioned above, i.e. the fact that 
some Member States will choose to grandfather permits to existing industries while others 
will use auctions, does not require a harmonised solution to the same extent. Given that 
grandfathering CO2 permits to existing industry as defined by some historical baseline is 
not equivalent to exempting it from the tax altogether (see Chapter 3), the potential 
distortions of the internal market are much smaller. Thus, it could be left to Member States 
to decide what distribution rule they choose to apply to private parties. This might lead to a 
‘race to the bottom’, which would consequently result in all Member State Governments 
choosing to grandfather CO2 permits to existing industries. However, taking into 
consideration that CO2 is regarded as an important tax base by some Member States, and 
given the potential for reducing other taxes in the economy, this negative conclusion of a 
‘race to the bottom’ could at least be challenged. 
Finally, the influence of interest organisations on EU policy making seem to suggest the 
following: 
• Imposing measures in the transport sector that are in compliance with the Kyoto 
Protocol (notably absolute emission levels) is going to be difficult given the already 
existing agreement between the European Automobile Manufacturers Association 
(ACEA) and the European Commission. 
• The protection of historical rights to emit CO2 to the atmosphere will be seen as critical 
by some power companies dependent on fossil fuels. This is likely to play a stronger 
role in the national policy arena. 
• The implementation of a renewables quota in the power sector will reduce the 
effectiveness of a tradable permit market although the two instruments can coexist 
without problems. 
In short, a Community-wide ‘upstream’ CO2 system, which can be regarded as the most 
efficient system, is likely to result in political deadlock.  
5.4 Design of a tradable CO2 permits market for the power 
and steam sector 
5.4.1 Introduction 
There are a number of reasons to why the power sector can serve as an interesting starting 
point for a CO2 emissions trading scheme, including: 
 the sector is important due to the large reduction opportunities; 
 The companies are relatively well informed of the overall opportunities to reduce CO2 
emissions in the market, which can work to encourage trading early on. 
 The liberalisation of the power sector and the international trading of electricity make it 
important that there are ‘level playing fields’ between the Member States. This also 
includes an equal treatment of companies in terms of the environmental frame 
conditions; 
 CO2 is most easily monitored; 
 it is likely to be politically simpler to start with a single sector 
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Obviously, there are a number of reasons as to why establishing a tradable CO2 permits 
scheme for the power sector cannot be the final answer. By excluding some sectors and 
greenhouse gases from the market the flexibility of the market is clearly reduced. Rather 
then letting the market find a way to reduce emissions cost effectively you have to establish 
reduction targets for individual gases and/or sectors based on model forecasts. Model 
forecasts are likely to be wrong and, as a result, there will be a differentiated treatment of 
sectors and gases and the cost-effective reduction of emissions will not be accomplished.  
However, the main point is to get a system under way that does not prevent a more cost-
effective solution to emerge later on. Generally, it seems that the establishment of a 
tradable greenhouse gas permit market in the EU can follow along two paths: 
1. Individual Member States will establish their own schemes that will gradually merge 
into a larger system 
2. The system includes all Member countries from the outset but has limited coverage of 
gases and sectors. 
Given that many Member States are already considering a national trading scheme, the first 
approach seems to be the more likely of the two. In fact, the first alternative will probably 
not be limited to EU Member States but can equally well consist of Member States together 
with non-member States. In any case, the role of EU institutions in such a scheme is going 
to be limited.  
Still, the view taken here is that the EU, being the only international organisation to sign the 
Kyoto Protocol, provides some interesting opportunities to harmonise some important 
features in a tradable permit market. Especially when taking into consideration that the 
allocation of permits can have a large impact on competition in certain sectors.  
The EU burden sharing agreement has defined the overall cap for the individual EU 
countries. The establishment of an EU power sector bubble will require that the EU 
countries agree on the following: 
 Total amount of permits to be put into the bubble (the target level) 
 Permit contributions from each country’s emission target 
 Distribution mechanisms for permits to individual power plants. 
The section is organised as follows. Subsection 5.4.2 will consider the target level for the 
emissions trading bubble as well as the possible gains from trading in such a scheme. 
Subsection 5.4.3 considers what entities in the power and steam sector can take part in 
trading as well as the possibility of market power. Subsection 5.4.4 then goes on to consider 
the permit contributions from each country's emissions target as well as the distribution 
mechanism to individual power plants. Finally, Subsection 5.4.5 and 5.4.6 will look at the 
trade rules and the control system respectively. 
5.4.2 Target level 
As mentioned earlier, there is a clear need for a harmonised solution to sector allocation of 
permits in the EU so the setting of a sector target for the electricity and steam sector should 
take place at Community level. 
Pollutant and reduction goal 
The total amount of permits to be put into an emissions trading bubble for the power and 
steam sector must reflect the expected emissions reductions needed from this sector in order 
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for the EU to meet its overall Kyoto commitment. First of all, this requires that the 
reduction opportunities of other greenhouse gases be carefully examined. As noted in 
Subsection 5.2.1, many model studies point to a number of cheap reduction opportunities 
with respect to methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) within the EU. If we take the results 
of The Shared Analysis Project, Vol. 5 and Vol. 11 to be indicative of a “best-informed 
guess”, the cost-effective reduction of CO2 emissions corresponds to a 6.2 % reduction in 
the year 2010 compared to the 1990-level. This corresponds to a target level for CO2 
emissions in the EU in the order of 2880 Mt, or alternatively, a reduction of The Shared 
Analysis Vol. 5 baseline level of emissions in 2010 by some 434 Mt. 
Furthermore, we also need to come up with a ‘best-informed guess’ as to how many of 
these CO2 reductions are to take place in the electricity and steam sector. Here we will use 
the marginal abatement cost curves for individual sectors estimated by using the Primes 
Model (Capros and Mantzos, 1999) as mentioned in Subsection 5.2.1 (see also Appendix 
B). The results are confined to the energy system at large and consider that the 
macroeconomic and sectoral patterns remain unchanged. In Figure 5.5 below the marginal 
abatement cost curve for the power and steam sector and the total abatement cost curve 
including all sectors is shown (the figure is identical to Figure 5.2). 
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Source: Capros and Mantzos, 1999. 
Figure 5.5: Marginal abatement cost curves for CO2 
By applying a shadow value to CO2 emissions coming from the whole energy system of the 
EU, which captures about 95 % of total CO2 emissions, the figure shows that a 434 Mt CO2 
emissions reduction can be achieved at a shadow value equal to 38 Eur99/tCO2. This is 
equivalent to a price of CO2 permits equal to 38 Eur99/tCO2 in a CO2 trading scheme 
covering all emissions of CO2 in the EU. 
Preferably, the choice of a common CO2 emissions target for the electricity and steam 
sector can be set by applying the same shadow value to CO2 emissions as is required to 
reach the overall target, i.e. the 38 Eur99/tCO2. This would reduce the carbon leakage 
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between different sectors, which can be a real problem for a downstream trading system, 
especially as long as the coverage of the system is limited (see also Chapter 3).  
As can be seen from the figure the model predicts that app. 260 Mt of CO2 emissions 
reductions relative to the emissions baseline should take place in the power and steam 
sector in order to minimise abatement costs. This corresponds to a reduction in the level of 
emissions in 2010 by app. 22 % compared to 1990-level, or alternatively to an overall 
allocation of permits to the electricity and steam sector in the neighbourhood of 950 Mt 
CO2 equivalents. Due to the many low-cost reduction opportunities in the power sector, the 
suggested least-cost allocation to this sector requires a much larger reduction in emissions 
(22 %) compared to the overall reduction requirement (6.2 %). These figures along with 
simulation in other model studies could serve as a starting point for future negotiations. 
Potential gains from trade 
To get a picture of the potential gains from trade in a tradable CO2 permits market in the 
EU, it makes sense to compare such a system to a situation with no trading at all between 
Member States. Furthermore, comparing it with other schemes with more comprehensive 
coverage of emissions will also be interesting. In the following, we focus on emissions of 
CO2 alone so the coverage is only a matter of what sectors and geographical areas are being 
covered by the trading scheme. We also look into how the position of individual Member 
States changes under different schemes depending on whether they are net buyers or net 
sellers of permits. 
A full-scale trading model in the EU would equalise the price of CO2 permits throughout 
the EU. As we just saw, the Primes model suggests that the equilibrium price of CO2 
permits for the EU would be around 38 Eur99/tCO264 in order to ensure a reduction of CO2 
emissions by 6.2 % compared to the 1990-level. In the following Table 5.6 we have tried to 
illustrate the differences between a situation with full scale trading of CO2 permits between 
Member States and one without. The emissions reductions that correspond to 38 
Eur99/tCO2 in Table 5.6 are the reductions that the individual Member states would choose 
to do domestically if trading was allowed. As a reference, the permit price (or marginal 
abatement costs) if Member States were to achieve their burden sharing target by unilateral 
action (no trading) is shown. In that case, the permit price will not be equalised and permit 
prices are likely to be very high in the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Belgium, and 
consequently, these countries are the ones most likely to be buyers of CO2 permits in a 
common trading scheme. Clearly, the larger the difference between the permit price of a 
Member State in a situation with trading and one without trading, the larger will be the 
gains from participating in a common trading scheme. Besides Belgium and Holland, the 
results suggest that Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden would be net buyers of 
CO2 permits while the net sellers will be Germany, Denmark and France. Despite the large 
emissions reduction requirements of Denmark and Germany, they will nevertheless end up 
as net sellers of CO2 permits. Especially the situation of Germany is outstanding. Germany 
is the only country where the ‘business as usual’ (BAU) emissions of CO2 are expected to 
be lower in 2010 than in 1990 and very much lower as well (by 112 Mt which is equivalent 
to a 12 % reduction). This is mainly due to the German reunification, which has resulted in 
a large decrease of emissions from former East Germany. Likewise, all the cohesion 
countries except Spain will end up as net buyers even though these countries are allowed to 
increase their emissions significantly compared to the 1990 level. The reason is that these 
countries are expected to experience relatively high growth rates in the coming years, and 
                                                           
64 Evidently, this price prediction is just one of many. We refer to chapter 8 for elaboration of 
different models and their price predictions. 
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consequently, their ‘business as usual’ emissions will run higher compared to the rest of the 
EU Member States65.  
Table 5.6: Marginal abatement costs in Member States with and without full scale trading. 
0 (BAU) 14 24 38 55 76 100 128 159
AU 55 89% 3 -1 -3 -5 -7 -9 -11 -13 -14
BE 105 95% 18 13 10 6 2 -3 -8 -15 -20
DK 53 88% 2 -2 -5 -8 -11 -14 -16 -18 -20
FI 51 103% 21 13 6 4 0 -5 -9 -12 -14
FR 352 103% 41 20 8 -5 -11 -29 -46 -66 -82
GE 952 81% -112 -171 -191 -220 -260 -298 -335 -369 -400
GR 71 128% 39 26 24 22 19 16 13 9 7
IR 30 116% 13 10 8 7 4 2 0 -1 -3
IT 388 96% 42 21 0 -15 -27 -40 -54 -69 -83
NL 153 96% 54 39 35 30 25 18 9 0 -7
PO 39 130% 26 23 21 18 11 8 6 4 1
SP 202 118% 73 61 41 33 22 7 -9 -20 -29
SW 50 107% 19 14 12 7 4 0 -2 -5 -8
UK 567 90% 5 -29 -46 -65 -84 -106 -132 -160 -181
EU14 3068 94% 244 38 -79 -190 -312 -452 -593 -734 -854
Trading Burden sharing, no trading
1990 
level
Burden 
Sharing
Change of emissions in 2010 compared to 1990, Mt
Carbon Value: Marginal Abatement Cost in EUR99 per ton CO2 avoided
 
Source: Based on estimates by the Primes, Ver. 2 model by (Capros and Mantzos, 1999).  
Note: The burden sharing targets of the various Member States has been adjusted slightly upwards so 
that the overall EU target corresponds to a 6.2 % reduction in CO2 emissions. The Danish burden 
sharing obligation is assumed to be based on an import/export corrected baseline so the reduction 
percentage related to actual emissions in 1990 has been reduced accordingly (as 1990 involved large 
electricity exports from Denmark).  
In Table 5.7 we have illustrated the consequences of a 22 % reduction target for the power 
and steam sector compared to the 1990 level. Again it is evident that the majority of 
emissions reductions (‘business as usual’ reductions as well as avoided emissions due to the 
implementation of the permit scheme) will take place in Germany. Besides Germany, the 
‘business as usual’ emissions level will also be significantly lower than the 1990 level of 
emissions in United Kingdom mainly due to the ‘dash for gas’ following the early 
liberalisation of the power sector.  
                                                           
65 It should be noted, however, that the Member State Governments have been involved in the 
development of their respective emissions baselines in the Shared Analysis framework, which could 
create a bias towards higher emissions baselines.  
 
Chapter 5. EU model: A qualitative evaluation of a CO2 permit market 
116 Risø-R-1184 (EN) 
 
Table 5.7: CO2 emissions avoided in power and steam trading model 
0 (BAU) 14 24 38 55 76 100 128 159
AU 17 52% -3 -5 -6 -7 -8 -8 -8 -9 -9
BE 28 80% 2 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -6 -8 -9
DK 27 75% 2 -2 -5 -7 -9 -11 -12 -14 -15
FI 22 111% 19 13 6 5 2 -1 -4 -5 -6
FR 72 75% -3 -10 -14 -18 -12 -16 -20 -26 -27
GE 430 68% -87 -129 -136 -154 -177 -199 -215 -228 -238
GR 37 110% 18 7 6 5 4 2 0 -1 -2
IR 12 103% 6 4 3 2 0 -1 -2 -3 -3
IT 147 79% 17 2 -16 -25 -32 -38 -44 -48 -53
NL 64 81% 15 5 2 1 0 -2 -5 -9 -12
PO 19 104% 12 10 9 6 1 -1 -2 -4 -5
SP 79 131% 25 24 24 24 24 24 23 23 23
SW 9 72% 9 6 5 2 0 -2 -3 -4 -5
UK 251 70% -42 -63 -69 -76 -81 -92 -106 -117 -124
EU14 1213 78% -10 -145 -213 -271 -323 -392 -453 -505 -544
Trading Burden sharing, no trading
1990 
level
Burden 
Sharing
Change of emissions in 2010 compared to 1990, Mt
Carbon Value: Marginal Abatement Cost in EUR99 per ton CO2 avoided
 
Source: Same as Table 5.6. The burden-sharing target has been adjusted so that the reduction targets 
for the power sector corresponds to the same marginal abatement costs as before. 
As mentioned above, the potential gains from trade and thus the incentives to trade depend 
on the difference in marginal abatement costs in a situation with trading and one without. 
We will use the marginal abatement cost curves shown in Figure 5.5 to come up with an 
estimate of the potential gains from trade. In the following Table 5.8 the total abatement 
costs of individual Member States at different emissions reduction levels has been 
calculated. 
In the case where no trading is allowed at all the total abatement costs in 2010 is equal to 
MEur99 10674 (the sum of all the shaded areas in Table 5.7. On the other hand, if marginal 
abatement costs are equalised through trading the total abatement costs of the EU is equal 
to MEur99 7071. In other words, the overall gains from trading in 2010 are app. equal to 
MEur99 3600 in a scheme with comprehensive coverage. 
Again, Germany can be used as an illustrative example. As can be seen from Table 5.7, the 
total domestic abatement costs in Germany will amount to MEur99 383 without trading and 
to MEur99 1679 with trading. However, with trading Germany will be able to sell the extra 
permits created (app. 49 Mt of CO2) at a price equal to 38 Eur99, which is equal to MEur99 
1875. In total, the gains from trading in Germany in 2010 will be equal to app. MEur99 
580. 
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Table 5.8: Total abatement costs in 2010 in full trading model in the EU. 
14 24 38 55 76 100 128 159
AU 55 89% 26 61 145 248 359 501 775 948
BE 105 95% 31 90 193 403 713 1163 1929 2719
DK 53 88% 31 90 174 328 499 685 993 1281
FI 51 103% 55 196 271 434 763 1081 1424 1783
FR 352 103% 152 382 784 1074 2265 3785 6048 8276
GE 952 81% 383 756 1679 3535 6042 9346 13220 17576
GR 71 128% 115 147 222 343 534 835 1257 1602
IR 30 116% 22 53 100 217 355 514 720 964
IT 388 96% 156 565 1020 1586 2481 3709 5343 7384
NL 153 96% 79 173 310 553 1033 1766 2818 3882
PO 39 130% 15 57 154 458 629 823 1121 1566
SP 202 118% 95 459 721 1240 2221 3607 4842 6193
SW 50 107% 33 77 223 364 627 865 1185 1645
UK 567 90% 174 485 1074 1976 3437 5760 8880 12000
EU14 3068 94% 1365 3586 7071 12767 21960 34414 50564 67813
Trading Burden sharing, no trading
1990 
level, Mt
Burden 
Sharing
Carbon Value: Marginal Abatement Cost in EUR99 per ton CO2 avoided
Total abatement costs in MEur99
 
Source: The total abatement costs have been calculated by integrating the marginal reduction cost 
curves estimated in the Primes, Ver. 2 model (Capros and Mantzos, 1999). The total abatement costs 
correspond to the emissions reduction levels of Table 5.6. 
A similar calculation has been done for all Member States in the following Table 5.9. 
Furthermore, we have compared the potential cost savings in an emissions trading system 
covering all CO2 emissions in the EU with an emissions trading system covering only the 
power and steam sector, and as a further reference, an emissions trading scheme covering 
all the Annex B countries. The calculation of the gains from trade in a full scale Annex B 
trading model is based on a permit price estimate by (Coherence, 200066) using the POLES 
model, which estimates the permit price to some 66,5$/tC (app. 23 EUR99/tCO2). The same 
study suggests that the permit price of a world wide free emissions trading model would be 
24 $/tC (app. 8 EUR99/tCO2).  
First of all, there are clear benefits from allowing private party emissions trading at 
Community level compared to unilateral action by Member States. A tradable CO2 permit 
scheme with comprehensive coverage of emissions within the EU, which would have to be 
an upstream permit market, could reduce the total abatement costs by some 32 % compared 
to a system with no trading between Member States. In comparison, a Community-wide 
system containing only the electricity and steam sector would reduce the total abatement 
costs by 13 % only. 
These differences in abatement costs are, however, without taking advantage of any of the 
other Kyoto mechanisms. A full CO2 emission trading system between Annex B countries 
suggest overall cost savings in the order of 40 % compared to a situation with no trading at 
all between Member States. Obviously, these gains from trade are not as easily appropriated 
as within the EU given that no international institution can effectively enforce an Annex B 
market. 
                                                           
66 These estimates consider emissions of CO2 alone and not the other greenhouse gases. 
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Table 5.9: Gains from trading CO2 permits in different schemes. 
MEur99 % of GDP MEur99 % MEur99 % MEur99 %
AU 145 0,06% 19 13% 0 0% 0 0%
BE 1163 0,40% 646 56% 425 37% 108 9%
DK 90 0,04% 0 0% 19 21% 14 16%
FI 434 0,21% 95 22% 30 7% 20 5%
FR 382 0,02% 0 0% 89 23% 25 7%
GE 383 0,01% 102 27% 578 151% 266 69%
GR 343 0,23% 75 22% 23 7% 11 3%
IR 217 0,17% 67 31% 22 10% 16 7%
IT 1020 0,06% 101 10% 0 0% 0 0%
NL 3882 0,81% 2696 69% 2147 55% 817 21%
PO 458 0,36% 168 37% 56 12% 49 11%
SP 721 0,09% 58 8% 0 0% 0 0%
SW 364 0,11% 100 28% 26 7% 13 4%
UK 1074 0,07% 131 12% 0 0% 0 0%
EU14 10674 0,10% 4258 40% 3415 32% 1341 13%
EU, Power sector
Gains from trading in various schemes:Total abatement 
costs, non-trading Annex B, All sectors EU, All sectors
 
Source: Based on marginal abatement cost curves estimated by (Capros and Mantzos, 1999) using 
the Primes, Ver. 2 model and an Annex B permit price estimated by (Coherence, 2000) using the 
Poles model. 
Furthermore, some observations can be made about the incentives of individual Member 
States to participate in a given emission-trading scheme. It is evident from Table 5.9 that all 
the buyer countries will have larger gains from trading if the system is widened to cover all 
the Annex B countries. Especially the Netherlands followed by Belgium, Portugal, Greece 
and Finland will have strong incentives to allow for as much flexibility in the system as 
possible. The situation is reversed when we look at the countries that are potential sellers of 
CO2 permits in a system covering only the EU Member States. Especially Germany 
followed by France and Denmark will have strong incentives to limit the coverage of the 
system to the EU Member States. The reason is that the seller countries will sell fewer 
permits at a lower price when the system is widened to cover all the Annex B countries (the 
price of CO2 permits in an Annex B trading scheme is not low enough to turn these 
countries into net buyers). Germany is actually projected to make a net profit in an EU 
trading scheme covering all sectors because the gains from trade is higher than their total 
abatement costs in meeting their own emissions target. This net profit will disappear if the 
system is widened to include all Annex B countries. On the other hand, all EU Member 
States will have an incentive to include as many sectors within the EU as possible and not 
limit the system to the power and steam sector. At least that is the case with the emissions 
reduction requirements shown in Table 5.7, where we have chosen a burden sharing target 
for the power and steam sector that results in marginal abatement costs identical to those 
that are expected to materialise in the system covering all sectors. In other words, if the 
individual Member States are planning to meat their burden-sharing target at the least costs 
to society they will all have incentives to broaden the coverage of the system as much as 
possible. As noted, though, the existence of voluntary agreements between certain sectors 
and the Member State Governments as well as with the European Commission will severely 
limit the possibility of starting out with a broad scheme. 
Obviously, the same observations about possible gains from trade can be made at the 
company level as well. Firms with many cheap emission reduction opportunities do not 
want to include other firms with cheap reduction opportunities in the permit market because 
it can reduce their own profits from selling surplus permits. Unless, of course, the resulting 
drop in the market price of CO2 permits after including a group of new firms (or a sector) is 
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large enough to lower their cost of abatement by more than their profit from selling permits 
is being reduced. 
In conclusion, the overall gains from trade in a CO2 permit market for the power and steam 
sector are significantly lower than from a system including all sectors in the EU and clearly 
such a system should not be the final answer. Nevertheless, the system can still provide 
significant gains from trading. 
5.4.3 Target group 
The target sector is the power and steam sector in the EU. The questions we need to 
consider are the following: 
 Who can take part in trading? (the boundaries of the trading system) 
 The number of sources and companies 
 The concentration of permit holdings among companies 
The third point is particularly important when grandfathering is used as a distributional 
principle. 
Who can take part in trading? 
If abatement costs are to be minimised, it is preferable that the share of total emissions 
covered by an emissions permit system be as large as possible. However, monitoring and 
enforcement costs will be incurred by any policy measure and may limit the coverage of 
emissions sources that is cost effective (as noted earlier). Monitoring costs consist of the 
costs of measuring emissions. Enforcement costs consist of the costs of assessing whether 
there is compliance with the policy measure (whether permit rights are equal to emissions) 
and the costs of prosecuting violators. If the monitoring and enforcement costs required to 
keep violation within set limits for a source exceed the contribution of the source to 
reducing total abatement costs, it would be cost effective to exclude the source from control 
(ABARE, 1998).  
The electricity sector is, however, very regulated from the starting point. This means that 
the fuel consumption and thus the CO2 emissions can be easily monitored. Furthermore, in 
relation to the UNFCCC, the emissions of power stations are to be monitored closely in 
order to assure compliance with the overall emission targets. This is true even without 
emissions trading and the extra costs of monitoring in relation with a trading scheme are 
negligible. 
The enforcement costs of a trading scheme will also be relatively small. However, given 
that the system should be expanded to other sectors later on, it is important to explore 
opportunities to limit the number of participants without significantly reducing the trading 
opportunities. In Table 5.10 the number of boilers in the EU with different primary fuels are 
shown: 
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Table 5.10: Number of units and legal entities with different primary fuels in the EU, 1999. 
 Primary fuels  
 Coal Oil Gas Total number of 
legal entities 
Number of fossil fuelled 
boilers 916 2713 4280 2959
Installed capacity by primary 
fuel, GWe 
162 83 75
Number of fossil fuelled 
boilers > 25 MWe 
695 492 579 375
Installed capacity by primary 
fuel, GWe 
160 72 66
Source: UDI database, 1999. 
The total amount of fossil-fuelled boilers amounts to 7038, while the amount of boilers 
larger than 25 MWe amounts to 1690. The 1690 boilers are in the same order of magnitude 
as the US Acid Rain Program, which has proven to be a workable number. Secondly, the 
total number of legal entities is reduced from app. 3000 to 375 while most of the installed 
capacity of fossil-fuelled boilers is still included in the market.  
The lesson learnt from Table 5.10 is that it will be possible to reduce the number of boilers 
to approx. 1700 and still keep most of the emissions in the system. By doing this the 
administrative procedures can be developed and prepared for a larger scheme. 
The system should be defined as broadly as possible. Notably, the emissions from heat 
production and from combined heat and power production should also be included in the 
market. Otherwise, given that the heat market is a natural monopoly, it might be possible 
for the CHP producers to allocate a disproportional share of the costs of CO2 emissions to 
the production of heat, thereby providing them with a competitive edge in the production of 
electricity. Of course, the problem with how the costs of CO2 emissions is shared between 
electricity and heat is no different than with any other input to production such as fuel, 
capital and labour. However, including emissions stemming from heat as well as power in 
the permit market will secure an equal treatment of the two products.  
If monitoring costs are found to be too large for some smaller industrial plants these should 
be regulated by a tax or some other measure to ensure that they are faced with 
approximately the same cost per unit of emissions. 
The possibility of market power 
If the permits are grandfathered to the existing electricity producers the concentration of 
permits on a few large producers can be a real problem. 
A simple snapshot picture of the concentration of the EU power industry is shown in the 
following Figure 5.6. We have illustrated the electricity market shares as well as the CO2 
market shares for the larger power companies in the EU.  
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Source: Company data collected from 1997 Annual Reports and Environmental Reports. Total 
production and emission figures from 1996 calculated from IEA Electricity Information 1997, 1998 
edition. CO2 market shares have simply been calculated as the percentage of total CO2 emissions 
from power production that stems from individual power companies.  
Figure 5.6: Comparison of market shares. 
The likelihood of market power being present can also be illustrated by a concentration 
index for the EU power sector67. The possibility of strategic interaction between the permit 
and electricity markets can be expected to increase with higher market shares. The m-firm 
concentration ratio simply adds up the m highest market shares in the industry, which gives 
the following result for the electricity sector in the EU:  
Table 5.11: M-firm concentration ratio for the EU power sector, 1996/1997. 
 Production market 
shares 
CO2 market shares (largest 
producers) 
CO2 market shares 
(largest emitters) 
R5 37.70 %  24.76 % 33.70 % 
R10 50.59 %  40.07 % 43.56 % 
R15 58.32 %  43.17 % 48.52 % 
Source: Same as Figure 5.6. 
As can be seen, the 5 largest producers have an electricity market share of 37.70 % and are 
responsible for 24.76 % of the CO2 emissions. Even though such an index is at best only 
                                                           
67 Only under highly simplifying assumptions will concentration indexes (actually the Herfindahl 
index) be an exact measure of industry profitability (see Tirole, 1990). However, the Herfindahl 
index requires knowledge of market shares of all market participants. When firms have asymmetric 
market shares (because of cost differences, say), there is no longer an unambiguous measure of 
concentration. Furthermore, in a dynamic perspective upholding a high industry-wide profit will 
require some sort of barrier to entry. Still, we will use a concentration index as an indicator of the 
possibility of market power being present. 
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indicative of the possibility of market power being present68, the numbers indicate that the 
electricity sector is not unsuitable as a starting point for emissions trading. Especially since 
some of the largest companies are not among the highest emitters of CO2. 
The electricity sector should not be seen in a static perspective, however. The changing 
frame conditions following the liberalisation directive for the electricity and gas sectors 
have started to provoke a response from the industry itself. It seems clear that the size of a 
company is a shaping factor with regard to the type and dimension of risks that can be 
accepted and the ability to expand into new markets and businesses clearly depends hereon. 
So far, we have seen a tendency towards horizontal integration between power companies 
as well as power companies buying up distribution companies. Within the last few years, 
several of the larger companies in Figure 5.6 have merged (or have announced plans to do 
so). This is true for EdF/EnBW, PreussenElektra/Bayernwerke and RWE/VEW. This 
process is expected to proceed and the result will probably be only a handful of large 
companies within a relatively short period of time. 
Moreover, the experience with the market liberalisation for the electricity sector so far 
clearly indicates that the lack of third party access to the grid in some cases have resulted in 
abuse of market power (Wolfram, 1997). The point is, however, that the market for CO2 
permits will extend Community-wide and not be regional in character like the electricity 
market itself. Furthermore, the establishment of a formal marketplace for the buying and 
selling of CO2 permits means that the buyers and sellers of permits will not know the 
identity of each other. Finally, it should be noted that a large concentration of CO2 permits 
on a few sources in itself would not result in possible abuse of market power. As noted in 
Chapter 3, it is the difference between the cost-effective permit allocation and the allocation 
that the company receives free of charge from the outset that is the real problem in terms of 
market power. 
The conclusion is that there will be a reasonable number of sources of CO2 -emissions in 
the power sector to use it as a testing ground for an EU-scheme of emissions trading. In the 
longer run, it will be important to broaden the scope of the trading scheme and the inclusion 
of other sectors will limit the risk of market power. 
                                                           
68 The fact that electricity has to be supplied via a grid makes the competitive situation quite unique. 
As there are no economically viable storage opportunities for electricity, supply has to equal demand 
at all times. This is coupled with the fact that the flow of electricity in a grid is governed by the law 
of physics and cannot be allocated in a certain direction. Thirdly, the power loss in a grid rises 
quadratically with the current and linearly with the distance. What all this means is that the 
competitive situation of a specific power plant can change dramatically during the day, week or year. 
At some hours the power plant may be exposed to competition by a range of other suppliers while at 
another time of day the competitive situation may be more like a local monopoly. The transmission 
capacities and the way the usage of this transmission capacity is priced determine the extent to which 
a Danish power plant will compete with a Dutch power plant. Even though a system with free third-
party access to the transmission grid is established, securing that future investments in the 
transmission grid will actually reflect the scarcity in the grid can also be a potentially contentious 
issue, especially with regard to the building of international transmission capacity. However, as long 
as primary energy is by large cheaper to move around than electricity, there will be no need for 
moving around a substantial volume of base load electricity from the southernmost part of the EU to 
the northernmost part. 
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5.4.4 Distribution rule  
As noted earlier, when having agreed on the target level for a tradable CO2 permit market 
for the power and steam sector, we need to consider the two following things: 
 Permit contributions from each country’s emission target 
 Distribution mechanisms for permits to individual power plants. 
From a political point of view, distribution (and redistribution) of wealth is of paramount 
importance. The total yearly amount of CO2 permits to be allocated to the power and steam 
sector in EU-15 is suggested to be in the neighbourhood of 950 Mt corresponding to a 22 % 
reduction of emissions compared to the 1990 level. With a modest value of CO2 permits at 
15 Euro per ton CO2 this means that the sum to be distributed between the EU Member 
States will be app. 14 billion Euro per year, considering emissions from the electricity and 
steam sector alone. 
Many arguments can be used in defining the ‘just’ allocation of CO2 permits. Among the 
most important are: 
• Existing emitters will claim a prescriptive right to continue their emissions. 
• Those parties worst damaged by the limited number of emission rights will claim the 
need for a compensation 
• New entrants will claim the right to be treated equally compared to the existing emitters 
• It can be claimed that all citizens have the same right to emit CO2. This leads to a per 
capita distribution rule 
• The economically ‘less’ developed EU member countries might claim the right to emit 
much more than their historical emissions because compared to the strong economies in 
the EU, they did not emit much CO2 in the past.  
In the longer run, the most logical and fair allocation principle is a per capita allocation 
principle. Everything else is based on random political power struggles between countries 
(and sectors). However, in order to achieve a political feasible solution it will probably be 
necessary to use some kind of free allocation of permits to existing emitters, grandfathering. 
There are two different levels of distributional aspects that are crucial in relation to the 
initial allocation of CO2 permits: 
 the redistribution of wealth between Member States, which relates to the Burden 
Sharing Agreement; 
 and the redistribution of wealth between sectors (between capital owners, workers and 
consumers). 
Some of the economically ‘less’ developed EU member countries have claimed the right to 
emit much more than their historical emissions because compared to the strong economies 
in the EU, they did not emit much CO2 in the past. In that case, the flexibility of 
grandfathering might satisfy troublesome EU members by giving them a larger number of 
permits than their historical emission levels qualify them for, which is exactly what has 
been done by the Burden Sharing Agreement. The point of using a grandfathered system is 
to create incentives for a larger number of countries to participate in the system. In this 
way, ‘hot air’ can be thought of as compensation to some countries that might not otherwise 
have participated.  The trick is to ensure that the amount of ‘hot air’ is kept as low as 
possible while still ensuring participation (Barrett, 1998). 
However, any distribution rule based on historic emissions as defined by some base year 
will become irrelevant in the longer run. This applies at the Member State level (Burden 
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Sharing) as well as at the sector or company level. Therefore, grandfathering should be 
gradually out-phased thereby reducing the risk of over-compensating some Member States 
or sectors. Needless to say this will not happen easily. However, the existing Burden 
Sharing Agreement only deals with the compliance period 2008-2012 and reduction targets 
for periods later than that need to be renegotiated. 
Permit contributions from each country’s emission target  
As noted earlier, the allocation of permits to certain sectors by individual Member States 
can be carried out in such a way as to distort competition in that sector. The importance of 
the energy sector taken together with the ongoing liberalisation of the gas and power sector 
will make the energy sector an obvious candidate for a favourable allocation by Member 
States. For that reason, the allocation of permits to the power and steam sector from each 
country's emissions target needs to be harmonised.  
The least distortive approach is undoubtedly to construct a ‘true’ EC emission trading 
bubble from the outset. This would mean assigning 950 Mt of CO2 permits to the emissions 
trading bubble, emissions that are to be taken out of the total amount of greenhouse gas 
emissions assigned to the European Community. The revenue from the sale of the permits 
goes into the EC budget and the revenue is recycled to the participating companies 
according to some standardised rules of allocation (or redistributed to the Community at 
large if deemed possible). The problem with this approach, of course, is the lack of 
incentives of some Member States to participate in such a scheme. First of all, this approach 
ignores the political reality of the Burden Sharing Agreement. If the allocation rule is 
standardised, the redistribution of wealth between Member States will almost certainly 
differ from the Burden Sharing Agreement and some Member states will stand to loose. 
Secondly, this approach transfers a lot of decisional competence to the EC level compared 
to the National Governments, which some Member States will be very reluctant to accept. 
A more feasible solution is to let the total amount of permits, that is being allocated to the 
power and steam sector bubble, consist of assigned amounts from each Member State. The 
amount of CO2 permits that is assigned to the emissions trading bubble by each Member 
State will then need to be deducted from the overall assigned amount of each Member State 
as defined by the Burden Sharing Agreement. Furthermore, the revenue generated from the 
sale of CO2 permits will be redistributed to the Member States corresponding to the number 
of permits assigned by each individual Member State. In other words, we are considering a 
revenue-neutral auction at the EC level where some or all of the permits assigned by each 
Member State are put out for sale. Each Member State will then receive its particular share 
of the revenue (see Subsection 5.4.5).  
To illustrate the consequences of applying different initial allocation principles, we will use 
the following three allocations of CO2 emission permits: 
• Uniform reduction in all Member States. Each Member State must reduce emissions of 
CO2 from the power sector by 22 % compared to 1990. 
• An allocation of permits based on the EU burden sharing agreement. Each Member 
State must reduce emissions of CO2 from the power sector by their respective 
percentage compared to 1990. The actual reduction percentages of individual Member 
States have been proportionally rolled back so that the overall reduction corresponds to 
a 22 % reduction of emissions. 
• Per capita allocation. The total CO2 emissions from the EU power sector in 1990 
reduced by 22 % is allocated to each Member State in relation to their share of the total 
population in the EU. 
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Figure 5.7 below illustrates the number of CO2 permits that will be allocated to the power 
and steam sector from each Member State depending on the allocation principle. 
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Figure 5.7: Comparison of different initial allocation principles. 
It can be seen from Figure 5.7 that there are significant differences between the three 
allocation principles. Notably, an allocation of the permits based on a per capita principle 
will transfer a lot of wealth to the power sector in poorer and/or relatively less carbon 
intensive Member States. On the other hand, the power sector in rich and/or carbon 
intensive Member States like Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, Finland 
and Denmark will loose from the per capita allocation principle.  
In Figure 5.8 below we have compared the permit allocations in Figure 5.7 with a baseline 
projection of the CO2 emissions from the power and steam sector in the EU-countries in 
2010. The baseline scenario of The Shared Analysis Project mentioned earlier is used to 
illustrate the situation. 
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Figure 5.8: Different initial allocation principles and deficit of CO2 permits in 2010 
 
Figure 5.8 shows that for most countries and allocation principles the CO2 permits will 
constitute a binding constraint on the economy in 2010. This is no surprise given that we 
are assuming that emissions from the power and steam sector are to be reduced by 22 % 
compared to the 1990 level of emissions. The notable exemptions are France and Austria, 
who will have ‘hot air’ for sale if the per capita allocation principle is applied. This means 
that these countries can fulfil their obligations by doing ‘business as usual’ and still have 
permits for sale. Clearly the allocation based on a per capita principle is not a feasible 
solution, since the power sectors in France and Austria will be massively overcompensated. 
Presumably, if these countries are still intending to meet their burden sharing targets, some 
other sectors in these countries would have to undergo massive emissions reductions, so 
this allocation might not be in the their own self-interest. 
 Figure 5.9 takes the analysis a step further. Here we have used the marginal abatement cost 
curves for the power and steam sector in the various EU Member States derived by (Capros 
and Mantzos, 1999) to see what Member States will be net buyers or sellers of permits in a 
common CO2 trading regime. As we saw earlier, the overall emissions reduction target is 
met at a CO2 permit price of 38 Eur99/tCO2, and Figure 5.9 compares the emissions 
reductions that will be undertaken by each Member State at that permit price with the 
amount of permits allocated to the sector. If the actual emissions of a Member State are 
lower than its assigned amount (depending on the rule of allocation) that particular Member 
State will be a net seller of permits and vice versa. 
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Source: Own calculations based on (Capros and Mantzos, 1999) using the Primes, Ver. 2 model.  
Figure 5.9: Buyers and sellers of CO2 permits 
It is worth noting from Figure 5.9 that Germany despite a high percentage reduction 
according to the burden sharing agreement is still a large net seller of permits using this 
allocation principle, whereas Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece with room for increasing 
emissions will still be buyers of permits. Only if the per capita allocation principle is 
applied will all the richer and carbon intensive countries become net buyers of permits. 
Germany, Denmark and United Kingdom become net buyers instead of net sellers while 
Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands will buy even more than before. On the other hand, 
Italy and Portugal become net sellers instead of net buyers of CO2 permits under the per 
capita allocation rule while Spain, Greece and Ireland remain net buyers although to a 
lesser extent.  
The potential problem with an approach based on assigned amounts from each Member 
State is the possible distortion of competition, given that some Member States will have a 
large amount of permits compared to what their power sector actually need to cover their 
emissions of CO2. Figure 5.9 illustrates that an allocation based on the Burden Sharing 
Agreement is closer to the economic optimal allocation suggested by the Primes model than 
the two other allocation principles. In other words, the possibility for distorting competition 
is reduced. At the same time, however, the incentives for cross-border trading of CO2 
permits are smaller when the permits are allocated according to the Burden Sharing 
Agreement. In any case, the redistribution of revenue by Member States to the permit-
market participants will have to be overlooked by the European Commission (see next 
paragraph).  
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As noted, the allocation rule between the Member States should change over time. In our 
opinion, the distribution of responsibilities between Member States should gradually 
converge to a per capita allocation rule.  
In conclusion, a proportional rollback of the emissions defined by the Burden Sharing 
Agreement does not seem like a bad starting point. Possibly, this solution is also easier to 
deal with in terms of the distributional struggle between Member States. The overall 
emissions target for the power and steam sector bubble will remain a very contestable issue, 
however. 
Distribution mechanism for permits to individual power plants. 
We are now left with the question of how to distribute the permits to private parties. A 
fundamental question, of course, is whether the distribution principle used should be 
common to all Member States or up to the discretion of the individual Member States. 
There are two related questions we need to consider in this respect: 
 Can some Member States distribute the revenue broadly while others return the revenue 
to the market participants (i.e., grandfathering)? 
 Can Member States choose for themselves how to grandfather the permits or do there 
have to be a common grandfathering principle between the Member States? 
With regard to the first point, it is important to note that under ideal conditions, 
grandfathering the permits to existing producers entails an opportunity cost on production 
that is equivalent to that of using an auction. This means that the long-term investment 
decisions will be affected in the same way under grandfathering and auctions. In this way, 
the choice of distributional principle will not distort long-term resource allocation and 
could be left to Member States to decide69.  
This conclusion can, however, be challenged. An important underlying assumption is the 
existence of perfect capital markets. When the revenue from the sale of permits is 
distributed to society at large, the tradable permit market works very much like a tax 
instrument (with the notable difference that uncertainty is on the price of emissions instead 
of the quantity). This means that the ‘out-of-pocket’ cash flow of existing emitters will be 
relatively large and the changes in the balance sheet of the company can be significant. 
Furthermore, the company might have to resort to loan financing of future investments, and 
if capital markets are not perfect, this could result in credit rationing. If the ‘out-of-pocket’ 
cash flow results in credit rationing like this, the choice of distributional principle will 
affect resource allocation in the long term.  
A much more important issue has to do with the fact that the revenue from the sale of CO2 
permits is very large and can be used to offset other distorting taxes in the economy. As 
suggested by several studies, there are large welfare gains if the revenue is used to reduce 
other taxes in the economy rather than being given away for free to the existing emitters. 
From a perspective of fairness this is also a better solution, as the revenue is distributed 
broadly and reflects the fact that every citizen has the same right to emit CO2 into the 
atmosphere. For these reasons, grandfathering should be outfaced. One way of achieving 
this could be to gradually convert the units assigned to the bubble to EC assigned amount 
units. The revenue from the sale of these units would then go into the EC budget and the 
revenue should be distributed to society at large. 
From the outset, however, the initial distribution principle that many Member States will 
choose will undoubtedly involve some sort of grandfathering. Obviously, if some Member 
                                                           
69Rather, it is the overall allocation or permits that really matters for long-term resource allocation.  
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States choose to distribute the permits to the market participants it is rather unlikely that 
other Member States will not do the same. In this way, every existing emitter will receive 
the right to emit a certain amount of CO2. The second question raised above concerns the 
issue whether or not the principle used for grandfathering the permits should be common to 
all Member States or not. 
Leaving it to the Member States requires that the power sector is reasonably competitive, 
otherwise some companies might be able to use a favourable allocation of CO2 permits to 
gain market shares in the power market. As we have seen, the future situation in the power 
sector might not be that competitive. This could be a problem, especially since the 
distribution of permits between Member States is based on the premise that all Member 
States must have incentives to participate in the scheme. This means that some Member 
States will receive a relatively large proportion of the revenue and this revenue could be 
redistributed to domestic producers in a way that could help them to expand production 
internationally.  
The least distortive option would be to decide on a common distribution principle to the 
market participants. Notably, an allocation of permits to individual power plants based on a 
percentage reduction of the current size of emissions is to be preferred over an allocation 
principle based on past emissions, i.e. emissions in 1990. This ensures that power plants or 
blocks, which are shut down or mothballed today, are not given rights to pollute, and 
likewise, that power plants, which were not in operation back in 1990 will still receive their 
fair share of the permits. This, on one hand, leaves little room for power companies to 
exercise potential market power and on the other hand will be able to achieve a given 
reduction in CO2/kWh with the lowest negative impact on competitiveness.  
Of course, politically this introduces a new set of problems. Firms that have lower 
emissions today will argue that this is a result of their dedication to reduce emissions and 
therefore they should be compensated for their early action. 
A common allocation principle could ensure that the way the permits are allocated to 
individual power plants is not in violation with the EC rules on state aid. The allocation of 
permits to private parties could be in violation with the EC rules on state aid if the revenue 
created from selling permits is higher than the total abatement costs that the emissions 
reduction target inflicts on that particular company. In other words, if the company can 
make a net profit from taking on an emissions reduction target defined by the Member 
State. If it were left to the discretion of Member States, the Commission would have to 
approve of the principle chosen by each Member State. As noted, the Commission can 
overlook the EC rules on state aid quite independently. This could mean that some Member 
States would not be able to redistribute all the revenue to the participating parties because it 
would be in violation with the EC rules on state aid.  
In conclusion, it will be preferable with a common grandfathering principle but leaving it to 
the discretion of Member States with regulatory oversight by the Commission is a more 
feasible solution. In any case, there should be a common agreement as to how 
grandfathering can be outfaced from the system over time. 
5.4.5 Trade rules 
A CO2 permit market can be thought of as a public mechanism for buying and selling 
permits. This public mechanism is supposed to provide a solution to the following aspects: 
Transaction aspects. The market will offer a method to perform economic transactions, 
which means buying and selling of CO2 permits and clarifying issues such as property 
rights and contractual obligations in relation hereto. 
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Information aspects. The market will offer a method to collect and dissipate information on 
trade conditions, mainly price information, which means that potential buyers will gain 
information on price and quantity of CO2 permits for sale. Likewise, potential sellers will 
know the demand for their permits. 
The following will build on Chapter 3 and 4 to suggest the trade rules that need to be 
determined by the EC and its Member States in order to make the market function properly.  
Definition of a CO2 permit 
By an individual permit we will understand a right to emit 1 tonne of CO2. Each permit will 
specify what particular Member State has issued the permit and the year of issue (vintage 
year). Once the permit has been used to show compliance it will be withdrawn from the 
market. This means that for every new compliance period the permits will be reissued. As 
long as the permits have not been used to show compliance they stay in circulation and the 
permits are all identical no matter what vintage year is actually written on the permit. In 
other words, the permits can be banked for later use. 
The US SO2 legislature specifies that the entitlement is not a full property right but rather a 
limited permission to emit sulphur dioxide. This allows the government to make changes 
over time without any compensation to the market participants. This approach is also valid 
here to a limited extent.  
Obviously, any changes in the entitlement to CO2 permits have to be done with extreme 
caution, since a full property right is essential for a well functioning market. However, we 
need to distinguish between two things:  
 changes to the overall allocation of permits to the trading system, which in turn 
determines the market price of CO2 permits,  
 and changes to the distribution of revenue between market participants and society in 
general.  
With the liberalisation of the power sector it will be the market value of the assets that 
matter rather than the book value. The same will be true for tradable CO2 permits. What 
matters for investment decisions is what the permits can be sold for today and for years to 
come. For that reason, it is important that a credible economic value of CO2 permits is 
established for a considerable time period reflecting the long investment horizons in the 
power sector. Therefore, any alterations in the overall allocation of permits to the permit 
market must be the responsibility of the EC and not the market participants. 
However, any enlargement of the trading scheme to include other sectors, gases or even 
countries will affect the equilibrium price of CO2 permits as well. This is unfortunate 
because investments in cleaner technologies undertaken prior to the enlargement can turn 
out to be stranded. This problem is inherent in all tradable permit schemes that start out 
with less than complete coverage of emissions and it is not easily dealt with. 
With regard to the second point above, we noted earlier that any distribution principle based 
on historic emissions will become irrelevant in the longer run and the gradual out-phasing 
of grandfathering will reduce the risk of overcompensating traditional emitters. Preferably, 
the gradual out-phasing of grandfathering should be determined from the outset. However, 
given that changes in the distribution principle will not affect the market value of the 
companies' assets but only the book value, the Authorities can make minor changes to the 
distribution principle that was not agreed upon from the outset without compensation.  
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Duration of compliance period 
The market should be able to allocate efficiently between market participants as well as 
over time. To achieve efficient allocation over time the market participants should be 
allowed to allocate emissions freely over time. This would include banking (as noted) as 
well as borrowing of emissions. Banking means that any permits that are not used to show 
compliance during a specific time period can be carried forward to subsequent periods 
while borrowing means that future permits can be carried forward in time to show 
compliance in the current period.  
Borrowing is only to a limited extent sanctioned by the Kyoto Protocol by the 
establishment of 5-year compliance periods (so far only one compliance period, namely 
2008-2012) and within this compliance period countries are allowed to allocate their 
emissions anyway they choose. As noted earlier, borrowing of permits from future 
allocations of permits also poses a lot of problems in terms of credibility of the system. For 
these reasons, borrowing of permits is going to be limited.  
In addition, the longer the compliance period the less liquidity can be expected in the 
marketplace, which could mean that the market price of permits would not be credible. The 
duration of the compliance period is therefore suggested to be limited to a year. 
However, it is important to limit the adverse effects following from no or limited access to 
borrowing of permits. A potential problem with a trading system confined to CO2 emissions 
is that once the opportunities for fuel switching are exhausted, the short run supply curve of 
CO2 permits may be very inelastic. This is due to the fact that unlike SO2 emissions there 
are no ‘end-of-pipe’ solutions for reducing CO2 emissions and further reductions in CO2 
will require substantial investments in new technologies with low or no CO2 emissions.  
This could be a real problem if the compliance period is short. Especially, since the 
economic business cycles of the EU Member States are expected to become more aligned 
there could be a cyclical tendency in the pricing of the permits. In years with strong 
economic growth in the EU, the prices of the permits would be high and vice versa in 
periods with low economic growth. Given the long investment horizons of power projects 
this situation is far from ideal. 
The size and heterogeneity of the EU electricity market will alleviate this problem, though. 
First of all, the weather conditions, such as mean temperature and precipitation, will 
fluctuate in the different areas of the EU. Yearly variations in mean temperature have a 
huge impact on electricity demand and yearly variations in precipitation will influence on 
the supply opportunities of hydropower stations, which in turn will influence on the 
residual demand for conventionally produced electricity. These variations are only 
correlated to a limited extent between the Member States and will therefore introduce some 
flexibility into the system.  
Still, it would be preferable to allow for inter-temporal flexibility in the timing of emissions 
reductions. If borrowing is not allowed, the inter-temporal flexibility in the system is linked 
to the level of the fine for being in non-compliance. Obviously, the maximum price that 
anybody is willing to pay for extra permits will never be higher than the level of the fine. 
Thus, the level of the fine will put a price ceiling on the permit market. A low level of the 
fine will introduce more flexibility into the system because essentially the EC has extra 
permits for sale at a price equal to the level of the fine. In other words, the permit system 
will start working like a price instrument (tax) once the price ceiling has been reached. 
Unless the correlation between economic growth and CO2 emissions becomes significantly 
weaker than today, the price of the permits would sooner or later approach the level of the 
fine. Introducing a permit market will however lead to innovations in carbon reducing 
technologies and will therefore tend to make the link weaker. 
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In sum, the fine for non-compliance should not be set too high because in that case the costs 
borne by the regulated entities can be potentially enormous (large dead-weight loss to 
society). A suggestion could be app. 40 EUR/tCO2. 
At the end of each annual compliance period the account of every individual market 
participant is settled. A one-month ‘true-up’ period is allowed and during this month the 
emitters have the opportunity to ‘fine-tune’ their stock of emissions with their accumulated 
emission level during the preceding year. If the actual emissions are lower then the current 
permit holdings the surplus permits are credited to next years account. If the actual 
emissions are higher than the current permit holdings a fine is paid for the excess 
emissions.  
Auction design 
We propose that the EC should undertake a yearly EU-wide auction where all or a large 
share of the permits are put out for sale. The inclusion of a large share of the permits in the 
auction will secure equal access to the permits in all the Member States and thus an 
efficient allocation of the permits. Furthermore, this will provide price information and 
transparency to the market, which is important especially in the beginning when market 
participants are not that familiar with the market. 
By putting all the permits out for sale at an auction we are separating the issue of allocation 
from the issue of distribution. The revenue from the auction is redistributed to the Member 
States according to the overall distribution of responsibilities that is decided upon. As 
noted, the actual redistribution of the revenue to market participants could be left to the 
discretion of Member States with regulatory oversight by the Commission. 
We propose to use a non-discriminatory pricing principle for the auction where all bidders 
of permits pay the clearing price for the permits (provided that their bid was below the 
clearing price). The non-discriminatory auction provides important information to the 
market and works fine except in the case of a few very dominant market actors70.  
To make sure that there are buyers as well as sellers in the permit market and that the risk 
sharing capabilities of the marketplace will come into play, everybody should be allowed to 
participate in the market. Obviously, this includes brokers and traders as well. Brokers will 
offer arrangements (bilateral contracts) that hedge the price risk of buyers and sellers in the 
permit market. Experience from the US SO2 market have shown that contracts that address 
the volume risk directly and not necessarily the price risk are likely to be introduced, i.e. 
weather hedges. Traders (or speculators) on the other hand, take open positions in the 
permit market and speculate in future price changes. This adds liquidity to the market and 
reduces the difference between bids by buyers and sellers.  
Like in the US the system could start before the first compliance period. Possibly, the 
regulators should also release permits that are valid in the current year as well as permits 
that are valid in years to come (i.e. selling vintage year 2008 permits and vintage year 2013 
permits at the same time). 
                                                           
70 Neither a non-discriminatory (uniform) pricing principle nor a discriminatory (“pay-your-bid”) 
pricing principle is fully efficient because it can be shown that bidding your true demand curve is 
dominated by other strategies. If market power is not significant, the uniform pricing principle is 
nearly efficient (See Cramton & Kerr, 1998). 
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5.4.6 Control system  
The purpose of the control system is to make the whole trading scheme credible by assuring 
that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a permit to emit one tonne of CO2 and 
the actual emission of one tonne of CO2. The control system consists of two major parts, 
monitoring of emissions and enforcement. In this respect, it is important to clarify the 
relation between the overall compliance of Member States and the compliance of private 
entities included in the permit market. This leaves four cases as shown in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.12: Various elements of a control system. 
 Monitoring and verification of 
emissions 
Enforcement 
Market 
participants 
Emissions must comply with 
permits held by market participant 
National/EU sanctions against 
market participants 
Member States States must comply with Kyoto/EU 
burden sharing targets 
EU/UNFCCC sanctions against 
states 
 
One of the major issues in designing a single sector, single gas trading scheme will be the 
relation between the total national (or European) reduction targets and the target for the 
electricity sector. To make the emissions trading market as credible as possible, it is 
necessary that the total emission limit that applies to the permit market is known in advance 
– at least – for each commitment period and preferably much longer. This means that the 
target for the power and steam sector trading system should not be changed because of lack 
of compliance in other sectors, i.e. transportation.  
The only way such an influence could come about would be if governments – or other 
entities – buy emission permits and withdraw them from the market to be used to comply 
with emissions in other sectors. In this way, the electricity sector will be compensated for 
tightening of emission targets. 
Another issue is the relation between the national emissions targets as defined in the 
Burden Sharing Agreement and the overall EU target. Or in other words, if the EU will take 
the role as a party to the UNFCCC on behalf of all the Member States. In the context of a 
European-wide scheme of emissions trading it would be natural that the ultimate 
responsibility for ensuring compliance will be on a European level.  
It is the general assumption, however, that monitoring and enforcement in relation to the 
companies from the starting point will be a Member State task, because the Member State 
Authorities are equipped with the necessary regulatory power in relation to the private 
parties. On the other hand, the system could gain in general efficiency and credibility by the 
establishment of a common European institution. This could be EEA (European 
Environmental Agency).  
Monitoring and verification of emissions from market participants 
The direct measurement of CO2 emissions is expensive. As noted by (UNCTAD 1995), it is 
also unnecessary since accurate estimates can be made on the basis of the volume of 
carbon-based fuels that are burnt. All that is required is therefore that the flow of fuels is 
being monitored. 
There is no doubt that in the case of gas-fired plants, the measurement of fuel will be a 
cheap and efficient way to calculate the total CO2 emissions. The scope for cheating will be 
low, as there is a close relation between fuel input and electricity output for a given plant. 
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Both amounts can be found in the financial accounts of the company, accounts that are 
verified by external auditors. 
For coal fired plants a number of complications are involved in calculating the emissions 
from the fuel input. 
To estimate CO2 emissions from the content of carbon in the fuel it can be necessary to 
distinguish between coal of different origins as the carbon content can differ substantially. 
As an example, the yearly weighted average of CO2 emissions from the types of coal used 
by the Energy Company ELSAM is 95 grams of CO2 per MJ. The emissions from the 
different types of coal lie in the range of 87 grams of CO2 per MJ as is the case with coal 
from Canada and a maximum of 100 grams per MJ as is the case with coal from Great 
Britain. The variation in the yearly CO2 emissions per MJ from any particular power plant 
is low, though (lies within a range of ± 1 %). If the emissions were to be reported every 
month the resulting variation in CO2 emissions per MJ would be higher. This would make it 
practically harder to come up with a precise estimate of the CO2 emissions, since closer 
attention must be paid to what type of coal is actually being used at every given point in 
time. This is not always obvious, as different types of coal usually get mixed when lying on 
a storage yard.  
It also must be taken into account that part of the coal is left unburned in the ashes. This 
share varies between individual plants depending on the design. For pulverised coal firing 
the typical fraction of unburned is 5 %, but within a range of 3-10 %. For grate firing the 
typical fraction of unburned fuel in the ashes is as high as 30-40 %. Grate firing is a 
technology that is ‘dying’, but a number of small, mainly industrial plants still exist. 
Finally, there is also a marginal emission of CO2 from limestone used for desulphurisation.  
As described, there are a number of uncertainties that must be handled if fuel input shall be 
used to calculate CO2 emissions from coal fired plants. These uncertainties have to be 
weighted against the uncertainties of direct measurement. It is well known that it is quite 
easy to make very accurate measurements of the concentration of CO2 in a gas, but 
measuring the flow of flue gas is much more uncertain.  
Following another line of argument, (ABARE, 1998) notes that it would be desirable to 
base required permit holdings on a direct measurement of emissions since technologies are 
being developed for the post combustion capture and disposal of carbon dioxide emissions. 
However, these technologies are far from being economical at the moment due to large 
energy and investment costs. The argument is thus not very strong. 
In conclusion, calculating the CO2 emissions from the fuel input is a very cheap and 
efficient method, especially for a gas fired plant. This will be relevant for many of the 
smallest installations and thus not put a lower limit to the size of plant that can be part of 
the trading scheme. For coal fired plants the uncertainties can be so large that direct 
measurement should be preferred. These installations are usually large and the extra costs 
for measurement of CO2 emissions will be of minor importance. As long as the levels of 
uncertainties are comparable (in fact, as long as the uncertainties are not biased so that they 
sum out over time), the use of different methods of measuring will pose no difficulties. 
The emissions data will be collected by means of self-reporting by the companies.   
The most important role to be played by EC institutions will be to establish minimum 
requirements with regard to the measurement of emissions while to a large extent leaving 
actual monitoring and verification of emissions to the Member State Governments.  
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At present two monitoring mechanisms of national emissions exists: 
• National reporting to the secretariat of the UNFCCC 
• EU monitoring mechanism 
The national reporting to the UNFCCC is at present a relatively slow reporting system 
giving a time lag of 1-2 years between the timing of emissions and reporting. Even though 
this reporting may be speeded up it will probably continue to be too slow to serve as market 
information. 
Despite its modest and technical name, the EU ‘monitoring mechanism’ must be considered 
the cornerstone of the EU climate policy in the second half of the 1990s. Adopted in June 
1993, it obliges member countries to develop national programs for reducing greenhouse 
gases while the Commission evaluates the data provided by the member countries. An 
important feature of the monitoring mechanism is that it introduces additional and more 
specified commitments than the FCCC. However, inadequate reporting by the member 
countries has so far reduced its effectiveness. (Ringius, 1999)  
The EU monitoring mechanism could be developed to be the reporting procedure for the 
emissions trading scheme. At least, the annual reporting of emissions from the power and 
steam sector must be faster than today. The final data for the preceding year should be 
available in January in order to allow for a true-up period for the emission rights. To give 
the best possible market information it is proposed to report and publish emission data for 
companies included in the trading scheme on a monthly basis. This will mean speeding up 
of the existing reporting procedures, but it should be possible to do this with only minor 
extra costs.  
Finally, verifying that the emissions reported by companies are correct is most easily done 
by the Member States. The Member States could verify the reported emissions on a yearly 
basis and submit their result to an EC institution. Obviously, the Member States might have 
incentives to cheat as well, however, the scope for cheating should be relatively small with 
respect to the power and steam sector.  
Enforcement  
If emission trading is organised as proposed above with a single emissions target for all 
market participants, the issue of enforcement is ‘reduced’ to securing the individual 
compliance of all actors.  
In order to verify that the actual emissions by market participants actually correspond to 
their permit holdings, the following question can be raised: What are the differences 
between what is required in a system with emissions trading and one without? Clearly, in 
relation to the Kyoto protocol monitoring of emissions is necessary in both cases. However, 
when trading is allowed the actual emissions have to be compared with the current balance 
of CO2 permits so the trading of permits needs to be recorded at a central registry. This 
function can be computerised and should not give any theoretical or practical difficulties, 
which has been clearly demonstrated by the US Acid Rain programme.  
This central registry must be at the EU level. Data for emissions may be collected by 
national authorities but shall at once be transmitted to a European institution. Through the 
trading system a registry of permit holdings of each of the actors in the market is 
established. Likewise, through the monitoring process, a registry of the actual emissions of 
each actor is established. The ‘trick’ of the enforcement is to compare the two numbers for 
each actor and have the necessary authority to deter actors from breaking the emission 
limits.  
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The first step will be to establish sanctions against market participants who cheat on their 
reporting of emissions. In a European trading scheme the national authorities will – today – 
be the first choice for the practical enforcement because the authority for imposing 
sanctions on the actors will rest at the national level. The sanctions must not be seen 
independently but in conjunction with the probability of being caught if you cheat. Taking 
into consideration that the likelihood of detecting cheating is pretty high in this trading 
scheme, it will probably not be necessary with sanctions such as prison sentences to deter 
cheating. A high monetary sanction should be sufficient. 
The next step will be to establish sanctions against market participants exceeding their 
permit holdings. The suggestion here is straightforward. Market participants whose 
emissions are exceeding their current permit holdings must pay a fine for their excess 
emissions. The level of the fine must be the same in all Member States. Otherwise, there 
could be carbon leakage to areas with lower fine levels. 
This raises the question of the level of the fine. As noted in the previous subsection, the 
level of the fine is the maximum price that anybody will be willing to pay for an emission 
permit. If the fine is kept low, the emissions trading scheme will work very much like a 
price instrument (tax), whereas a high fine will secure that the emission target is reached (at 
any cost to society). Thus, a relatively low fine is proposed for the trading scheme, and the 
fine could be set at in the neighbourhood of 40 EUR/tCO2. The fine payments could be 
used by the enforcement institution to buy emissions permits internationally, in order to 
secure that the overall emission target of the trading system is met. 
To sum up, Figure 5.10 below tries to give an overview of how the institutional framework 
of a ‘downstream’ trading model involving electric utilities in the EU might look like. In 
the figure, a lot of political authority is delegated to an EU enforcement institution (possibly 
EEA). It is important, that one central authority, like the EPA in the US, enforces the 
market so that local (or national) authorities are not responsible for the control and thus are 
tempted to protect their own firms. In the case of the EU, the European Environment 
Agency could be an appropriate choice for the enforcement of property rights in a potential 
CO2 market.  
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Figure 5.10: Institutional framework of a tradable CO2 permits market. 
However, it is possible that a substantial amount of political authority would have to be left 
to the national governments, which reflects the facts that: 
• It is unclear whether the European Community or the Member States are ultimately 
responsible for overall compliance (and what is politically feasible); 
• Member States are better placed to set rules, which protect themselves against non-
compliance by private parties. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
There are a number of factors that point to an emission-trading scheme covering only CO2 
emissions from the power and steam sector as being a sensible starting point, including: 
• CO2 emissions are by far the largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and will 
remain so for any foreseeable future; 
• CO2 emissions stems almost entirely from fossil fuel use, which is most easily 
monitored; 
• Many low-cost CO2 emission reduction opportunities are within the power sector; 
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• The companies are relatively well-informed of the overall opportunities to reduce CO2 
emissions in the market, which can work to encourage trading early on; 
• It is likely to be politically simpler to start with a single sector 
Clearly, focusing on CO2 emissions, let alone only a subset of CO2 emissions, cannot be the 
final answer, since emissions of other greenhouse gases make a significant contribution as 
well. If emission reductions of the other greenhouse gases are to be achieved by applying 
other policy instruments, it is likely to result in differentiated treatment of different sectors 
and gases. From an overall efficiency viewpoint this is not preferable. However, getting a 
tradable permit system underway at all is likely to pose a significant political challenge and 
in this respect it makes sense to start out with a limited system, as long as it will not prevent 
a more cost-effective solution to emerge later on. 
We can, however, try to compensate for the limited coverage of emissions by taking the 
expected opportunities for reducing the other greenhouse gases into consideration. Model 
calculations for the EU have suggested that the cost-effective reduction of CO2 emissions 
correspond to a 6.2 % reduction of emissions compared to the 1990 level. This reduction 
percentage is lower than 8 %, which corresponds to a uniform reduction of all gases, due to 
the many low-cost reduction opportunities of methane and nitrous oxide  
The political economy of a tradable CO2 permit market in the EU 
The underlying constellation of actor interests in this policy area will clearly have 
implications for the possible design options. Two important observations can be made 
about the positions of Member States. First of all, the initial distribution of permits in any 
tradable permit system in the EU will somehow need to reflect on the Burden Sharing 
Agreement. Secondly, any expansion of the use of fiscal measures at Community level is 
strongly opposed by some Member States as it is still very much seen as a national 
responsibility. Thus, in order to assure that all Member States find it in their own best 
interest to participate in a tradable CO2 permit scheme, it seems that the distribution 
principle from Community level to the Member State level must involve grandfathering. In 
other words, the revenue stream generated by the sale of permits will be fully redistributed 
to the Member States. 
Furthermore, two important observations can be made about the influence of private parties 
on the EU policy-making process as well. First of all, any attempts to implement an 
upstream trading system, which is essentially a tax on all fossil fuels entering the economy, 
is likely to result in political deadlock. The existing voluntary agreement between the 
automobile industry and the European Commission is a strong indication of this. On the 
other hand, the European electricity producers have a less clear-cut agenda towards the 
climate change issue due to the asymmetric interests of the producers. As a result, 
Eurelectric has emphasised that policies and measures should not distort competition and 
therefore, they are generally supportive of market-based instruments and especially tradable 
permits. The position of some energy companies in the National policy agenda will make it 
unlikely, though, that the distribution principle to private parties will not involve some sort 
of grandfathering. 
In order to try to avoid deadlock in the negotiations over the design options of a tradable 
CO2 permit market, the principle of subsidiarity could be applied, thus leaving some 
conflicts unresolved at the Community level and shifting them to the implementation phase.  
This would suggest that the overall framework be defined at Community level while 
leaving as much scope for subsequent Member State action as possible.  
In other words, the level of decisional competence will be a fundamental aspect with 
respect to the design options. What is absolutely necessary to shift to the EC level and what 
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can be kept at the Member State level? Given the decisional structure of the EU there is a 
permanent struggle for decisional competence between the different levels of Government. 
Undoubtedly, the larger the role assigned to Member States the easier it is to come up with 
a solution. However, the global nature of the climate change problem and the profound 
economic impact that measures to limit emissions of greenhouse gases will have, reinforce 
the case for a supra-national policy response in the EU.  
The most fundamental design options we need to consider in establishing a tradable CO2 
permits market for the power and steam sector is the following: 
 Total amount of permits to be put into the bubble (the target level) 
 Permit contributions from each country’s emission target 
 Distribution mechanisms for permits to individual power plants. 
Target level 
The total number of permits assigned to the system determines the price of the permits and 
thus the marginal cost of emissions. Therefore, in choosing the overall allocation of permits 
to the trading system it should be taken into consideration that the opportunities for 
emission reductions vary between different sectors. This is important for two reasons. First 
of all, you minimise the distortion from not including all sectors and gases in the trading 
system from the outset and, secondly, the impact that the inclusion of more sectors over 
time will have on the equilibrium price of the permits is likely to be smaller. That is why it 
is clearly preferable with a top-down element in the setting of the overall reduction target 
for the sector so this should take place at Community level. 
However, any enlargement of the trading scheme to include other sectors, gases or even 
countries will affect the equilibrium price of CO2 permits. This is unfortunate because 
investments in cleaner technologies undertaken prior to the enlargement can turn out to be 
stranded. This problem is inherent in all tradable permit schemes that start out with less 
than complete coverage of emissions and it is not easily dealt with. 
The calculations based on the Primes model presented in this chapter predicts that app. 260 
Mt of CO2 emissions reductions relative to the emissions baseline should take place in the 
power and steam sector in order to minimise abatement costs. This corresponds to a 
reduction in the level of emissions in 2010 by app. 22 % compared to 1990-level, or 
alternatively to an overall allocation of permits to the electricity and steam sector in the 
neighbourhood of 950 Mt CO2 equivalents. Due to the many low-cost reduction 
opportunities in the power sector, the suggested least-cost allocation to this sector requires a 
much larger reduction in emissions (22 %) compared to the overall reduction requirement 
of CO2 (6.2 %). These figures along with simulation in other model studies could serve as a 
starting point for future negotiations. 
Target Group 
If abatement costs are to be minimised, it is preferable that the share of total emissions 
covered by an emissions permit system be as large as possible. Notably, the emissions from 
heat production and from combined heat and power production should also be included in 
the permit market. The inclusion of emissions stemming from heat as well as power 
production will secure an equal treatment of the two products. However, monitoring and 
enforcement costs will be incurred by any policy measure and may limit the coverage of 
emissions sources that is cost effective to include in the market. 
Monitoring and enforcement costs are likely to be too high to make it worthwhile to include 
all smaller industrial plants. All plants that are not included in the market should be 
Chapter 5. EU model: A qualitative evaluation of a CO2 permit market 
140 Risø-R-1184 (EN) 
 
regulated by a tax or some other measure to ensure that they are faced with approximately 
the same cost per unit of emissions. 
It is suggested to include all boilers larger than 25 MW in the trading scheme. The total 
number of fossil-fuelled boilers in the EU amounted to app. 7050 in 1999, while the 
number of boilers larger than 25 MWe amounted to 1690. The 1690 boilers are in the same 
order of magnitude as the US Acid Rain Program, which has proven to be a workable 
number. Secondly, the total number of companies is reduced from app. 3000 to 375 while 
most of the installed capacity of fossil-fuelled boilers is still included in the market. In other 
words, most of the emissions are still kept within the system. By doing this the 
administrative procedures can be developed and prepared for a larger scheme. 
If the permits are grandfathered to the existing electricity producers the concentration of 
permits on a few large producers can be a real problem. However, it should be noted that 
the problem in terms of abuse of market power is not so much that the permits are 
concentrated on a few companies. Rather, it is the difference between the cost-effective 
permit allocation and the allocation that the company receives free of charge from the 
outset that is the real problem. It seems clear, though, that there will be a reasonable 
number of sources of CO2 emissions in the power sector to use it as a testing ground for an 
EU-scheme of emissions trading. In the longer run, it will be important to broaden the 
scope of the trading scheme and the inclusion of other sectors will limit the risk of market 
power. 
Distribution rule 
Two questions need to be considered with respect to the distributional aspects of the trading 
scheme: 
 Permit contributions from each country’s emission target 
 Distribution mechanisms for permits to individual power plants. 
With regard to the first point, the allocation of permits to certain sectors by individual 
Member States can be carried out in such a way as to distort competition in that sector. The 
importance of the energy sector taken together with the ongoing liberalisation of the gas 
and power sector will make the energy sector an obvious candidate for a favourable 
allocation by Member States. For that reason, the allocation of permits to the power and 
steam sector from each country's emissions target needs to be harmonised.  
The least distortive approach is undoubtedly to construct a “true” EC emission trading 
bubble from the outset. This would mean assigning 950 Mt of CO2 permits to the emissions 
trading bubble, emissions that are to be taken out of the total amount of greenhouse gas 
emissions assigned to the European Community. The revenue from the sale of the permits 
goes into the EC budget and the revenue is recycled to the participating companies 
according to some standardised rules of allocation (or redistributed to the Community at 
large if deemed possible). 
The political reality of the Burden Sharing Agreement will, however, make it very hard to 
go through with this approach. A more feasible solution is to let the total amount of 
permits, that is being allocated to the power and steam sector bubble, consist of assigned 
amounts from each Member State. The amount of CO2 permits that is assigned to the 
emissions trading bubble by each Member State will then need to be deducted from the 
overall assigned amount of each Member State as defined by the Burden Sharing 
Agreement. Furthermore, the revenue generated from the sale of CO2 permits will be 
redistributed to the Member States corresponding to the number of permits assigned by 
each individual Member State. 
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The potential problem with an approach based on assigned amounts from each Member 
State is the possible distortion of competition, given that some Member States will have a 
large amount of permits compared to what their power sector actually need to cover their 
emissions of CO2. Taking this problem into account, it is shown that a proportional rollback 
of the emissions defined by the Burden Sharing Agreement does not seem like a bad 
starting point. In the long run, however, the distribution of responsibilities between Member 
States should gradually converge to a per capita allocation rule. 
With regard to the distribution of permits to private parties, it should be noted that under 
ideal conditions different distribution rules can coexist and in theory it is not necessary with 
a common distribution rule. This conclusion can, however, be challenged. 
Notably, there should be a common agreement as to how grandfathering can be outfaced 
from the system over time because there are large welfare gains if the revenue is used to 
reduce other taxes in the economy rather than being given away for free to the existing 
emitters. From a perspective of fairness this is also a better solution, as the revenue is 
distributed broadly and reflects the fact that every citizen has the same right to emit CO2 
into the atmosphere (per capita allocation rule). One way of achieving this could be to 
gradually convert the units assigned to the bubble to EC assigned amount units. The 
revenue from the sale of these units would then go into the EC budget and the revenue 
should be distributed to society at large. 
However, it seems unlikely that the distribution rule from the outset will not involve some 
sort of grandfathering. Therefore, we need to consider whether or not the grandfathering 
principle needs to be the same or whether it can be left to Member States. If it was left 
entirely up to the Member States the possible lack of competition in the power sector can be 
a problem, because some companies might be able to use a favourable allocation of CO2 
permits to gain market shares in the power market. 
The least distortive option would be to decide on a common distribution principle to the 
market participants. Notably, an allocation of permits to individual power plants based on a 
percentage reduction of the current size of emissions is to be preferred over an allocation 
principle based on past emissions, i.e. emissions in 1990.  
Leaving it to the discretion of Member States with regulatory oversight by the Commission 
is a more feasible solution. If it were left to the discretion of Member States, the 
Commission would have to approve of the principle chosen by each Member State. This 
could mean that some Member States would not be able to redistribute all the revenue to 
the participating parties because it would be in violation with the EC rules on state aid. 
Trade rules 
By an individual permit we will understand a right to emit 1 tonne of CO2. Each permit will 
specify what particular Member State has issued the permit and the year of issue (vintage 
year). Once the permit has been used to show compliance it will be withdrawn from the 
market. The duration of the compliance period is set to one year. 
The entitlement is not a full property right but rather a limited permission to emit CO2. This 
allows the government to make changes over time without any compensation to the market 
participants. This approach is also valid here to a limited extent.  
Obviously, any changes in the entitlement to CO2 permits have to be done with extreme 
caution, since a full property right is essential for a well functioning market. However, we 
need to distinguish between two things:  
 changes to the overall allocation of permits to the trading system, which in turn 
determines the market price of CO2 permits,  
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 and changes to the distribution of revenue between market participants and society in 
general.  
It is important that a credible economic value of CO2 permits is established for a 
considerable time period reflecting the long investment horizons in the power sector. 
Therefore, any alterations in the overall allocation of permits to the permit market must be 
the responsibility of the EC and not the market participants. 
On the other hand, the distributional principle can be changed over time and grandfathering 
can be out-phased. However, the out-phasing of grandfathering must be completely 
unrelated to the actual closing down of production plants, otherwise this will also inflict on 
long-term resource allocation. 
The system should allow for unlimited banking of permits. Borrowing of permits is 
preferable but problematic and could be excluded. When borrowing of permits is not 
allowed, the inter-temporal flexibility of the system is linked to the fine for being in non-
compliance, as the fine will put a price ceiling on the permit market. A low level of the fine 
will introduce more flexibility into the system because essentially the EC has extra permits 
for sale at a price equal to the level of the fine. Thus, the level of the fine should not be set 
too high and a suggestion could be app. 40 EUR/tCO2. 
We propose that the EC should undertake a yearly EU-wide auction where all or a large 
share of the permits are put out for sale. The inclusion of a large share of the permits in the 
auction will secure equal access to the permits in all the Member States and thus an 
efficient allocation of the permits. Furthermore, this will provide price information and 
transparency to the market, which is important especially in the beginning when market 
participants are not that familiar with the market. 
By putting all the permits out for sale at an auction we are separating the issue of allocation 
from the issue of distribution. The revenue from the auction is redistributed to the Member 
States according to the overall distribution of responsibilities that is decided upon.  
We propose to use a non-discriminatory pricing principle for the auction where all bidders 
of permits pay the clearing price for the permits (provided that their bid was below the 
clearing price).  
To make sure that there are buyers as well as sellers in the permit market and that the risk 
sharing capabilities of the marketplace will come into play, everybody should be allowed to 
participate in the market.  
Like in the US the system could start before the first compliance period. Possibly, the 
regulators should also release permits that are valid in the current year as well as permits 
that are valid in years to come (i.e. selling vintage year 2008 permits and vintage year 2013 
permits at the same time). 
Control system 
The purpose of the control system is to make the whole trading scheme credible by assuring 
that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a permit to emit one tonne of CO2 and 
the actual emission of one tonne of CO2. 
In the context of a European-wide scheme of emissions trading it would be natural that the 
ultimate responsibility for ensuring compliance will be on a European level. It is the general 
assumption, however, that monitoring and enforcement in relation to the companies from 
the starting point will be a Member State task, because the Member State Authorities are 
equipped with the necessary regulatory power in relation to the private parties. On the other 
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hand, the system could gain in general efficiency and credibility by the establishment of a 
common European institution. This could be EEA (European Environmental Agency).  
In terms of monitoring of emissions, calculating the CO2 emissions from the fuel input is a 
very cheap and efficient method, especially for a gas fired plant. This will be relevant for 
many of the smallest installations and thus not put a lower limit to the size of plant that can 
be part of the trading scheme. For coal fired plants the uncertainties can be so large that 
direct measurement should be preferred. These installations are usually large and the extra 
costs for measurement of CO2 emissions will be of minor importance. As long as the levels 
of uncertainties are comparable (in fact, as long as the uncertainties are not biased so that 
they sum out over time), the use of different methods of measuring will pose no difficulties. 
The emissions data will be collected by means of self-reporting by the companies.   
The most important role to be played by EC institutions will be to establish minimum 
requirements with regard to the measurement of emissions while to a large extent leaving 
actual monitoring and verification of emissions to the Member State Governments.  
The annual reporting of emissions from the power and steam sector must be faster than 
today. The final data for the preceding year should be available in January in order to allow 
for a true-up period for the emission rights. To give the best possible market information it 
is proposed to report and publish emission data for companies included in the trading 
scheme on a monthly basis. This will mean speeding up of the existing reporting 
procedures, but it should be possible to do this with only minor extra costs.  
The Member States could verify the emissions reported by companies on a yearly basis and 
submit their result to an EC institution. Obviously, the Member States might have 
incentives to cheat as well, however, the scope for cheating should be relatively small with 
respect to the power and steam sector.  
With respect to the enforcement of the permit market, a central registry must be created at 
the EU level. This function can be computerised and should not give any theoretical or 
practical difficulties, which has been clearly demonstrated by the US Acid Rain 
programme. Data for emissions may be collected by national authorities but shall at once be 
transmitted to a European institution. Through the trading system, a registry of permit 
holdings of each of the actors in the market is established. Likewise, through the 
monitoring process, a registry of the actual emissions of each actor is established. The 
‘trick’ of the enforcement is to compare the two numbers for each actor and have the 
necessary authority to deter actors from breaking the emission limits.  
First of all, we need to deter cheating by companies. Taking into consideration that the 
likelihood of detecting cheating is pretty high in this trading scheme, it will probably not be 
necessary with sanctions such as prison sentences to deter cheating. A high monetary 
sanction should be sufficient. 
The next step will be to establish sanctions against market participants exceeding their 
permit holdings. The suggestion here is straightforward. Market participants whose 
emissions are exceeding their current permit holdings must pay a fine for their excess 
emissions. The level of the fine must be the same in all Member States. Otherwise, there 
could be carbon leakage to areas with lower fine levels. 
If the fine is kept very low, the emissions trading scheme will work very much like a price 
instrument (tax), whereas a high fine will secure that the emission target is reached (at any 
cost to society). Thus, a relatively low fine is proposed for the trading scheme, and the fine 
could be set at in the neighbourhood of 40 EUR/tCO2. The fine payments could be used by 
the enforcement institution to buy emissions permits internationally, in order to secure that 
the overall emission target of the trading system is met. 
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Potential gains from trading 
There are clear benefits from allowing private party emissions trading at Community level 
compared to unilateral action by Member States. A tradable CO2 permit scheme with 
comprehensive coverage of emissions within the EU, which would have to be an upstream 
permit market, could reduce the total abatement costs by some 32 % compared to a system 
with no trading between Member States. In comparison, a Community-wide system 
containing only the electricity and steam sector would reduce the total abatement costs by 
13 % only. 
These differences in abatement costs are, however, without taking advantage of any of the 
other Kyoto mechanisms. A full CO2 emission trading system between Annex B countries 
suggest overall cost savings in the order of 40 % compared to a situation with no trading at 
all between Member States. Obviously, these gains from trade are not as easily appropriated 
as within the EU given that no international institution can effectively enforce an Annex B 
market. 
In conclusion, the overall gains from trade in a CO2 permit market for the power and steam 
sector are significantly lower than from a system including all sectors in the EU and clearly 
such a system should not be the final answer. Nevertheless, the system can still provide 
significant gains from trading. 
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6 Quantitative evaluation using the EMPS 
model 
This chapter investigates the consequences of different types of CO2 regulations of the 
Northern European electricity market. Three different scenarios are analysed:  
1) No CO2 restrictions as baseline 
2) Unilateral Danish CO2 tax and no restrictions in the other countries 
3) A harmonised CO2 tax in all countries. 
The analysis focus on the short-term response of the electricity markets and to simulate this 
situation the EMPS-model (EFI’s Multi Area Power Scheduling Model) is chosen. 
The description is structured as follows: 
• Section 6.1 gives a brief description of the EMPS-model. 
• Section 6.2 treats the basis of calculation including the assumptions regarding the model 
area, fuel prices, production facilities, electricity consumption etc. 
• In Section 6.3 the results are shown and commented. 
• The conclusion is outlined in Section 6.4. 
6.1 Brief description of the EMPS-model 
(Samkøringsmodellen) 
The System Planning department of Eltra has the EMPS-model at its disposal. The model is 
developed and up-dated by the EFI (Elforsyningens Forskningsinstitut) in Trondheim, 
Norway. 
In brief, the EMPS-model is an integrated model tool for economic optimisation of 
hydrothermal production systems in which hydropower carries considerable weight. The 
model is also applicable to both expansion planning and operational planning, including the 
calculation of projected prices on power. 
The model is an energy model with a time step of a week, however, it has the possibility of 
dividing the week into a number of accumulated time segments. 
To be able to make the economic optimisation in the model, it is necessary to assess the 
value of hydropower relative to other resources in the system.  
The value of hydropower is a function of the future development regarding the inflow to the 
reservoirs, the demand for electricity (guaranteed power) and the market for price 
dependent buying and selling of electricity. The value of water is therefore not a 
deterministic variable, but a stochastic variable. An expected value is applied in order to 
describe the variable. The water value in a given area is thus defined as the expected value 
of a marginally stored kWh water in the reservoir. The water value is then a function of 
time and the water level in the reservoir. 
The EMPS-model calculations are carried out in two stages. Firstly, the water values are 
estimated and secondly, the values are applied together with the marginal variable costs of 
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thermal power and spot prices for the supply/demand of electricity, for at any time being 
able to determine the optimum combination of hydropower and thermal power when it 
comes to production. 
The EMPS-model could be interpreted as a market model in the sense that it is a process-
oriented decision supporting tool, which week by week calculates the match between 
supply and demand in a hydro thermal power system with a stochastic varying inflow (to 
the reservoirs and run of river plants). 
When applying the EMPS-model, the input data are set to: 
• Description of the production systems in the model area. 
• The description includes, among other things, an appropriate time series of inflow 
statistics (normally 40-50 years) to the hydroelectric power stations as well as data on 
accessibility, production capacities and variable operating costs of the thermal power 
stations. 
• Description of the transmission system, including capacities, losses by exchange and 
price differences between areas prior to the exchange actually taking place. 
• Description of the electricity demand, including e.g. a price independent demand curve 
for the guaranteed power supply (to households and the industry), and a price dependent 
demand curve for the flexible power market (e.g. the flexible heat boiler market in 
Norway). 
The EMPS-model results cover for example: 
• Production amount and distribution on production facilities, including hydroelectric 
power stations and thermal power stations. 
• Emissions (e.g. CO2, SO2 and NOx) from the production. 
• Supply of guaranteed power and price dependent occasional power. 
• Exchange between areas and countries. 
• Power values in different price areas in the model, including price projection. (The 
power value in a given area is the value of the marginally produced/supplied kWh). 
• Reservoir curves, i.e. the water level in the reservoirs as a function of time. 
• Water value curves, i.e. the value of stored water as a function of the water level and 
time. 
6.2 Basis for model calculations  
The EMPS-model is made for the system consisting of the Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and Finland), Germany and the Netherlands, see Figure 6.1. Norway and 
Sweden are each divided into four areas, Denmark is divided into two main areas (Elkraft 
and Eltra) and Finland constitutes one area. The Continent is divided into the areas 
PreussenElektra (PE), VEAG, the remainder of Germany and the Netherlands. 
All calculations apply to the year 2005. All prices are DKK prices at a 1998 price level.   
The basis of the model calculations is “Kraftbalans för Nordelsystemet år 2005”, (Nordel 
1997) prepared by Nordel's System Operation Group in June 1997. 
The interconnections are assumed to be without losses. The consequence of losses on the 
transmission of energy is modelled by adding a minimum “toll” on exchange ranging from 
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0.003 to 0.007 DKK/kWh. The interconnections are not preloaded with already entered 
exchange agreements. The three planned new cable links in the North Sea between Norway 
and the Continent, as well as the Storebæltsforbindelsen, form part of the data too.  
Data from a 41 year long time series of meteorology (1950-1990) is used in the calculations 
to describe the stochastic variation in inflow to the hydropower reservoirs/production 
facilities. 
The natural gas supply to the electricity sector in Denmark is assumed to be contracted gas 
which has to be utilised. In the model this is simulated by giving priority to gas-fired units 
in the load dispatching. 
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Figure 6.1. Model area. 
Regarding the pricing of natural gas in Germany/the Netherlands it is assumed that: 
• 50 % of the gas is priced very low such that this production capacity always is exploited 
(contracted gas that has to be utilised). 
• 25 % of the gas power is priced correspondingly to coal power (buying on the spot 
market). 
• 25 % of the gas power is priced correspondingly to oil-fired power (buying on the spot 
market). 
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These assumptions are drawn up by Nordel's System Operation Group (Nordel 1997) and 
are adopted in the present calculations. 
The assumptions imply that a CO2 tax of e.g. 100 DKK/tonne will make the gas power, 
which was priced as coal power, cheaper than coal power and correspondingly make the 
gas power, which was priced as oil-fired power, cheaper than oil-fired power. Gas power 
will thereby replace coal power and oil-fired power. 
When calculating the CO2 taxes on fuel, the following specific CO2 emissions are assumed: 
• Coal: 95 kg/GJ 
• Orimulsion: 80 kg/GJ 
• Oil: 74 kg/GJ 
• Natural gas: 57 kg/GJ 
Nordel’s data (Nordel 1997) is updated on several areas in the present calculations: 
• It is taken into consideration that the guaranteed power consumption in the Nordic 
countries is temperature dependent. 
• The Eltra area being further divided into five smaller areas. This division has been done 
in connection with other studies and is based on congestion in the network. 
• The wind power in Denmark being simulated as a time series based on 19 years of 
metering of the energy content in the wind. The wind power is thereby described in the 
same way as the run of river hydropower. On the grounds of the 19 years of metering is 
generated a synthetic time series of 41 years corresponding to the above-mentioned 
hydrological statistics, ranging from 1950 to 1990.     
• The fuel prices (the year 2005) being adjusted so they are comparable to the prognosis 
in Energy 21: 
Coal:  14.4 DKK/GJ 
Heavy oil:  29.7 DKK/GJ 
Light oil:  51.1 DKK/GJ 
Orimulsion    9.0 DKK/GJ 
The data basis for Denmark generally complies with Energy 21 and later up-dates of the 
planning basis; this goes for both data on supply (production technology, production 
volumes, fuels etc.) and on demand, i.e. figures regarding the electricity consumption. 
From this the following aggregate data for Denmark is applied: 
The Eltra area (figures in GWh/year) 
Gas-CHP  8390 
Bio-CHP    440 
Coal-CHP (1)    520 
Coal-CHP (2)  5325 
Gas-condensation 1000 
Coal-condensation (1) 8575 
Coal-condensation (2) 5170 
Wind   3690 
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Sum   33110 (production potential) 
Demand   18700 
The Elkraft area (figures in GWh/year) 
Local CHP  3400 
Central CHP  8000 
Orimul.-condensation 4500 
Coal-condensation (1) 1900 
Coal-condensation (2) 1600 
Oil-condensation  3800 
Gas turbine  1600 
Wind   1050 
Sum   25850 (production potential) 
Demand   12900 
6.3  Model results 
Three main simulations have been carried out using the model: 
• Simulation 1: No CO2 taxes are included 
• Simulation 2: A CO2-tax of 100 DKK/tonne is assumed for Denmark alone 
• Simulation 3: A harmonised CO2 tax of 100 DKK/tonne is assumed for all countries. 
6.3.1 Outline of results 
Following outline of selected results applies: 
• Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.6 through Figure 6.8 show the yearly values of the net exchange 
(import is shown as a positive sign) of the countries and areas in the model. Results of 
41 years’ simulations, corresponding to the hydrological years 1950-1990, are indicated. 
Besides, value no. 42 is stated as the average value of the 41 years. 
• Figure 6.3 through Figure 6.5 show the exchanges between Denmark (Eltra and Elkraft) 
and the neighbouring countries as an average of the 41 meteorological years. 
• Figure 6.9 through Figure 6.12 show the yearly CO2 emissions for countries and areas in 
the model. Results of 41 years’ simulations, corresponding to the hydrological years 
1950-1990, are indicated. Besides, value no. 42 is stated as the average value of the 41 
years. 
• Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.14 show a grouping of CO2 emissions in the Nordic countries 
and as a total in the three simulations, as well as in a fourth simulation which is similar 
to simulation 3, but in which coal and oil generally are replaced by gas. 
The above-mentioned simulations are in the figures indicated by: 
• Simulation 1: <name>, 0 
• Simulation 2: <name>, DKK 100 
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• Simulation 3: <name>, 100 
• Simulation 3a: Gas scenario (Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.14). 
6.3.2 Exchange of energy 
Figure 6.2 shows the import/export from Denmark (Eltra and Elkraft) in simulations 1, 2 
and 3. It appears from the figure that the export in average decreases from approx. 20 TWh 
in simulations 1 and 3 to less than 5 TWh in simulation 2. A unilateral Danish CO2 tax of 
100 DKK/tonne would therefore definitely influence on the possibilities of the Danish 
export of electricity. 
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Figure 6.2. Denmark. Import/export. 
Furthermore, the figure shows that the Danish export in simulations 1 and 3 to a high 
degree is independent of the variety in meteorology during the 41 years, however, with 
exception of the extremely wet years of 1889 and 1990 (years no. 40 and 41). Even in the 
“normal” wet years the Danish production potential (except from oil condensation) is 
exploited, because Danish production is assumed to be cheaper than the German, Swedish 
and Finish thermal production. Danish export is taken over by especially German 
production in the situation of a unilateral Danish CO2 tax. In this case Danish production 
includes almost only non-dispatchable electricity production (wind power, CHP and 
contracted production of natural gas). 
For further illustration Figure 6.3 through Figure 6.5 show the yearly average of energy 
flows between Denmark and the neighbouring countries in the three simulations. It appears 
from the figures that the energy flows are almost identical in simulations 1and 3, while 
simulation 2 gives quite a different picture of a very limited net export from Denmark.  
Figure 6.6 shows the situation for Norway. The great diversity in import/export from year 
to year reflects the variation in precipitation and thereby the potential of hydropower 
production. For instance are the years no. 12 and 21 (1961 and 1970) dry years with a large 
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volume of imports, while the years no. 40 and 41 (1989 and 1990) are wet years with a 
large volume of exports from Norway. The variation within the individual year and in the 
average year (year no. 42) between the three simulations is in comparison to this of minor 
importance. 
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Figure 6.3. Exchange of energy (GWh/year). CO2 tax: 0 DKK/tonne. 
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Figure 6.4. Exchange of energy (GWh/year). CO2 tax: 100 DKK/tonne in Denmark 
Chapter 6. Quantitative evaluation using the EMPS model 
Risø-R-1184 (EN) 153 
 
5801 285 3541
251
7558
179
965
145
4059
302
963
69
 
Figure 6.5. Exchange of energy (GWh/year). CO2 tax: 100 DKK/tonne in all countries. 
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Figure 6.6. Norway. Import/export. 
Finally Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 show that PreussenElektra’s export is increasing and 
VEAG’s import is increasing from simulation 1 to 3. This is caused by the production being 
changed from coal power in the PreussenElektra area and the VEAG area to gas power in 
the PreussenElektra area (and the remainder of Germany and the Netherlands) due to a 
harmonised CO2 tax of 100 DKK/tonne. 
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Figure 6.7. PreussenElektra. Import/export. 
VEAG, import/export (import: positive sign)
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Figure 6.8. VEAG, Import/export. 
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6.3.3 Variations in annual CO2 emissions 
Figure 6.9 shows the CO2 emission from the Danish production of electricity, exclusive of 
CO2 emission from heat produced by a combined heating and power production. When 
distributing the CO2 emission on power and heat by a combined production, the advantage 
of CHP is assumed to be attributable to the heat production. The figure shows that besides 
from the two extremely wet years in 1989 and 1990, all the Danish production capacity 
(exclusive of oil-condensation) is exploited in all of the years in simulation 1 and 3.  
By comparison Figure 6.2 shows a little variation in the net export from year to year. The 
diversity is due to the wind power production in Denmark varying from year to year. 
Similarly is assumed a small yearly variation in the electricity consumption resulting from 
variations in temperature. Figure 6.9 further shows that a unilateral Danish CO2 tax of 100 
DKK/tonne on average leads to a yearly CO2 reduction of approx. 28 million tonne to 
approx. 15 million tonne from the Danish electricity sector. 
Figure 6.10 through Figure 6.12 show the corresponding results regarding the emissions 
from the PreussenElektra area, the VEAG area and the total amount of emissions from the 
entire model area. 
It appears from Figure 6.10 that PreussenElektra’s CO2 emission (in average) increases 
marginally from simulation 1 (30.3 million tonne) to simulation 2 (31.3 million tonne), 
because of a growing production, see Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.9. CO2  emissions, Denmark. 
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Figure 6.10. CO2 emissions, PreussenElektra. 
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Figure 6.11. CO2 emissions, CO2 emissions, VEAG. 
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Figure 6.12. CO2 emissions. Total emissions in model area. 
Correspondingly, Figure 6.11 shows that VEAG’s CO2 emission (in average) increases 
from simulation 1 (78.0 million tonne) to simulation 2 (82.9 million tonne), because of a 
growing production for the replacing of Danish production. Furthermore, it is seen that the 
CO2 emission is somewhat smaller in simulation 3 (72.8 million tonne), because VEAG’s 
coal based production in this case to a certain extent is taken over by a gas-fired production 
in the PreussenElektra area, the remainder of Germany and the Netherlands. 
Finally Figure 6.12 shows that a unilateral Danish CO2 tax (100 DKK/tonne) is not leading 
to any CO2 reduction in the model area in general. The total amount of CO2 emission (in 
average) is approx. 425 million tonne/year in both simulation 1 and 2. A harmonised tax of 
100 DKK/tonne in all countries results in a small reduction of the total amount of emission 
from 425 million tonne to approx. 415 million tonne, a reduction of 2-3 per cent. This very 
limited reduction is a lower value (pessimistic estimate) of the real reduction. This is caused 
by several factors: 
• A given production unit is in the model specified as either being e.g. coal-fired, gas-
fired or oil-fired. However, the model is not able to allow for some production facilities 
being fired with different kinds of fuel. The model is therefore not capable of optimising 
the choice of fuels for such facilities accordingly to the fuel price. The individual 
production units are thus “fixed” regarding fuel type and thereby specific emissions. The 
above estimated CO2 reduction does consequently not include the changing of fuels in 
the units that are capable of being fired with several kinds of fuel, e.g. the changing 
from coal to gas. 
• Besides, the model does obviously not include the change from e.g. coal to gas in the 
units, where this calls for re-buildings and relating investments. In e.g. Denmark such a 
change in the existing power stations would be a reasonable and economic applicable 
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option in case of increasing CO2 taxes. The changing could probably many places be 
carried out with limited investments.  
In order to get an idea of the potential for CO2 reductions, a fourth simulation is carried out 
(simulation 3a, gas scenario), in which the assumptions are the same as in simulation 3, but 
where coal and oil is replaced by gas in the entire model area. 
6.3.4 Comparison of average annual CO2 emissions for the model areas 
Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.14 show a grouping of results (average figures of results from 41 
years) of the four calculations for the Nordic countries and the entire model areas. 
The Nordic Countries: CO2 emissions.
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Figure 6.13. CO2 emissions (million tonne per year) in the Nordic countries 
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Figure 6.14. CO2 emissions (million tonne per year) in the model area. 
It appears from Figure 6.13 that the total CO2 reduction potential for the Nordic countries 
amounts to approx. 20 million tonne (the difference between approx. 55 million tonne and 
approx. 35 million tonne in simulations 1 and 3a). A reduction distributed by approx. 8 
million tonne in Denmark, approx. 3 million tonne in Sweden and approx. 9 million tonne 
in Finland. 
Correspondingly, Figure 6.14 shows that the total reduction potential for the entire model 
area amounts to approx. 170 million tonne of CO2, a reduction from approx. 425 million 
tonne (simulation 1) to approx. 255 million tonne (simulation 3a). The reduction potential is 
distributed by approx. 100 million tonne in the remainder of Germany and the Netherlands, 
40 million tonne in the VEAG area, 10 million tonne in the PreussenElektra area and the 
above-mentioned 20 million tonne in the Nordic countries. 
The CO2 emissions in Denmark (Eltra and Elkraft) do, as mentioned earlier, only apply to 
the electricity production alone. The advantage of CHP is assumed to be attributable to the 
heat production. 
Analogous to Figure 6.14, Figure 6.15 shows the CO2 emissions in the Nordic countries 
with the four alternatives (as in Figure 6.13), but this time including the Danish CO2 
emissions from the electricity production, inclusive of the total emissions from the CHP. 
By comparing Figure 6.15 directly with Figure 6.13 it is seen that the Danish CO2 
emissions increase by 2-3 million tonne, when CO2 emissions from the heating production 
is included. 
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The Nordic Countries: CO2 emissions.
Denmark: incl. CO2 from heat production by CHP
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Figure 6.15. CO2 emissions (million tonne per year) in the Nordic countries. 
6.4 Unilateral vs. harmonised CO2 payments 
From the model simulations and evaluations carried out in this section the following 
conclusions can be summarised: 
A unilateral Danish CO2 tax or CO2 quota will reduce Danish power production and so the 
Danish CO2 emissions. However, the Danish production will be taken over by German 
production and the total CO2 emissions in the Nordic countries plus Germany/the 
Netherlands will not be reduced. 
A harmonised tax of DKK 100 per tonne of CO2, corresponding to international trade in 
quotas, where CO2 quotas are worth DKK 100 per tonne, will result in a smaller CO2 
reduction in the order of ten million tonnes (2-3 per cent) in the Nordic countries and 
Germany/the Netherlands (applies to year 2005). However, this estimate is a lower value 
for the actual reduction. The total CO2 reduction potential for the 2005 production facilities 
is estimated at approx. 20 million tonnes in the Nordic countries (from approximately 55 
million tonnes to approximately 35 million tonnes), distributed on approximately eight 
million tonnes in Denmark, three million tonnes in Sweden and nine million tonnes in 
Finland. The reductions correspond to a fuel switch-over from coal/oil to gas everywhere in 
the production facilities. The corresponding potential in Germany/the Netherlands for the 
2005 production facilities is approximately 150 million tonnes of CO2 (from 370 million 
tonnes to 220 million tonnes). 
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7 Modelling tradable permits and 
technology choice 
This chapter discusses the impact of fuel and electricity prices on the choice of technologies 
over the next decades using technologies for combined heat and power (CHP) for different 
scales of district heating systems as an example. The presentation is based on quantitative 
analyses using a traditional modelling approach. 
The methods and examples are based on contributions to several research projects for both 
national and international programmes: 
• Danish utilities in a competitive market, Danish Energy Research Programme, 1993-
1996. 
• A Northern European Power Exchange. Danish Energy Research Programme, 1996-
1998. 
• Tradable CO2 permits in Danish and European energy policy Danish Energy Research 
Programme, 1998-2000. 
• The Shared Analysis Project (Energy analysis and forecast study after Kyoto). European 
Commission DG XVII (Energy) 1997-1999. 
• Industrial Benefits and Costs of Greenhouse Gas Abatement: Applications of E3ME71. 
EU JOULE III Programme, 1997-2000. 
• Balmorel – Baltic Model of Regional Energy Market Liberalisation. Danish Energy 
Research Programme, 1999-2000. 
CHP producers are operating in two markets: the electricity market, which is becoming 
increasingly international and competitive, and a heat market, which may remain a natural 
monopoly. Industrial CHP plants are most often based on the steam or heat requirement 
from the particular industrial site itself, thus an external heat market may not be considered 
at all. An important driver for industrial CHP and industrial autoproducers of electricity in 
the past has been the autonomy from the public electricity supply industry and monopoly 
pricing. The same driver has also been very important for local utilities of any size, from 
small village co-operatives to metropolitan multi-utilities. 
The motivation of autonomy may well survive in a liberalised electricity market. CHP 
technologies may be well-suited to enable a flexible response to changing market 
conditions as a contribution to a portfolio of facilities and technologies for hedging against 
the risks of price volatility, unexpected regulation and taxation, and market or regulation 
failures. 
                                                           
71  E3ME is a macroeconomic model, which was constructed as part of a project under the EC Non-
Nuclear Energy Programme. JOULE II (1993 to 1995). The current version of the model covers 19 
regions of Europe (the EU-15 member states plus Norway and Switzerland with Germany divided 
into east and west and Italy divided into north and south).  
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7.1 Modelling the penetration of new technologies 
Optimisation models with detailed techno-economic assumptions for identified 
technologies are well suited to describe the penetration of new technologies. The same set 
of technology data and the same model structure can be used to model the development in 
different regions or countries, using different structural date for the initial infrastructure, 
and scenario assumptions for the energy market, development of the demand, prices, 
taxation, etc. Many of these assumptions may be based on the results from economic 
models describing the global energy market or the national economic development.  
7.1.1 Optimisation with emission constraints  
The impact of emission constraints on the technology choice in the energy sector has been 
the topic of numerous studies using ‘bottom-up’ models since the mid 1980s, when the 
reduction of SO2 and NOx was on the agenda, and later the same models were used to 
describe the impact of CO2 emission reduction targets on the national energy systems. One 
of the first multinational studies using the method of emission cost curves was a study for 
the Commission DG XII covering all the then 12 Member States (Coherance 1991). The 
results were presented by the impact of stepwise tighter constraints on CO2 on total energy 
system cost and the technology mix. An illustrative example was found for the Danish 
power system: The targets of constant CO2 emission in 2005 compared to 1988 until 30 % 
reduction could be met mainly by the substitution of gas for coal. However, a stricter 
reduction target would be met by less gas and expensive non-fossil fuel technologies 
(renewables). To avoid ‘stranded assets’ in newly built natural gas generating units, 
investment in these non-fossil fuel technologies should start already by the year 2000, when 
the reduction target were less strict than five years later (Grohnheit 1991). 
7.1.2 Liberalised market 
Although optimisation models for the energy sector were designed for the traditional 
organisation of the industry, these models with their detailed representation of technologies 
and their simple optimisation algorithm are also useful for analyses of penetration of 
technologies in a liberalised model environment. However, the traditional application of 
these models for the national energy system covering all energy sectors is not very useful. 
They must be redesigned to describe a single agent or a homogeneous group of agents who 
are facing a large competitive market that may be characterised by a set of exogenous 
prices.  
The structure and boundaries of the optimisation model used in a liberalised market is very 
important. A societal discount rate of perhaps 5 % may be applied for the common 
optimisation of the economy including elements that are regulated monopolies, while the 
optimisation for a particular agent in a competitive market must apply a higher discount 
rate of 10 % real or more, which also indicate a short time horizon. In the latter case all 
elements that have a regulated monopoly character must be exogenous. 
The shadow prices of the emission limits will increase the effective price level of fossil 
fuel. These shadow prices may be implemented either by taxes or tradable permits, which 
will change the relative prices of fuel use and capital-intensive equipment in favour of the 
latter.  
It has become conventional wisdom from numerous studies with econometric and 
macroeconomic models that the allocation effect of an excise tax on energy is small 
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compared to the income and re-distribution effects of the compensation. The same type of 
result may be found for tradable permits when using equilibrium models. 
An important issue for these measures is: who will pay the taxes or the price of the permits 
in the end?  
For modelling purpose a CO2 tax or tradable permit can be added as a price tag to the fuels 
that are used for electricity generation, but the full weight of this extra fuel cost may not be 
transferred fully to the electricity price on the international wholesale market, because a 
higher price on the spot or futures market for electricity would attract investment new large 
gas-fired power stations for sale on the wholesale electricity market. Such investments will 
limit further price increase by the competition among the potential investors.  
7.1.3 CHP-combined heat and power 
The penetration of CHP for both industrial processes and space heating is widely different 
among the European countries, ranging from more than 30 % in the Netherlands, Denmark, 
and Finland to less than 5 % in the UK, France, Greece, and Ireland. It is more dependent 
on traditions and legislative support than climatic and infrastructural difference. 
The maximum technical potential of CHP has been assessed by different studies to be 40 % 
of the total electricity generation. This potential includes CHP for both industrial steam and 
district heating and cooling. Increased energy efficiency in industrial processes and space 
heating will reduce the technical potential for heat supply from CHP, which is dependent on 
the heat densities of the local heat markets. On the other hand, new technologies for CHP, 
in particular the combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), have increased the efficiency of CHP 
technologies. These new technologies have a much higher power-to-heat ratio, which 
means that a given heat market will become the basis for a much larger generation of 
electricity. 
The European Parliament has asked the Commission to encourage the ”wider application of 
CHP technology”. The key areas addressed for the 5th Framework Programme consider all 
levels of CHP applications for space heating, from large-scale district heating applications 
to gas-fired CHP applications in single-family houses, applications with a low demand for 
space heating, much lower than the normal capacity required in northern Europe (i.e. 5-10 
kW).  
This issue was also addressed within ‘The Shared Analysis Project published by the 
European Commission Directorate General for Energy in a Special Issue of Energy in 
Europe72, December 1999. One of the individual volumes published with this report focus 
in particular on the potentials and obstacles for the penetration of CHP73. 
                                                           
72 The Shared Analysis Project, Economic Foundation for Energy Policy. Energy in Europe. Special 
Issue, European Commission, Directorate General for Energy. December 1999, www.shared-
analysis.fhg.de./. 
73 Grohnheit, P.E., (1999) Energy policy responses to the climate change challenge: The Consistency 
of European CHP, Renewable and Energy Efficiency Policies. The Shared Analysis Project, Volume 
14. www.shared-analysis.fhg.de./ (Printed as Risø-R-1147(EN). Risø National Laboratory, Roskilde, 
www.risoe.dk/rispubl/SYS/ris-r-1147.htm) 
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7.1.4 Bottom-up model analyses of technology choice 
Optimisation models like EFOM74 and MARKAL75 are well suited to describe the 
penetration of new technologies. Thus, cogeneration of electricity and steam for industrial 
processes and heat supply to district heating grids is easily modelled by this type of models, 
because the heat is used for a single identified process. The demand for electricity and heat 
on the different markets for electricity and heat/steam are modelled using exogenous 
assumptions on the size of this market. These demand assumptions may be based on the 
results from different types of economic models, such as macroeconomic models or general 
or partial equilibrium models (top-down models). 
Macroeconomic models in the Keynesian tradition describe short and medium-term 
economic consequences of policies but with a limited treatment of long-term effects, such 
as those from the supply side of the labour market. In contrast, Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models have been widely used to analyse long-term energy-
environment-economic (E3) policies. CGE models specify explicit demand and supply 
relationships and enforce market clearing.  
Figure 7.1 shows the structure of a set of co-ordinated model results from techno-economic 
optimisation model for standardised CHP generators and partial equilibrium models that are 
used to describe the price formation and trade volume on an international electricity market. 
Selected results form this model system may further be used to produce date for 
macroeconomic models, e.g. the E3ME model, concerning the macroeconomic impact of 
the penetration of the selected technology. 
In the optimisation model CHP generators are treated as standardised agents that are 
serving a given demand at minimum cost either by own-generation or by purchase of 
electricity from outside.  
The model is focusing on the technology choice in the various sectors of the energy system, 
primary fuel demand and emissions. The technology choice will depend on both the techno-
economic parameters for future technologies as well as fuel prices, demand for energy 
commodities or services, and emission constraints.  
Electricity generators are operating on national markets facing international competition. In 
this study the total demands for electricity and heat (i.e. heat for district heating and steam 
for industrial uses) are based on the PRIMES Baseline Scenario used for the Shared 
Analysis Project76, which covers the period until 2020. Non-fossil electricity generation 
                                                           
74 The EFOM model (Energy Flow Optimisation Model) was developed as to the supply part of the 
energy model complex of the Commission of the European Communities. It has been used for a 
number of studies since the 1970s. It was used during the 1980s for reference projections of the 
energy systems in the member countries; and scenarios with assumptions concerning economic 
growth levels, oil import prices, or the role of solid fuels and nuclear power were studied. An 
extension of the model to include emissions of pollutants and abatement techniques has been used 
for many international collaborative studies, e.g. for the construction of cost curves for emission 
reduction.  
75 The MARKAL model (MARKet ALlocation) is similar to EFOM. It was developed by the 
International Energy Agency and has been used worldwide over the last decades, in particular within 
the Energy Technology Systems Analysis Programme (ETSAP) of the IEA – 
www.ecn.nl/unit_bs/etsap/main.html. The Nordleden Project (Unger et al. 2000) is using MARKAL 
for a recent CO2 reduction study for the Nordic countries.  
76 European Commission (1999), The Shared Analysis Project: European Union Energy Outlook to 
2020. Energy in Europe. Special Issue, European Commission, Directorate General for Energy. 
November 1999, www.shared-analysis.fhg.de./. 
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(i.e. hydro, nuclear and wind) is exogenous. The potential markets for gas-fired micro-scale 
CHP are estimated on the basis of the same model results77.  
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Figure 7.1. Electricity market model based on optimisation modules for CHP generators. 
We have not used any model to determine the equilibrium of the international energy 
markets. Purchase and sale of electricity is a key feature of the optimisation model for the 
various standardised generators. The national markets are calibrated to comply with 
structural data for 1995 and using the forecasts of the PRIMES Baseline Scenario.78  
7.2 PRIMES results for the European Union 
PRIMES is a modelling system that simulates a market equilibrium solution for energy 
supply and demand in the Member-States of the European Union and the implications of 
energy use on the environment. It considers both national energy systems and the overall 
European energy market over the period 1990- 2030. 
7.2.1 The PRIMES Model 
The fundamental assumption in PRIMES is that producers and consumers respond to 
changes in price. The factors determining the demand for and the supply of each fuel are 
represented, so they form the behaviour of the agents. The model determines the economic 
                                                           
77 Norway and Switzerland are not covered by the PRIMES model. The forecasts for Norway are 
based on the Nordleden Project (Unger et al. 1999), the forecasts for Switzerland are based on the 
IEA forecast in Electricity Information. 
78 The development of a model for a market equilibrium for electricity trade in the Baltic region is 
the main target of the Balmorel project (Baltic Model of Regional Energy Market Liberalisation) for 
the Danish Energy Research Programme 1999, www.balmorel.dk. 
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equilibrium for each fuel market through an iterative process. In the current model for the 
European Union price-driven equilibria are considered in all energy and environment 
markets, including Europe-wide clearing of oil and gas markets, as well as Europe-wide 
electricity and natural gas networks.  
The model is organised in modules by energy production sub-system (oil products, natural 
gas, coal, electricity and heat production, others) for supply and by end-use sectors for 
demand (residential, commercial, transports, six industrial sectors). Some demanders may 
be also suppliers, as for example industrial cogenerators of electricity and steam. 
The formulation of the market equilibrium for each market is described by the equations 
 Demand = Function (Price) 
 Supply = Demand 
 Price = Inverse Function (Supply). 
More detailed, the behaviour in the supply side is formulated as a set of linear programming 
models for cost minimisation, and the demand side has the form of a system of (non-linear) 
equations. Hence the equilibrium model can be written: 
Solve for  x,q,p,u that satisfy: 
Supply side:  Min c ⋅ x 
  subject to. A ⋅ x ≤ b, x ∈ X 
Demand side:  q = Q(p) 
Cost Evaluation: u = f (c, x and other factors) 
Equilibrium Condition: p = u + taxes 
where  
x and q denote supply and demand quantities, and 
u and p denote producer and consumer prices. 
The supply side may contain different mathematical programming problems to describe the 
behaviour of the various supplying agents (e.g. different for refineries, gas and electricity). 
The fact that some suppliers of energy commodities are demanding energy commodities 
from other suppliers (e.g. electricity for the refinery sector and vice versa) is included in 
optimisation modules. 
7.2.2 The modular structure of PRIMES 
PRIMES was developed during 1992-1995 under the JOULE II Non-Nuclear Energy 
Research Programme by a consortium of institutes from UK, Greece, Belgium, and France. 
It is a very large and data-intensive model system. It was developed on the basis of models 
previously used by the European Commission, e.g. EFOM, MEDEE, and MIDAS. The 
main source for economic data is the EUROSTAT national account statistics. The model 
system has been used for several studies for various Directorate Generals of the European 
Commission, and has been expanded to address further issues.. Table 7.1 shows the 
structure and contents of the PRIMES modules for the model version that was available for 
the Post-Kyoto scenarios of the Shared Analysis Project.  
The model is written in the GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) with Excel-
based input and output interfaces. In principle, the model is applicable to different countries 
or groups of countries by changing the data, the definition of industrial classifications and 
technologies etc., and eventually adapting the code. However, up till now the model is 
maintained and operated by the developing team at the National Technical University of 
Athens, managed by Professor Pantelis Capros. 
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Table 7.1. Survey of PRIMES modules 
REGIONS 15 European Union countries 
DEMAND
 Residential:  
4 energy uses,  
 4 types of households,  
 2 technology vintages,  
 several types of electric appliances 
 Commercial:  4 sectors,  
 7 energy uses,  
 full technology vintages 
 thermal integrity, heat and cooling production, energy savings 
 Industry:  9 industrial sectors 
 up to 4 types of sub-processes  
 11 energy uses defined 
 full technology vintages 
 heat production and recovery,  
 energy savings  
 pollution abatement. 
 Transports:  3 transport purposes with different transport modes 
 6 to 10 alternative technologies for each mode 
Electricity production:  Several hundreds of different types of existing and new thermal 
plants 
 Nuclear, hydro and renewable technologies 
 chronological load curves,  
 interconnection network, representation;  
 three typical companies per country; 
 cogeneration of power and steam,  
 district heating; 
Refineries:  4 refineries with typical refinery structure,  
 6 typical refining units (cracking, reforming etc.) 
Natural gas:  Regional supply detail (Europe, Russia, Middle Africa, North Sea 
etc.),  
 transportation, distribution network 
Fuel types and emissions:  18 energy forms 
 7 types of atmospheric emissions 
Markets Country specific 
 European level markets: refining, gas, electricity exchanges,  
 World oil market: exogenous 
7.2.3 The electricity and CHP sector in PRIMES 
A fundamental characteristic of electric or steam producers is that they cannot store their 
product in order to meet fluctuations in demand. At the level of the electricity and steam 
sub-model in PRIMES, demand for electricity and steam is considered as exogenously 
given, varying widely between different times of the day and between different seasons.  
The representation of demand is based on the definition of a chronological load curve, 
which depicts the load as a function of time in a year. Within an iteration of the overall 
PRIMES model, the demand sub-models provide estimates of demand using the same 
representation of time as the electricity and steam sub-model. Changes in the demand-side, 
for example, induced by prices or other factors, influence the electricity and steam sub-
model. The latter may, for example, change prices that may further affect demand. 
In the PRIMES version for the Shared Analysis Project, steam and electricity generation are 
grouped together as if they were a single industrial sector. The analysis includes the whole 
production of industrial steam and the heat that can be distributed through small-scale or 
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large-scale district heating networks. The analysis deals with three standardised – or 
stylised – market suppliers, namely 
• utilities 
• industrial generators and  
• other decentralised producers 
Thus, an industrial sector can exploit any advantage in self-generation of steam or 
electricity provided that it does so in a cost-effective way. The other generators may also 
act as distributors of district heating. The three stylised market suppliers have different 
technology choice menus reflecting their differences in size and associated economies of 
scale. Utilities have an investment menu comprising of large-scale plants, while industrial 
generators may only invest in small-scale units.  
The dynamics regarding economies of scale associated to plant size is an important driver 
of restructuring. For example technologies that close the cost gap between small and large 
size (such as small gas machines and fuel cells) favour decentralisation of supply and 
reduction of the share of traditional utilities. The analysis captures this mechanism and this 
explains the increased role of non-utilities over the outlook period under baseline 
assumptions.  
The analysis treats stylised suppliers as if they were representatives of an unknown number 
of similar real-world companies. The discount rate applicable to all decisions on power 
generation capacity expansions has been assumed to be equal to 8 % per year in real terms. 
This is uniformly applied for all stylised generators. Tariffs are set to the level of long-run 
marginal cost of delivering a customer but are adjusted so as to recover total accounting 
costs plus a normal rate of profit. Steam (or heat) is considered as a by-product, but a 
minimum tariff is set to reflect reserve margin ensured from maintaining boilers.  
7.2.4 Results from PRIMES Post Kyoto Scenarios  
The macroeconomic assumptions for baseline scenario for the Shared Analysis Project was 
made early in 1998, and the various supply modules were developed during the following 
year in several stages and with communication to a network of scientists and national 
energy agencies in the Member States. Figure 7.2 shows the results concerning fuel supply 
for electricity and steam generation for the baseline scenarios and three scenarios with 
constrained CO2 emissions. 
The CO2 emission limits – or the shadow price for CO2 emissions will lead to little more 
renewables on a European level. but far more natural gas and a significant reduction in 
solid fuels. The most important technology for new investment in generating capacity is the 
combined cycle gas turbine for utilities as well as industrial cogenerators. 
The key assumptions for the Baseline Scenario are: 
• The baseline scenario projects a significant improvement of the energy intensity ratio. 
Annual energy intensity improvement is expected to average around 1.5 %/a throughout 
the projection period. It is due, first, to the changing sources of economic growth, and, 
secondly, to continued technological progress in the energy use and conversion.  
• In per capita energy terms, EU primary energy is continuing to grow significantly, by 
0.7 %/a, in the period to 2010. In the latter part of the period, however, per capita energy 
demand will slow down to just 0.3 %/a.  
• Technological advances and changes in market structure will reduce the dominance of 
utilities in electricity generation. The use of gas turbines in combined cycle mode will 
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also greatly encourage the more widespread use of steam, especially by independent 
producers.  
• The trends in fuel use for steam and power generation purposes reflect the trends in the 
choice of fuel for new capacity requirements and trends in efficiency. The use of coal 
and lignite will decline quite dramatically between 1995 and 2010 but after that it will 
recover to reach, and marginally exceed, its 1995 level.  
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Figure 7.2. Electricity and steam generation in EU-15, 1990, 2010 and 2020. 
The CO2 reduction scenarios consider stabilisation, -3 % and -6 % compared to the 1990 
emissions. These targets are achieved by iteration. The carbon values (Ecu90 per ton C 
avoided) are calculated from the results. Table 7.2 shows different representations of 
carbon values for different currencies and per ton carbon contents or per ton CO2 
Table 7.2. Different representations of carbon values in the PRIMES Post-Kyoto Scenarios 
 Year Per ton C Per ton CO2 
  Ecu90 US$ 98 Ecu90 Ecu98 DKK 98 US$ 98 
Scenario S0: 1990 level 2010 50 70 14 17 160 19
 2020 59 83 16 20 189 23
Scenario S3:1990 level minus 3 % 2010 78 109 21 27 250 30
 2020 81 114 22 28 259 31
Scenario S6:1990 level minus 6 % 2010 102 143 28 35 326 39
 2020 115 161 31 39 368 44
12 t C is equivalent to 44 ton CO2. 
The most important drivers for the determination of prices and volumes in an equilibrium 
model are income and price elasticities. However, the currently available documentation of 
the PRIMES model contains only a very limited – and theoretical – description of the 
elasticities.  
Apparently, elasticities must be exogenous to the PRIMES models, based either on external 
data sources, guessed, or determined through the calibration process. 
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Results of the CO2 reduction scenarios were published for the European Union as a whole, 
and not for the individual Member States. 
7.3 Optimisation results for a CHP region 
In the EFOM model, the energy system is described as a network of energy flows 
combining the extraction of primary fuels through a number of conversion and transport 
technologies to the demand for energy services or large energy consuming materials 
The model is focusing on the technology choice in the various sectors of the energy system, 
primary fuel demand and emissions. The structure and optimisation method (linear 
programming) is similar to the supply modules of the PRIMES model, and it was one of the 
sources for the development of the PRIMES model. The technology choice will depend on 
both the techno-economic parameters for future technologies as well as fuel prices, demand 
for energy commodities or services, and emission constraints.  
7.3.1 The EFOM model for CHP systems 
The EFOM-CHP model is used as an element within a set of modelling tools that are 
available for analysing the options and strategies for electricity generators that are operating 
in a an electricity market with competition and environmental constraints79.. This model 
structure may describe a country, but it may be disaggregated into regions or large utility 
companies. The natural boundary for a CHP system is a town or urban region with an 
interconnected district heating grid. 
The physical network infrastructure for electricity, gas and district heating is exogenous. 
However, it is an important feature of a liberalised market for energy that the ‘pipes and 
wires’ remain a regulated monopoly with access for all market participants. 
An EFOM-CHP model module for a single generating company or a group of 
homogeneous companies may be used to analyse the revenue requirement from long-term 
contracts, or the market conditions that will encourage or discourage particular generating 
technologies, e.g. renewables. A set of modules for different types of generators, operating 
in the same interregional electricity market, can be used to find a long-term price profile 
that will clear the market.  
Figure 7.3 shows the types of links that are used to describe CHP either for industrial steam raising 
or district heating with a few technologies for separate production. Electricity and heat demand 
forecasts are exogenous, but the model can be extended to describe technology substitution in the 
demand sectors, or demand forecasts can be dependent of price assumptions using price elasticities. 
Each link in the figure can represent several competitive technologies or several vintages of the same 
technology (Grohnheit 1993). The links refer to a database containing techno-economic data, e.g. 
fuel efficiencies, investment and operating costs, emission factors, initially installed capacities and 
constraints on new capacities or energy flows.  
                                                           
79 The EFOM-CHP model is developed from the model version used for a study on analysis of CO2 reduction 
options for the European Commission in 1990 focusing on CO2 reduction cost curves (Coherance 1991). 
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Figure 7.3. Optimisation model for large-scale and small-scale CHP networks 
The upper part of Figure 7.3 shows electricity generating technologies for the interregional 
electricity market including extraction-condensing units for large-scale CHP systems. Non-
thermal technologies (i.e. hydro, wind and photovoltaic cells) are technologies that are 
competing with CHP. At very high fuel prices the model may select these technologies or 
electricity purchase from the interregional electricity market instead of local or regional 
CHP generation. Existing nuclear capacity may compete with CHP generation and existing 
fossil-fuel condensing capacity may discourage investment in new CHP capacity.  
Extraction-condensing turbines is modelled as condensing turbines generating electricity 
only. Then demand for heat from the urban district heating grid is modelled by converting 
part of the potential electricity to heat using the inverse of the power-loss-ratio. Thus the 
model is able to simulate the flexible combination of electricity and heat from extraction-
condensing turbines.  
The lower part of the figure shows small-scale CHP technologies that are available for 
small district heating grids, mainly back-pressure units that generate electricity and heat in 
a fixed proportion specified by the power-to-heat ratio.  
Both the upper and lower parts of Figure 7.3 are available for large urban grids, or a small 
district heating grid connected to a particular extraction-condensing power station. 
A CHP model region is specified using a set of consistent data for electricity and heat 
demand, equipment for generating electricity and heat, biomass resources, and 
infrastructure constraints. The same model and basic data are used to model different scales 
of district heating, using the capacity of heat transmission from large extraction-condensing 
power plants as a key parameter.  
7.3.2 The impact of tradable CO2 permits 
The optimisation model is used for three examples of prices for tradable permits, CO2 
payments at 10,66 Ecu90 (rounded to 11 Ecu90) equal to 100 DKK-1998 per ton CO2, the 
double (rounded to 21 Ecu90), and four times the first assumption (rounded to 43 Ecu90). 
The CO2 payment is modelled as a price tag to fossil fuel prices, which may be fully or 
partial transferred to the electricity market price.  
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The PRIMES forecast for fossil fuel prices has been used, see Table 7.3. Similar to the 
PRIMES modelling for the Shared Analysis Project all prices are shown in ECU at 1990 
price level, which is the price base for several consumer price indices and fixed price 
presentations of national accounts. The consumer price index in ECU for 1998 with 
1990=100 is 125 (the conversion factors for DKK and NOK 1998 are 9.382 and 10.596, 
respectively (see Appendix A). 
Table 7.3. Price assumptions for fuels and electricity trade. 
 Ecu90/MWh Ecu90/toe 
 1995 2000 2010 2020 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal 4.92 4.79 4.87 4.99 57 56 57 58 
Fuel oil 6.97 6.17 7.27 8.37 81 72 85 97 
Gasoil 13.47 12.15 13.96 15.77 157 141 162 183 
Gas 6.63 6.43 7.86 9.29 77 75 91 108 
Straw 6.88 6.88 6.88 6.88 80 80 80 80 
Wood 5.59 5.59 5.12 5.12 65 65 60 60 
Urban waste -8.31 -8.31 -8.31 -8.31 -97 -97 -97 -97 
Electricity purchase (import) 17.21 16.92 17.10 17.36 200 197 199 202 
Electricity sales (export) 13.75 13.46 13.63 13.89 160 157 159 162 
Sources: PRIMES Post Kyoto Scenarios and Energistyrelsen 1995. 
The very important prices for wholesale trade of electricity cannot be derived from the 
PRIMES assumptions. An annual contract price 2001 is assumed on the basis of price 
quotations in 1998 from the Norwegian-Swedish electricity exchange Nord Pool and the 
power broker Skandinavisk Kraftmegling for forward prices for annual contracts at 161 
NOK per MWh (15 Ecu90). This price is divided into two components: the variable cost of 
a coal or gas fired power plant and a residual that represent the contribution margin for the 
marginal generator. However, this margin is very small, leaving much existing capacity as 
‘stranded assets’. In a preliminary model analysis the variable component was assumed to 
follow the price forecast for coal and gas respectively. The conclusion of the first iteration 
was that the price of an annual contract for electricity should follow the lowest of a coal or 
gas reference price with CO2 payments, see Table 7.4. Given the remaining assumptions for 
the CHP model regions, this assumption tends to lead to a reasonable balance between 
electricity purchase and sales for the different types of CHP regions and power generation 
without heat supply. The difference between the prices for electricity purchase and sales in 
Table 7.3 reflects the costs of interregional or international transmission. 
Table 7.4. Electricity forward prices for annual contracts with full transfer of CO2 
payments. 
Ecu90/MWh 1995 2000 2010 2020
Reference 15.48 15.19 15.37 15.62
11 ECU per ton CO2 15.48 19.56 22.41 23.73
21 ECU per ton CO2 15.48 23.93 26.77 29.65
43 ECU per ton CO2 15.48 32.66 35.51 38.38
Source: EFOM-CHP 
In the first optimisation year, there is no CO2 payment or other energy taxes. The CO2 
payment is assumed for the optimisation years: 2000, 2010 and 2020. 
The reference scenario assumes a competitive market for all technologies, which will 
require a discount rate at 10 % for the optimisation. A 5 % discount rate can be interpreted 
as some legal or political support, cf. e.g. Article 8, Subsection 3: of the electricity Market 
Directive: “A Member State may require the system operator, when dispatching generating 
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installations, to give priority to generating installations using renewable energy sources or 
waste or producing combined heat and power”80. In particular this may apply to small-scale 
CHP technologies and new investment in large-scale CHP.  
Some model results were also tested using a 15 % discount rate to represent risk-averse 
agents in a very competitive market. This higher discount does not change the main pattern 
of the technology choice, but investment in new capacities and sale of electricity will be 
discouraged, while it becomes more attractive to purchase electricity from outside. This 
mechanism may lead to higher electricity prices after a decade with low prices.  
7.3.3 Model assumptions for standardised CHP generators 
Table 7.5 summarises the assumptions for the CHP regional modules describing different 
groups of homogeneous companies characterised by their access to different scales of heat 
markets and initial generating capacities. 
Table 7.5. CHP regional modules 
CHP module Technology and demand 10 % discount 
rate 
5 % discount 
rate 
Small DH Small-scale CHP – No initial CHP X X 
Small CHP Small-scale CHP – CHP capacity X X 
Large DH Large-urban DH – No initial CHP X X 
Large CHP Large urban DH – CHP capacity X  
CHP from 2010 Local heat/steam – No CHP before 2010 X X 
Sep. Prod, Local heat/steam – No CHP X  
No Capacity No district heating - Import constrained X  
No-DH No district heating - Initial old capacity X  
New capacity 2010 No district heating - No demand before 2010 X  
New capacity 2020 No district heating - No demand before 2020 X  
 
The modules with initial CHP capacities are based on structural data from groups of Danish 
district heating networks ranging from large urban grids with heat supply from CHP units 
of different vintages to smaller grids with base load from a single CHP unit and a waste 
incineration plant. The techno-economic and structural data for these modules are 
documented in Grohnheit 1999 (the Shared Analysis Project, Volume 14), Sections 4.3.1 
and 4.3.2. 
The modules with no initial CHP capacity are based on the modules for large-scale and 
small-scale district heating networks, assuming that all the heat is supplied by heat-only 
boilers. Scenario results for the combinations of scale and initial capacity are documented 
in details in Grohnheit 1999, Section 4.3.4. Extracts of these results are shown in the 
following sections. 
The remaining modules are specified adding further constraints concerning technology 
options or heat demand.  
                                                           
80 Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market for 
electricity. 
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7.3.4 Electricity generation by technology 
The various assumptions on fuel and electricity prices have significant influence on the 
amount of import of electricity and local generation. In general, there will be a shift from 
purchase on the national or international electricity market to local generation, and the 
higher the fuel and electricity prices the more electricity will be generated locally, see 
Figure 7.4.  
 
Figure 7.4. Electricity generation by technology, 1995, 2000, 2010, 2020 
If the wholesale electricity market price followed the rise in coal price with the cost of CO2 
quotas and the full weight of the permit price were transferred to the electricity price on 
spot or futures markets, high export prices would create an incentive to invest in new 
capacity to generate for sales to the market. However, if this became the reaction of all 
utilities, there would be overcapacity, and market prices would be reduced by competition 
among generators.  
Thus, the assumption chosen for the development of the electricity market price (i.e. the 
lowest of coal and gas prices with CO2 payment) seems to develop market equilibrium with 
export from some regions and import to other regions. 
At high CO2 payment, operators of both small-scale and large-scale CHP will have an 
incentive to invest in new – gas fired – large-scale capacity for sale to their electricity 
customers or on the wholesale market for electricity in the period 2010-2020. At even 
higher CO2 payment than those shown in Figure 7.4 they would invest in expensive non-
fossil technologies, e.g. wind or nuclear power. However, only obsolete and tentative data 
has been included for nuclear technologies, and nuclear CHP has not been considered. For 
other technologies the assumptions on technology progress are very conservative and does 
not address the dynamics of technology progress, see Section 7.5. 
An initial capacity in 1995 has little influence on the technology choice. Under most 
assumptions the optimisation will choose the same technologies as in the regions with a 
planned development. When large-scale CHP is available this technology seems to be 
dominant, i.e. it will be chosen both at higher CO2 payments and lower discount rate. For 
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small-scale CHP the technology choice is much more sensitive to variations in assumptions. 
However, the overall pattern of the results is not very sensitive to different assumptions. 
In the regions with existing large-scale CHP capacity there is assumed an abundance of 
electricity generating capacity, because the access to a large heat market has been the 
primary criterion for location of large power plants (i.e. 250-500 MW extraction-
condensing units). This location policy is justified only if there will be a significant sale 
from these units to the regional or interregional electricity market. 
7.3.5 District heating supply technologies 
The impact on district heating technologies is visible, but moderate as shown in Figure 7.5. 
In particular, there is an increase in biomass for the small-scale district heating grids at the 
expense of fossil fuel boilers. The large share of central CHP will remain unchanged, but – 
as shown in Figure 7.6 – the primary fuel will change from coal to gas.  
 
Figure 7.5. District heating technology choices 1995, 2000, 2010, 2020. 
The overall picture is that both small-scale CHP and large-scale will penetrate, but large-
scale CHP will dominate when available. A lower discount rate will speed up this 
penetration of small-scale CHP. The most important impact of higher CO2 payments is that 
biomass technologies will penetrate further in the CHP regions without access to large-
scale CHP.  
An interesting feature, which appear at most of the different assumption is the emergence of 
heat pumps in the last period 2010-2020. These model results may even underestimate the 
potential for heat pumps, because the techno-economic assumptions are very conservative. 
The assumed efficiency factor is 2.7 only, while current vintages of large-scale heat pumps 
may have a much higher efficient factor.  
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7.3.6 Primary fuels in scenario results 
Figure 7.6 clearly illustrate the dominance of gas for small-scale CHP applications. Only 
the default assumption are shown, but parameter variations within the range used for the 
previous figures have little impact on the dominance of gas. 
In large-scale CHP regions with an initial capacity of coal-fired or multi-fuel capacity, the 
introduction of CO2 payment will lead to the substitution of gas for coal, reflecting the 
somewhat lower carbon contents of gas compared to coal (56 kg CO2 per GJ gas and 95 for 
coal). However, this result may be sensitive to the relative prices of coal and gas as seen in 
the lower right part of the figure, which shows a return from gas to coal in the last period, 
2010-2020, because the assumed increase in gas price will outweigh CO2 payment at the 
moderate level at 21 Ecu90 per ton CO2. 
 
Figure 7.6. Primary energy for CHP regions 1995, 2000, 2010, 2020. 
7.3.7 Model results as ‘building blocks’ for geographical regions 
The model results from the EFOM-CHP model for the different types of CHP regions can 
be used as ‘building blocks’ or modules to represent the existing and future infrastructure of 
the electricity and heat markets in actual geographical regions facing competition from 
electricity generators in neighbouring regions.  
It should be emphasised that the EFOM-CHP modules will address neither the important 
issue of network expansion nor the competition with improvement of the thermal standard 
of buildings.  
Heat pumps are included as an alternative supply option for heat distribution networks, as 
well as renewables for electricity-only generation. The latter technologies are both 
competitive and complementary to CHP technologies. Heat pumps, which consume 
electricity and small-scale CHP, which generate electricity used in combination will add to 
ability of operators of district heating and heat distribution systems to take advantage of the 
volatility of electricity prices on a liberalised market. 
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7.4 The international electricity market 
The model results from the EFOM-CHP model for the different types of CHP regions are 
also used as ‘building blocks’ for the electricity markets in the 17 western European 
countries covered by the E3ME macroeconomic model. 
7.4.1 Modelling the electricity market in 17 western European countries 
Table 7.6 shows in the first row the composition of the national electricity markets in six 
countries in northern Europe with strong transmission lines for electricity trade, or plans for 
further interconnections. The next row shows six countries in western Europe that take part 
in international electricity trade, and the last row show the remaining of the countries. 
The national markets are calibrated for 1995, so that all heat or steam supplies according to 
PRIMES are covered by the CHP modules. Further calibration was made for consistency 
with the data heat/steam generation from CHP units and boilers according to the PRIMES 
scenarios until 2020. However, PRIMES has no distinction between heat or steam 
generation for district heating and industrial use, so consistency with 1995 data must be 
made using other sources. Unfortunately, consistent statistics for the potential markets for 
CHP is not available from any source.  
As shown in Table 7.6 nearly 90 % of the Danish electricity market is described by the 
CHP modules. Existing and planned wind power is not included in the CHP modules. In 
1995 wind power covered some 5 % of the market. The PRIMES Post Kyoto scenario 
increases the generation from wind considerably. In addition, in the optimisation a 
company may invest in electricity-only generation – including wind – if this technology is 
competitive. 
Table 7.6. CHP modules for the European electricity markets 
Northern European electricity market Denmark Finland Germany Netherlands Norway Sweden 
Small-scale CHP. No initial capacity 15 % 10 % 7 % 10 % 2 % 20 % 
Large-scale CHP. No initial capacity 12 % 10 % 5 % 5 % 12 % 
Small-scale CHP, Initial CHP capacity 20 % 25 % 9 % 45 % 2 % 4 % 
Large-scale CHP, Initial CHP capacity 40 % 20 % 10 % 5 % 4 % 
Sum of CHP modules 87 % 65 % 31 % 65 % 4 % 40 % 
 
Six countries in western Europe Austria Belgium France Italy Spain UK 
Small-scale CHP. No initial capacity 5 % 1 % 6 % 8 % 10 % 4 % 
Large-scale CHP. No initial capacity 5 %  3 %   
Small-scale CHP, Initial CHP capacity 15 % 10 % 6 % 20 % 15 % 17 % 
Large-scale CHP, Initial CHP capacity 10 %    
Sum of CHP modules 35 % 20 % 15 % 28 % 25 % 21 % 
 
Other European countries Greece Ireland Lux.-bourg Portugal Switzerland 
Small-scale CHP. No initial capacity 15 % 15 % 5 % 30 % 2 %
Large-scale CHP. No initial capacity   
Small-scale CHP, Initial CHP capacity 1 % 8 % 2 %  
Large-scale CHP, Initial CHP capacity   
Sum of CHP modules 16 % 23 % 7% 30 % 2 %
Source: Own estimates. 
The Norwegian market can be represented by a small percentage of small-scale CHP 
modules without initial capacity and hydropower, which supply the interregional electricity 
market. The large Swedish district heating market will be represented by both small-scale 
and large-scale modules, mainly without initial capacities. Hydro and nuclear will supply a 
decreasing percentage of the market depending of the phase out of nuclear units.  
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The size and structure of the Finnish market for district heating is similar, but the total 
Finnish electricity market is much larger. In absolute terms the German district heating 
market is about twice the Danish, but it covers only about 10 % of the German electricity 
market. The Austrian district heating market can be represented by one large-scale CHP 
module with existing and planned CHP capacity. 
In all other European countries the modules with no initial CHP capacity will be dominant. 
The large district heating systems in Sweden is represented by less than one of the modules 
with CHP capacity, but several large and small scale modules with no initial CHP. District 
heating in France outside Paris can be represented by a few small-scale modules with no 
initial CHP, while the large and unique Paris district heating system may be badly 
represented by the large-scale module.  
Outside the district heating systems there are large markets for CHP for industrial processes 
and water-based heating systems for large institutions and blocks of flats. The industrial 
market is very significant in many countries. The best indication of the significance of this 
market is the penetration to about 40 % of the electricity market in the Netherlands. The 
size of the latter may be significant, but the statistical basis for quantification is very weak. 
In many European countries, there is a very developed natural gas grid that supply gas 
boilers for space heating. If micro-scale CHP becomes available the market in these 
countries will be enormous, and this may considerably change the electricity supply 
industry. The potential for this technology is discussed in Section 7.5. The current 
liberalisation of the industry could be a driving force for the development of the necessary 
equipment and their penetration.  
Figure 7.7 shows the result of a calibration of the model for 1995 for the 15 Member States 
of the EU plus Norway and Switzerland. The structure of electricity generation by the CHP 
modules is compared with available international statistics (the PRIMES Post Kyoto 
scenario, the statistics in the Annual Review of Energy from the European Commission, 
and Nordel statistics for the Nordic countries). For most countries it was possible to 
describe the structure of the electricity market in 1995 reasonably exact by the standardised 
generators of thermal electricity and CHP as shown in Figure 7.7. The difference for the 
heat markets as described by the PRIMES model are larger. However, any definition of the 
heat market for international comparison is dubious, and the international statistics is very 
bad.  
 
Figure 7.7. The structure of electricity generation in the 17 countries in western Europe. 
There are significant differences among the countries. In France, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland hydro or nuclear power cover much more than half of the total supply, while 
the share in Austria, Belgium Finland, Spain and the UK is between one-third and two-
thirds.  
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Hydro, nuclear and wind power are exogenous to the bottom-up model, and the generation 
from these technologies is taken from other scenario studies. Nuclear and wind are 
technologies that may be chosen by the optimisation. For example will significant 
economies of scale for gas-fired generating units make it cheaper to invest in electricity-
only capacity elsewhere than in local small-scale CHP. 
The difference between hydro, nuclear and wind is not significant for the current study. 
These are non-fossil technologies. Hydropower with reservoirs is important for peak load, 
while run-of-river, wind and nuclear are non-dispatchable. These issues are only limited 
addressed by the time-resolution used by the optimisation model (summer and winter; peak 
and base load).  
7.4.2 CO2 costs and international electricity trade 
Only part of the assumptions necessary for modelling the European electricity market are 
listed in Table 7.6. A key constraint used for balancing of the international markets is the 
maximum net trade as a percentage of the national electricity demand. This constraint is 
shown in Figure 7.8 as a negative maximum additional export. In this market balance only 
Luxembourg may import all electricity demand, and the maximum net export is set equal to 
the national demand. The constraint on net trade is set at 50 % for smaller countries with 
high capacity international transmission lines (Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland) or a 
potential for expansion of transmission capacity. The limit for Norway is set at 25 % and 
20 % for most countries (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK). 
Lower limits are used for large or isolated countries, or in case of a large share of industrial 
CHP (15 % for Finland and the Netherlands, 10 % for Greece, and 4 % for Germany). The 
model (implemented on a spreadsheet) will automatically correct surplus export by 
reducing electricity-only generation by fossil fuels, while surplus import must be corrected 
manually by assuming new capacity from 2010 or 2020, see the list of standardised 
generators in Table 7.5.  
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Figure 7.8. Electricity supply structure and market potential by 1995 for 17 European 
countries 
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Figure 7.9 shows the electricity trade among the countries. The data for 1995 is a result of 
the calibration shown in Figure 7.7 while the results for the years 2000, 2010 and 2020 are 
results that are mainly dependent on assumptions on new generating capacity for fossil 
electricity-only generation. These assumptions are chosen in order to balance the 
international market and minimise investment in new capacity, which can be postponed or 
avoided by import from neighbouring countries. In Figure 7.8 the residual electricity 
market illustrates the need for and the constraints of new electricity-generating capacity. In 
some of the larger countries – or the more isolated countries – such new capacity is 
constrained by the international transmission capacity. These constraint will also apply to 
investment in new renewable capacity, or micro-scale CHP capacity in addition to “New 
small-scale CHP”, which reflects the heat or steam market that was identified in the 
PRIMES Post-Kyoto Scenario. 
Reference scenario – Years 1995, 2000, 2010, 2020 
 
11 Ecu90 per ton CO2 
 
Figure 7.9. Net foreign electricity trade among 17 western European countries by CHP 
modules. 
CO2 payments will increase investment in small-scale CHP in nearly all countries. In Germany the 
export potential will increase above the constraint set in the scenario assumptions as shown in Figure 
7.9. At higher values of CO2 payments the constraints on export will be broken also in the 
Netherlands and France.  
7.4.3 Model results for electricity and heat in 6 countries in northern 
Europe  
Detailed results for electricity and heat generation is shown only for the six countries in 
northern Europe, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, for 
which the model results of the standardised CHP generators are most appropriate, see 
Figure 7.4, Figure 7.5, and Figure 7.6.  
In Figure 7.12 the upper graph shows the results of the reference scenario for these 
countries in absolute values for the six countries, which are very different in size. Trade 
among generators and distributors with a potential for investing in – mainly small-scale – 
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CHP is very important in Germany and the Netherlands, and there is a smaller, but relative 
large, potential for CHP in Sweden, while the remaining CHP markets in Denmark and 
Finland are small.  
Reference scenario – Years 1995, 2000, 2010, 2020. 
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CO2 payment 11 Ecu90 – Years 1995, 2000, 2010, 2020 – 20 times larger scale 
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Figure 7.10. Electricity generation for 6 countries in northern Europe. 
The development of hydro and nuclear power is exogenous, so the results of the 
standardised generators will apply to thermal generation only. 
The lower graph in Figure 7.12 shows the impact of the CO2 payment at 11 Ecu90 per ton. 
There is a shift from purchase of electricity to local generation by small-scale CHP units. 
The impact, however, is limited (the scale of the lower graph that shows the difference is 20 
times larger than that of the upper graph). 
Figure 7.11 shows the same scenario results for generation of heat for space heating by 
local distribution of hot water or industrial steam. The heat market is extended to include 
even small heat distribution system, which may be a potential market for micro-scale CHP, 
if this technology becomes economically available (see Section 7.5.2). In the scenarios 
shown here, CHP technologies below some MW-electric are not assumed available before 
2020.  
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The increase in biomass and small-scale CHP in the reference scenario follow from the 
weight of the standardised generators, see Figure 7.5, and CO2 payment at 11 Ecu90 per ton 
leads to some further penetration.  
Reference scenario – Years 1995, 2000, 2010, 2020 
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CO2 payment 11 Ecu90 – Years 1995, 2000, 2010, 2020 – 10 times larger scale 
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Figure 7.11. Heat and steam generation for 6 countries in northern Europe. 
Figure 7.12. shows the development in primary energy. At the current price assumptions, 
there is some substitution of gas for coal in the reference scenario until 2010, while there is 
an increased use of coal in the last period. This revival of coal is very sensitive to price 
assumptions and CO2 payment. The lower part of Figure 7.12 is shown in the same scale 
and indicates a significant shift from coal to gas. 
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Reference scenario – Years 1995, 2000, 2010, 2020 
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Figure 7.12. Primary energy for electricity and heat or steam for 6 countries in northern 
Europe 
In contrast to the previous figures, Figure 7.13 is normalised per kWh consumed in each 
country. The most visible difference in the cost structure among the countries is the 
differences in trade activity. The unit costs are low, because they do not include sunk costs, 
and the need for new investment within the period is limited. The impact of CO2 payment at 
11 Ecu90 is shown in the lower part of Figure 7.13.  
Although the trade activity will be reduced by more local generation, both purchase cost 
and sales revenue (negative) will increase. Thus, nearly all the difference in unit costs of 
electricity in the scenario with CO2 payment 11 Ecu90/t are caused directly by the CO2 
payment and the assumed transfer of these payments to the wholesale electricity price, 
which also apply to hydro and nuclear electricity in Norway and Sweden. The extra costs of 
fuel substitution and investment in new capacity is negligible.  
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Figure 7.13. Annual unit electricity cost and CO2 emissions for 6 countries in northern 
Europe. Reference and CO2 payment 11 Ecu90/t. 
7.5 Modelling technology development 
In the bottom-up model studies described in the previous sections CO2 tradable permits or 
CO2 taxes was implemented as a price tag on fuel prices and electricity prices. The result 
was a shift from coal to gas or investment in technologies with less emissions of CO2. Both 
fuel prices and the investment costs are exogenous, and a relatively high value of CO2 
payment would be necessary achieve a significant reduction of CO2 emissions. 
Technological progress is taken into account by more efficient technologies becoming 
available from a future year or lower investment costs due to technological progress.  
In summary, the model results were based on the relative costs of fuels and generating 
equipment. And the assumptions concerning technology development are rather 
conservative. 
7.5.1 Technological progress 
These conservative assumptions are not consistent with the experience that ‘once a 
technology penetrate the market, it tends to be cheaper’. There is little tradition to quantify 
this experience into a bottom up model, which would require specific quantitative 
assumptions on the development in investment cost and efficiency parameters.  
As a part of a study “Industrial Benefits and Costs of Greenhouse Gas Abatement: 
Applications of E3ME”, for the JOULE III energy research programme, the EFOM-CHP 
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model described in Section 7.3 was used to quantify the impact of a future availability of 
micro-scale CHP (e.g. for single family houses) at investment costs that would allow this 
technology to penetrate into the market for heat and electricity. Two scenarios depending 
on assumed development of vintages of technologies were specified: a moderate one and a 
high-speed development. These scenarios were compared with the reference scenario in 
order to find final impacts of the future CHP.  
The key technology assumption concerns the availability of very small-scale gas fired CHP 
– either in the form of gas motors or fuel cells. In the reference scenario this technology 
will not be available in scales lower than those available for industrial CHP in many 
countries, ‘decentralised CHP’ in Denmark or ‘Blockheizkraftwerke’ in Germany81.  
In a scenario on moderate technology development it is assumed that micro-scale CHP for 
single-family houses and small businesses at costs no higher than current small-scale CHP 
before 2010. The availability of such technologies will require an increase in R&D 
expenditure in selected sectors in the period 2001-2010. The penetration of the technology 
will depend on the same conditions as other technologies, using the discount rate at 10 % in 
an optimisation model. The result of this scenario is described in the following sections.  
In a scenario on fast technology development it is assumed that this technology is supported 
by public R&D, and various types of market regulations or subsidies, which will allow 
investors of all types of small-scale CHP to use a lower discount rate. Under such a 
dissemination friendly environment technologies the discount rate at 5 % was used in the 
optimisation model. 
The market potential for micro-scale CHP is identified combining the forecast for natural 
gas supply to boilers outside the market for district heating and industrial steam in the 
PRIMES Post-Kyoto Scenario and the “residual electricity market” in Figure 7.8.  
The size of the market potential for micro-scale CHP is very dependent on a number of 
assumptions, concerning both technology parameters and the structures of the national 
markets. The key technology parameter is the power-to-heat ratio, which is highly 
dependent on the technology development and the actual choice of equipment. There are 
very significant differences among the countries, which mainly depends of the penetration 
of current CHP technologies and the existence of a natural gas grid. Assuming a moderate 
power-to-heat ratio (about 0.6) the potential for micro-scale CHP is larger than the 
electricity demand in 1995 in the Netherlands, where the space heating and horticulture 
markets are dominated by natural gas supply. The market potential for micro-scale CHP is 
much smaller in all other countries. It is between 30 and 60 % in most countries (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK), between 20 and 30 % 
in Denmark, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland, and between 10 and 20 % in Greece and 
Finland. In Norway there is no gas grid at all for domestic supply, and in Sweden the 
penetration of natural gas is very limited. However, in both these countries there is a 
potential for a massive introduction of natural gas.  
7.5.2 Availability of micro-scale CHP 
More local electricity generation means less generation from the utilities or an exportable 
surplus. It is assumed that local generation and utilities are competing in an international 
                                                           
81 The description of the infrastructure and the options for investment in new equipment and new 
technologies and their techno-economic data are based mainly on the most recent Danish energy 
plan “Energy 21” from 1996. The techno-economic data for the various scales and vintages of CHP 
have been compared with the data in the German IKARUS database.  
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competitive market. All generators, who have a given portfolio of electricity supply 
obligations, optimise their purchase or own generation on the basis of given annual average 
unit price for electricity purchase and sales. 
In Figure 7.14 the impact of the introduction of CO2 payment at 11 Ecu90 per ton is 
compared with the technology scenarios. The figure shows the difference to the trade 
pattern shown in Figure 7.9 using the same scale. 
If micro-scale CHP becomes available, generation will shift significantly from the utilities 
to local generators with a supply obligation for the heat market. but no access to access to 
large-scale CHP and no initial generating capacity. In the UK, Germany and Italy 15-30 % 
of the fossil thermal generation will shift from large-scale to small-scale generators. In 
Germany and France this will also lead to an exportable surplus, which can be balanced by 
import to Italy, and less investment in conventional generating capacity in Italy. The same 
mechanism will also be found among smaller countries, e.g. export from Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, and import to Austria, Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg.  
11 Ecu90 per ton CO2 
 
Micro-scale CHP available (moderate technology development) 
 
Small and new CHP with PSO (fast technology development) 
 
Figure 7.14. Differences in foreign electricity by CO2 payment and if micro-scale CHP 
becomes available from 2010. 17 countries 
Chapter 7. Modelling tradable permits and technology choice 
 
Risø-R-1184 (EN) 187 
 
In the scenario with fast technology development it is assumed that new and small-scale 
CHP is supported by some kind of regulation (e.g. a public service obligation, which is 
implemented into the model by assuming a lower discount rate). In this scenario the same 
pattern of development will be found, but the impact will be about twice as significant. In 
this scenario also Austria, Belgium, Finland and Sweden become exporters, while Spain 
and the UK become importers. In both these scenarios and in most countries there will be a 
shift in primary fuels from coal to gas. Obviously, CHP will replace boilers for heat supply 
Thus efficiency gains in one country may lead to increased CO2 emissions in this country 
and less emissions in the countries that are importing the surplus electricity instead of own 
generation by fossil electricity-only technologies. 
In some countries the availability of micro-scale CHP will lead to no new investment in 
new large-scale capacity, in particular in 2010. In other countries, e.g. the UK, most 
investment in new capacity will still be large-scale. Part of the investment in new boilers 
for heat and industrial steam will be replaced by micro-scale CHP. This mechanism is less 
significant in countries with a tradition for district heating or industrial CHP. In these 
countries the impact of micro-scale CHP will be less significant. 
7.5.3 Economic and environmental impact of CO2 payments or new 
technologies 
The most significant economic impact of the availability of micro-scale CHP is that 
electricity purchase is replaced by own generation for the standardised agents that has a 
portfolio of contracted electricity sales, but no initial generating capacity. Thus electricity 
sales by the utilities will be reduced. However, all these differences are small. Another 
consequence is that investment in new capacity will be made by different agent and in a 
different period.  
Although the availability of micro-scale CHP will have a significant impact on the structure 
of the power sector, the CO2 reduction caused by the technology development is modest, in 
particular compared with the model results for the impact of CO2 payments. This is 
illustrated for the 17 countries in Figure 7.15. At the assumptions – mainly concerning fuel 
prices – used in the optimisation model CO2 payments at 21 Ecu90 lead to significant 
reduction in the periods represented by the years 2000 and 2010. In some countries this 
reduction will be reversed by 2020. This is a consequence of the close competition between 
coal and gas. However, the more modest gain in CO2 reduction by new, more efficient 
technologies will not be reversed. 
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Figure 7.15. CO2 emissions in 17 countries. Reference scenario and reduction scenarios. 
7.5.4 Scenarios for CO2 emissions in the European Union 
In Figure 7.16 the results of the optimisation model concerning the total reduction of CO2 
in the power and heat/steam generating sector is compared with the results of the PRIMES 
results for the Shared Analysis project as described in Section 7.2.4. Although the results of 
the PRIMES model was used as the main data source for the structural data in the model 
used in this study, the CO2 emissions in the Reference scenario is some 100-200 mill. ton 
larger in this study than the PRIMES results. This reflects the broader definition of the heat 
sector in order to cover all the market potential for small- and micro-scale CHP. With this 
difference the result for the scenario with CO2 payments at 11 Ecu90 is similar to the 
PRIMES stabilisation scenario. On the other hand, the PRIMES 3 % and 6 % reduction 
scenarios are not well reproduced by the use of the EFOM-CHP model for standardised 
agents. 
In contrast to PRIMES the EFOM-CHP model is a pure techno-economic optimisation 
model. It is well-documented, but it does not contain elastic demand, which would be 
necessary to clear the markets finding both prices and volumes. 
7.6 Tradable permits and market design 
The optimisation for the electricity and heat market in a region with a large and diversified 
market for district heating and subject to competition on the electricity market – consisting 
of different EFOM-CHP modules – indicates that tradable CO2 permits may lead to a very 
rapid substitution of gas for coal, but CO2 permits may not be the major driver for new 
technologies with no CO2 emissions, but high investment costs.  
 
Chapter 7. Modelling tradable permits and technology choice 
 
Risø-R-1184 (EN) 189 
 
 
Figure 7.16. CO2 emissions in the power and heat/steam sector in EU-15. Comparison of 
different scenarios by EFOM-CHP and PRIMES. 
 
In summary it may be concluded from the generalisation of the model results: 
• Tradable CO2 permits are likely to lead to a very rapid substitution of natural gas for 
coal. 
• Tradable CO2 permits are unlikely to be a major driver for new technologies with no 
CO2 emissions, but high investment costs   - at least in the short and medium term  (i.e. 
until 2008-12). 
• Some elements of regulation apart from CO2 permits will be necessary to reduce the 
financial risk of investment in low-emission technologies. 
• However, an appropriate regulatory framework is essential not only for the ‘green’ 
market, but for any organised commodity market. 
• Large-scale CHP from coal or gas fired power plants is the dominant technology for 
district heating supply, when this technology is available. The technology choice is 
more open for small-scale district heating systems. 
• Local or regional generators of CHP, who are able to react on price signals, should not 
conclude long-term contracts that include fixed time-of-day tariff for sale of electricity. 
A common European taxation of fuels or a European market for CO2 emission permits may 
be favourable for capital-intensive, clean technologies that will reduce the demand for fossil 
fuels. However, even very high taxes or permit prices are unlikely to have much effect on 
the development of CHP unless further measures are taken e.g. long-term contracts 
supported by a market for ‘green certificates’.  
An important conclusion from the liberalisation in the UK is that market liberalisation and 
privatisation will require an appropriate regulatory framework. 
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8 Quota prices 
How high or how low will the CO2 quota prices be if a system of tradable permits is agreed 
on? What are the costs to society of CO2 reductions under alternative assumptions on quota 
trade (or Joint Implementation and CDM)? These are important questions to politicians, 
power producers, energy intensive firms and consumers. 
A number of model based studies have estimated quota prices and costs to society of 
conducting CO2 reduction policies. The estimated prices and costs vary so much that it is 
difficult to extract any clear message. The variance in results suggests that researchers (and 
model users) even disagree on assumptions of importance to the magnitude of quota prices 
and costs. In some of the studies there seem to be confusion with respect to the use of 
different cost concepts: It is not at all clear what is meant by ‘costs of CO2 reduction’, 
‘costs to society’, ‘quota prices’. Often ‘costs’ are presented as ‘costs per ton CO2 reduced’ 
and interpreted as an estimate of quota prices, but the cost concept include macro economic 
effects of quota prices. 
Section 8.3 illustrates that estimates how costs to society and estimates of quota prices can 
vary from one study to another. At least estimates of costs to society seem to vary in a 
systematic way, dependent on the type of model used. 
The present analysis briefly discusses the use of different types of models to estimate quota 
prices, emission reductions and costs to society of reducing emissions (cf. Sections 8.1 and 
8.2).  
The main focus is on the limitations of the models with respect to estimating quota prices. It 
is obvious that national models cannot be used to derive quota prices on an international 
market. Estimates for example of EU quota prices require EU models. If CO2 reductions 
outside the EU are cheaper than within the EU, and if it is possible to buy these CO2 
reductions for example through JI or CDM – this will affect the EU CO2 quota prices. If 
countries conduct policies, which support renewables within power production, or support 
other initiatives, which reduce greenhouse gases, this will have an effect on the quota prices 
(cf. Nielsen, 1999). If there are important backstop technologies with respect to CO2 
reduction, and reductions of other greenhouse gasses, this may have an effect on quota 
prices.  
The analysis demonstrates that there are important backstop technologies with respect to 
CO2 reduction. If a backstop technology is the marginal CO2 reduction technique on the 
market, the quota price will be equal to the CO2 reduction cost of that backstop technology. 
If the models used to estimate quota prices do not model the relevant backstop 
technologies, the estimated quota prices may be too high.  
The analysis demonstrates that in Denmark and in the EU the power-producing sector is 
significant with respect to CO2 reductions; and furthermore that there are important 
backstop technologies with large emission reduction potentials. Knowledge of the backstop 
technologies and their CO2 reduction costs (under given assumptions) can be used to infer 
upper limits to the CO2 quota prices. This is done for Denmark and the EU, given a number 
of assumptions.  
The present analysis stresses the importance of attention on backstop technologies – their 
emission reduction potentials and the prices at which they become profitable – in studies of 
quota prices and costs of CO2 reductions. The present analysis indicates that failure to 
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include backstop technologies may give quota price estimates that are too high and of 
limited value.  
8.1 The cost of CO2 reduction  
Different types of models have been used to evaluate the cost of reducing CO2 emissions to 
a given level. The models differ with respect to their foundation in the technical sciences, 
microeconomics or macroeconomics.  
The technical models focus on energy producing techniques (especially within the power-
producing sector) and the techniques associated with energy consumption. The models 
evaluate emission reduction efforts and the costs of changing the existing technologies with 
new and less CO2 intensive techniques. The technical optimisation models describing the 
power producing sector optimise the power producing techniques for given prices on 
electricity, taxes, quota prices, etc.  
The macroeconomic models evaluate the macroeconomic responses to CO2 quotas, CO2 
taxes, TP, TQ, JI or other instruments. They focus on the effects on aggregate energy 
consumption, international competitiveness, industrial output, the macroeconomic activity 
level, etc.  
The assumptions forming the models and the cost concepts used differ. But both types of 
models have relevance. 
In Denmark and internationally both types of models have been used to analyse the same 
questions concerning costs to society of reducing greenhouse gasses. But there seems to be 
a systematic difference between the models with respect to the estimated cost: The 
technical models seem to estimate lower costs to society than the macroeconomic costs (cf. 
Jacobsen et al., 1996, Chapter 2). Much effort has been done to integrate the models. 
The present and the following section relates the concepts of quota prices, CO2 reduction 
costs and costs to society of reducing CO2 with the different types of models. It is important 
to be aware that these concepts do not cover the same. 
The quota price is formed on a market where supply and demand for quotas are presented. 
The quota price is equal to the marginal CO2 reduction cost on the market. 
The macroeconomic CO2 reduction costs – the costs to society – are the direct and indirect 
economic consequences of firms and consumers being forced to reduce emissions or to buy 
or sell quotas. CO2 quota prices can be interpreted as CO2 taxes on firms and consumers, 
and the wider economic consequences of these taxes can be analysed in the macroeconomic 
models.  
For given quota prices the national macroeconomic models estimate the macroeconomic 
costs of the quotas. But if the national and international macroeconomic models are 
sufficiently specific with respect to techniques and emissions, it is in principle possible to 
estimate the CO2 tax – or the quota price – which will imply that the CO2 reduction target is 
reached.  
National macroeconomic and technical models cannot estimate quota prices on quota 
markets, which include more countries.  
Macroeconomic estimates of national and international quota prices have the advantage that 
there are feed backs between the quota market (prices) and energy consumption, economic 
activity, foreign competitiveness, etc. These feed back mechanisms are the more important 
the higher the quota prices and the larger the effects on energy consumption behaviour and 
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macro economic activity. The amount of data needed for the international analysis may be 
considerable. 
Marginal CO2 abatement costs and CO2 abatement costs curves can be estimated from 
technical models. Cost curves for all the countries participating in a quota system combined 
with country specific emission reduction targets will say something about the quota market, 
the amount of trades and the quota price. Cost curves are estimated for given activity level, 
prices and technological development. It is obvious that quota prices estimated by technical 
models reflect the assumptions of the technical cost curves. 
It is typical that output from the one type of model is used as input in the other type of 
model. The technical models use activity levels, prices and perhaps elasticities from the 
macroeconomic models and the macroeconomic model use emission reduction potentials 
and microeconomic CO2 reduction costs from the technical models. 
8.2 Relations between quota prices and macroeconomic costs 
of CO2 reductions  
This section shows that there is no ‘one to one’ relation between the size of quota prices 
and the macroeconomic costs of CO2 reductions. And demonstrate why it is important to 
distinguish between quota prices and macroeconomic costs. 
The higher the economic activity in a country, the more emissions (in general) and the more 
emission reductions needed to reach a fixed emission target for the country. On a national 
quota market higher economic activity may increase quota prices, because the price of the 
marginal emission reduction increases. But it is not at all obvious that an international quota 
price is affected. Even if the quota price is unaffected of an increase in the national activity 
level, the national macro economic costs may be higher. 
Along the same lines, changes in the fixed emission target for the country do not 
necessarily lead to changes in (international) quota prices. But the macroeconomic cost 
change. 
A higher quota price may be less damaging to the macro economy, if the high quota price is 
co-ordinated between countries and the low quota price is not. Co-ordination means that the 
international competitiveness is less affected. 
A given quota price will have different macroeconomic implications dependent on for 
example the structure of a country's industry. The extremes could be an economy, which 
produce emission-reducing technologies, and therefore would have an economic advantage 
of international policies towards emission reductions. Or an economy where firms and 
processes are exported to countries without environmental regulation.  
Studies of macroeconomic costs of CO2 reductions reflect that the time horizon analysed is 
short. The reason why policies to reduce the greenhouse gasses are conducted are that there 
are positive welfare gains in the long run. And that these gains are bigger than short-term 
economic costs. 
The time perspective is also important with respect to the quota price: Investments in CO2 
reductions can be very expensive if the CO2 investments are not coordinated with other 
investments or not planned properly.  
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8.3 Quota prices in selected empirical studies 
Estimates of quota prices are important as measures of the costs of climate policy to the 
individual emitters of CO2. At the national level estimates of quota prices are important as 
input in macroeconomic analysis of the costs to society.  
The following presentation of a few estimates of the quota price is very brief. The purpose 
is to show that estimates differ a lot. All the different estimates of the quota prices may be 
“correct” given the different assumptions. But it leaves the reader rather confused – and 
with a need for a method or guidelines to evaluate the quota prices. The following sections 
tries to develop such a method or guidelines concerning reductions of emissions.  
A recent article by Criqui et al. (1999) use the POLES and EPPA models to estimate both 
costs of fulfilling the Kyoto agreement in different regions of the world and quota prices for 
these regions. Estimated quota prices are listed in Table 8.1. All prices are in constant 1990 
US dollars or constant 1990 Danish currency (DKK). EPPA is a general equilibrium 
macroeconomic model and POLES is an energy system model with some common features 
with the ‘top-down’ models. The abatement costs calculated by the POLES model are 
‘sectoral cost’, whereas the EPPA model takes the “full range of impacts of reduction 
policies” into account (Criqui et al., 1999, p 588). The size of the quota prices are much 
dependent on the model: According to Table 8.1 the EPPA model estimate prices twice the 
size of the POLES model prices for the Annex B market and EU market. In the article it is 
said that these differences are due to different reference scenarios: If the POLES reference 
scenario is used in the EPPA model, quota prices will be almost the same.  
In 2010 the CO2 reduction needed in the EU to go from the reference to the Kyoto target is 
20 % in the POLES model and 29 % in the EPPA model. The quota prices are, following 
Table 8.1, 166 and 330 $/ton C respectively. Comparing the two models gives that reducing 
emissions 9 % more (to reach the same target) gives a quota price increase of 100 %! Will 
that be credible? It is difficult to say, without having anything to evaluate it against. (The 
amounts of emissions reduced are 204 and 308 million ton C in the two models). 
Table 8.1. Quota prices for year 2010 
Region/Model POLES EPPA 
World* 21.3 $/ton C    (41.9 DKK/ton CO2)  24   $/ton C      (47 DKK/ton CO2) 
Annex B 63    $/ton C    (124  DKK/ton CO2) 127 $/ton C    (250 DKK/ton CO2) 
EU 166  $/ton C    (326  DKK/ton CO2) 330 $/ton C    (650 DKK/ton CO2) 
Source: Criqui et al. 1999. 
Notes:  All prices are in constant 1990 US dollars or constant 1990 DKK. 
Non annex B countries are assumed to have reduction target equal to their baseline. 
A special issue of the Energy Journal (1999) is dealing with “The costs of the Kyoto 
Protocol: A multimodel evaluation”. Thirteen different modelling teams use their particular 
model to analyse some standard questions: 
“First, each team was asked to run a ‘modellers reference’ scenario, with modeller chosen 
GDP, population, energy prices, etc. This scenario was to assume no new policies other 
than those currently in effect (e.g., nothing new from Kyoto). 
Second, the modelling teams were asked to run a number of stylised Kyoto scenarios 
varying on three dimensions: (i) The amount of international emissions trading assumed, 
(ii) The availability of sinks and ‘other greenhouse gas’ emission reductions to satisfy the 
Protocol’s requirement, and (iii) The required emission reduction beyond 2010.”  
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The modelling teams estimate emission quota prices (carbon taxes) for different areas. With 
respect to the European Union the results are summarised in the following Figure 8.1 
showing four different emission trading scenarios: 1. No international trade, 2. Annex 1 
trading, 3. “Double Bubble”, i.e. separate EU and separate “rest of Annex 1” trade, and 4. 
Global trading.  
The EU carbon tax in the no international trade scenario is equal to the quota price in the 
“Double bubble” EU emission trading scenario (there may be minor differences). It is seen 
that there is an extreme variance between the most optimistic (<20 $/t C = 5 $/ton CO2) and 
most pessimistic price estimates (>900 $/t C = 245 $/ton CO2). Apart from the most 
optimistic model study, all the quota prices exceed 300 DKK/ton CO2 (175 $/ton C, 
exchange rate 6.19 DKK/$). The Annex 1 trading scenario in most cases more than half the 
model based quota prices. This is to a large extent due to Russian ‘hot air’. 
The different quota prices of course reflect the different reference scenarios, assumptions 
and models. In principle all the quota prices can be equally relevant, but it could be very 
convenient to have a method or guidelines to evaluate the empirical relevance of the 
different outcomes.  
 
Source: Weyant and Hill (1999) 
Figure 8.1. Year 2010 Carbon Tax Comparisons 
Table 8.2 describes the results of three Nordic model based studies of quota prices on a 
Nordic or a national market. Again the quota prices reflect the assumptions and models. 
What could be interesting to evaluate is the development of quota prices over time, and the 
very high quota price in 2020 in the Delmark study: According to Hauch (1999) an 
important difference between his own analysis of Sweden and Delmark's is that Hauch 
assumes that Sweden import electricity from the other Nordic countries. But why can 
Sweden not invest in the same power producing technologies as the other Nordic countries 
and bring the quota price down?  
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Table 8.2. Quota prices in three Nordic studies 
Analysis Amundsen Delmark Hauch Hauch 
Model type Partial 
equilibrium 
General equilibrium General equilibrium General equilibrium 
Market Nordic1 Sweden Sweden Nordic1 
Sectors Power sector Power sector All All 
Reduction relative 
to target 
Swedish nuclear 
power phase out, 
1990 emission 
level 
Swedish nuclear 
power phase out,  
1990 emission level 
Swedish nuclear 
power phase out, 
Kyoto (EU) targets1 
Swedish nuclear 
power phase out, 
Kyoto (EU) targets1 
Year for quota 
price(s) 
 
2000 
 
2000, 2020 
 
2000, 2020 
 
2000, 2010, 2020 
reduction in pct. 
of reference 
   year 2010: 26 % 
year 2020: 38 % 
Quota price3 65 DKK/ton CO2 Year 2000: 
125 DKK/ton CO2 
Year 2020: 
1045 DKK/ton CO2  
 
Year 2000: 
62 DKK/ton CO2 
Year 2020: 
680 DKK/ton CO2  
 
Year 2000: 
75 DKK/ton CO2 
Year 2010: 
340 DKK/ton CO2  
Year 2020: 
600 DKK/ton CO2 
Sources: Amundsen: Amundsen 1999, Delmark and Hauch: Hauch 1999.  
Notes: 1) Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark. 2) The EU distribution of the Kyoto target 
implies that Denmark reduces emissions by 21 % compared to a revised 1990 level. The other 
Nordic countries have reduction targets close to their 1990 emission level. 3) Prices are constant 
1990 prices. 
8.4 A method to evaluate the size of quota prices 
Quota prices are results of supply and demand for emission quotas and indirectly results of 
supply and demand for emission reductions. Estimates of a future CO2 quota price may be 
given by the intersection of supply and demand curves for CO2 reductions. But supply and 
demand curves are difficult to construct because of the amount of data needed. 
With respect to the power producing sector estimates of future quota prices are often based 
on technical optimisation or simulation models describing the existing power producing 
system and a number of alternative investment possibilities. A model based supply curve 
for CO2 reductions can be constructed from registering the changes in the models emissions 
following different levels of quota prices. Of cause the supply curve reflects the alternative 
investment possibilities given in the model, fuel input prices, prices on electricity, and all 
the other assumptions of the model. 
The method used in this section to evaluate the size of quota prices is to analyse important 
backstop technologies with respect to CO2 reductions. These backstop technologies may 
form a maximum-price supply curve for CO2 emission reductions. Given that these 
backstop technologies have large emission reduction potentials this supply curve may have 
large flat segments. The cheaper the backstop technologies – with respect to CO2 reductions 
– the more likely it will be that the backstop supply curve will be close to, or even equal to, 
the ‘real’ supply curve for CO2 reductions.  
The idea is illustrated in Figure 8.2, which shows prices and emission reduction potentials 
for three backstop technologies. At a price equal of P(b3) there is a reduction potential of z-
y. y-x is the reduction potential for a backstop technology, b2, with CO2 reduction costs 
equal of P(b2), and x-v is the potential at a quota price equal of P(b1). Figures are 
constructed so that the reduction potentials can be added. Together the tree backstop 
technologies have a reduction potential of (z-v). 
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Assume a tradable emission quota system. Then, if the ‘demand’ for emission reductions is 
between z-y, the quota price can never exceed P(b3), which is the price of the cheapest 
backstop technology. If the required level of emissions are between x and y the price will 
not exceed P(b2), and given a required emission level between v and x the price will not 
exceed P(b1). 
If the emissions reduction potentials for the three backstop technologies are significant 
compared to the total reduction requirements, and if the CO2 reduction costs are relatively 
low compared to other possibilities, one of these prices could be a good estimate for the 
emissions quota price. At least the prices of the backstop technologies will form maximum 
quota prices within different ranges of the total level of emission reductions.  
Quota price 
emissions
0
Backstop technologies
 
P(b1)
P(b2)
P(b3)
v x y z
Emission level
for the whole economy
 
Figure 8.2. Backstop technologies, prices and potentials 
The method can be motivated by at least two different arguments: 
Knowledge of the emission reduction costs for backstop technologies with a large reduction 
potential (relative to the required reductions) can be used to question for example model 
based quota prices, which are either much higher or much lower than costs for the relevant 
backstop technology. 
Part of the explanation why prices of American SO2 quotas fell much below the predicted 
level was the presence of cheap backstop technologies with a huge emission reduction 
potential. But also investments in high cost emission reductions options82 based on false 
expectations of high SO2 quota prices (partly justified on the predicted high SO2 quota 
price) played a role (Ellerman, 1998). The irreversibility of the investment decisions 
increased the supply of quotas at sunk costs (implying an outward shift in the supply 
curve). Because of the ‘over-investment’ in high cost emission reduction methods, the 
marginal SO2 reduction technique was a low cost technique. Table 8.3 copied from 
Ellerman (1998) summarises reduction costs and emission reductions in the American SO2 
market. “… early studies of compliance cost estimated (prices) at about $300 per ton, 
although it was possible to find even higher estimates” In 1993 the auction clearing price 
                                                           
82 The backstop technology in question is ‘scrubbers’, which clean SO2 emissions to air. 
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was $131, in 1996 allowance prices were slightly below $70 and in 1998 again around $130 
(Ellerman, 1998).  
Table 8.3. Reduction and compliance costs in 1995 
Method of compliance Emission reduction 
ton SO2      Percentage 
Avg. cost 
$95/ton 
Min. cost 
$95/ton 
Max. cost 
$95/ton 
Total cost 
Million $ 
Title IV Scrubbers 1,733,743 45 % 267 186 773 463.1 
Non-Title IV Scrubbers 20,698 1 % 65 65 65 1.3 
Coal Switching 1,707,819 44 % 153 60 297 261.3 
Non-cost Switching 425,242 11 % 0 0 0 0.0 
 
Total 
 
3,887,502 
 
100 %
 
187 
 
0 
 
773 
 
725.7 
Source: Ellerman, 1998. 
 
The preceding section showed wide differences among predicted future CO2 quota prices. 
Of course these differences reflect the different models and the different assumptions. Some 
of them may be compatible. But if there are important backstop technologies with large 
emission reduction potentials, and if the investment costs of these are well known, all the 
studies must be able to relate to this information. The intention behind the next sections is 
to develop, or demonstrate, a method that can be used to evaluate predicted quota prices 
and the assumptions of the models used. Section 8.5 describes CO2 reduction costs and 
potentials within the Danish power producing sector. These reduction costs are used to say 
something about maximum quota prices in a purely Danish CO2 quota system. The analysis 
is broadened to the whole EU in Section 8.6. 
8.5 CO2 reduction costs for the case of Denmark 
Table 8.4 gives a brief impression of alternative costs of reducing CO2 within the Danish 
electricity sector. Figures are calculated based on a number of assumptions as to for 
example the interest rate, which type of power production is substituted, and which level of 
capacity the new and substituted plant is run at. The sizes of the figures are highly 
dependent on the assumptions, which are therefore relevant in evaluating the figures:  
Table 8.4. Costs for CO2 reductions in Denmark in 1996 
Country/ 
Technology 
Denmark 
DKK/ton CO2 
Electricity export reduced by 50 %  40  
Electricity export reduced by 100 % 100  
Fuel conversion  
– coal to gas 76  
– coal to straw, 10 %   275 
– coal to straw, 10 % in separate boiler  446 
  
New capacity  
Industrial CHP, gas 326 
Central KAD, coal – 
Central GAD, gas 129 
Central CC, gas 93 
Wind mills, placed at land  241 
Wind mills, offshore 282 
Source: Elsam, 1997. 
The higher the interest rate the more expensive are new investments in CO2 reductions.  
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A given investment in CO2 reductions will reduce more CO2 – and the CO2 reduction costs 
per ton CO2 will be cheaper – if the substituted plant is very inefficient and emits a lot of 
CO2. Therefore, if figures are based on the assumption that the substituted plant is always 
the highest CO2 emitter, the figures may be valid only at the margin and have little or no 
relevance with respect to large scale emission reductions: One should notice that the CO2 
reduction costs are dependent on the reference scenario and which investments have 
already been carried out.  
If the calculations assume that the new investments are always operating at full capacity 
(irrespective of whether it is profitable or not), it is likely that the amount of CO2 reductions 
will be higher, compared to a situation where the investments are run below full capacity: 
The larger the CO2 reductions, the cheaper these may be.  
For a detailed list of assumptions behind Table 8.4, readers are referred to ELSAM, 1997. 
Some of the important general assumptions are: an interest rate at 5 % p.a., market prices of 
electricity (implying less than full capacity use) and market prices on input fuels. All costs 
are measured in constant 1996 prices. One implication of this is that improvements in 
technologies compared to the 1996 ‘levels’, or more intense price competition in markets 
for certain technologies (wind mills) are not taken into consideration. But these factors may 
be significant for certain technologies and may press investment costs – and the CO2 
reduction costs – down. Real fuel prices are kept constant at their 1997 level. (This 
assumption is in line with projections for 1997-2010 in World Energy Outlook, IEA, 1998). 
Electricity prices are close to variable costs in conventional electricity production, meaning 
that there are no incentives in the electricity prices to invest in new capacity. This price 
assumption may be very realistic in a ‘strategic’ market, or a market with excess capacity, 
but increases the CO2 reduction costs because investments in general are less profitable.  
The general impression of the costs for CO2 reduction given in Table 8.4 is that the 
magnitudes of costs are valid within a relevant Danish CO2 reduction range. The interest 
rate may be too low for private investors. Table 8.4 is further commented in the following 
subsections.  
8.5.1 Reducing export  
The level of the Danish electricity production has traditionally been closely related to 
electricity production in Sweden and Norway, and in particular to the Norwegian 
hydropower production. In some years Denmark is a net importer of Norwegian 
hydropower (wet years in Norway) and in other years Denmark is a net exporter of coal 
produced electricity.  
The new Danish electricity act from May 1999 introduces a CO2 emission quota (on an 
annual basis) on the Danish electricity producers. If this quota is violated the producers has 
to pay a fee of 40 DKK per ton CO2. This fee will make it less profitable to produce 
electricity at marginal Danish coal fired power plants (it will not make coal fired power 
plants unprofitable in general). It is estimated (see Chapter 6) that the fee will reduce 
Danish exports of electricity by around 50 %, given constant prices on electricity and 
constant export prices. Under the same assumption of constant export prices, and therefore 
sufficient international supply of electricity at that prices and sufficient cable capacity, a 
100 DKK pr ton CO2 fee will reduce Danish electricity exports to zero. 
The new electricity law does not necessarily squeeze the marginal coal fired power plants 
out: If the international electricity prices are sufficiently high, production at these plants 
may still be profitable. 
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A Danish fee will reduce Danish emissions, but not necessarily reduce global emissions: if 
the Danish electricity export to for example Norway is substituted by Norwegian import of 
electricity produced by a technology which also emits CO2, and maybe emits the same 
amount of CO2, the global CO2 reductions may be limited or be zero. On the other hand, if 
Norway instead of importing from Denmark import electricity from Germany, the German 
emissions will rise and put pressure on the German government to take measures to reduce 
emissions in order to fulfil the German Kyoto emission reduction target. 
8.5.2 Fuel conversion 
The economics behind fuel conversion depends on the technology of the power plant in 
question, and on the prices and emission factors of the substituted and substituting fuels. 
Fuel conversion may be very cheap or very expensive. In Table 8.4 a typical Danish coal 
fired condensing power plant is converted to either gas or straw. Conversion to gas is 
relatively cheap – around 80 DKK per ton CO2 – whereas conversion to straw, for both 
technologies, is relatively expensive. The reason why conversion to straw – which is often a 
waste product in the agricultural production – is so expensive is the transportation costs, 
and the more complicated technology needed to make the straw fired power plant function 
properly (for example to avoid Dioxin and dangerous emissions other than CO2).  
Back pressure or extraction power plants have higher fuel efficiency than the condensing 
power plants, and of course the technical properties are different. But fuel conversion does 
not change the basic technical functionalities of the power plants. And assuming that the 
investments needed for fuel conversion are the same irrespective of the condensing or 
combined heat and power technology – we further assume that the CO2 reduction cost of 
condensing power plants apply to combined heat and power83. 
Waste from households and biomass other than straw (for example wood chops and energy 
crops) have zero CO2 emissions factors and may be used as fuels in the heat and power 
production. The table does not cover conversion to these fuels. But compared to the CO2 
reduction prices for the two straw technologies, wood chop prices will be lower and energy 
crop prices probably higher. This relation reflects relative prices of tree chop, straw and 
energy crop, and reflects that using straw in the power production is technically more 
difficult than using wood chops and energy crops.   
8.5.3 Building of new capacity 
The fuel efficiency of power plants has much to say regarding emissions. Even substituting 
old coal fired power plants with new coal fired may reduce emissions. Therefore building 
new power plants with a) high fuel efficiency and b) a low emission fuel type may be the 
cheapest way to reduce emissions. Alternatively new renewable capacity may be built. For 
example windmills or solar cells. In Denmark windmills are relatively cheap because of 
good wind conditions. 
The table refers to a relatively new coal fired power plant with relatively high efficiency as 
reference. Therefore it makes no economic sense to substitute this type of power plant with 
another coal-fired power plant. The chosen reference gives the CO2 reduction costs in the 
table more credit, as these numbers are applicable beyond the margin. 
                                                           
83 The intuitive reasoning behind this assumption is that fuel conversion is related to the input into 
the power plant, whereas the question of condensing, back pressure or extraction is related to the 
energy output of the plants.   
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The relatively high CO2 reduction price of industrial combined heat and power is due to the 
Danish industrial structure with many relatively small firms and few very energy intensive 
firms. Investments in the cheapest industrial combined heat and power plants have already 
been carried out.  
The CO2 reduction cost related to windmills may be exaggerated as the investment cost are 
declining due to falling prices of windmills. Falling prices are a result of the size of the 
markets for wind-mills, increased competition and improved technology. Included in the 
investment costs are investments needed to cope with the fluctuating nature of power 
production from windmills. These costs may be smaller the larger the electricity net and the 
more dispersed the wind conditions.  
Building new power production capacity will in practice be a much slower way to reduce 
emissions than fuel conversion. Investments, risks and losses are far bigger – and the 
planning horizon is longer.  
8.5.4 Prices in a national CO2 quota market 
At the national level the Danish total costs of reducing CO2 will be at a maximum if no 
international trade is assumed. Given international – for example European trade – the 
Danish national costs of CO2 reductions will be lower. That is, quota trade reduces costs at 
the national level. 
An international – for example European – quota price may be higher or lower than a 
purely national – for example Danish – quota price. If the international quota price is higher 
Denmark will be net exporter of quotas, and if it is lower Denmark will be a net importer.  
If emission reductions are cheaper abroad, and if it is possible to substitute international 
emission reductions for national, the international price of emission reductions will also be 
the price of quotas on a domestic market. If foreign emission reductions are cheaper than 
the cheapest domestic emission reduction, no emission reductions will be carried out 
domestically. And there will be no quota trade on the national market.  
There have been several attempts to prognosticise quota prices using different methods and 
assumptions.  
The method used in this paper may be useful when only limited information about emission 
reduction curves is available. The method used has got the advantage that it tries to identify 
the lowest upper limit to the quota price. And this information may be very valuable to 
planners and firms – especially if the quota price identified in this way is relatively low. 
In short the method is to focus on already known backstop technologies. That is, to select a 
few technologies, with great emission reduction potentials within the analysed area, and see 
at which quota prices these technologies will be profitable. The price estimates combined 
with estimates on emission reduction potentials can tell something about likely price ranges 
for emission quotas.  
The European Union must follow the Kyoto protocol in reducing emissions by 8 % 
compared with the 1990 emissions level. 
Within the European bubble Denmark has agreed to reduce emissions by 21 % compared to 
an adjusted 1990 level.  
The question analysed in this section is what will the quota price be on a purely national 
CO2 quota market? Denmark is taken as an example, but exactly the same analysis could be 
carried out for all the EU countries. 
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Assume no substitution of foreign emission reduction for national. That is, only emission 
reductions carried out nationally will be accounted for, and the national emissions must not 
exceed the Kyoto targets.  
The energy sector is by far the most important emitter of greenhouse gasses. According to 
the table below 68 % of Danish emissions of greenhouse gasses in 1994 originated from the 
energy sector and around 16 % from transport (Fenhann et al., 1997 and NERI, 1997, p. 
40).  
So, even though electricity production and export in 1994 was considerable and the table 
may therefore overestimate the contribution from the energy sector, emission reductions in 
the energy sector are important factors in a national Danish strategy to reach the Kyoto and 
EU emission targets.  
Table 8.5. Greenhouse gas emissions in 1994 apportioned by sector in percent of total 
emissions. 
Sector Percent of total emissions  
Energy 68 
Transport 16 
Agriculture 16 
Waste 3 
Forestry -6 
Industry 2 
Source: Fenhann et al., 1997. 
Assume a national Danish CO2 quota market within the electricity sector alone. And 
assume the extreme situation that this sector is the only sector to reduce emissions. If 
Denmark has to fulfil the EU reduction target, the CO2 reduction target in 2010 for the 
power producing sector should then, given the assumptions below, be in the range of 31 to 
62 %  
The electricity sector reduction target of 31 % is calculated in the following way: Assume 
total national emissions are the same in 2010 as in 1990 and the share of the energy sector 
is 68 % in 2010. The national Kyoto reduction target of 21 % is fulfilled by the electricity 
sector alone. Then (100-79)*100/68 = 31 % The 62 % is calculated under the assumption 
that total national emissions have increased by 15 %84 in 2010 as compared to 1990, and the 
share of the energy sector is 50 % in 2010. Then (115-79)*100/(0.5*115) = 62 % 
How can these reduction targets be reached, and at what prices?  
Following Table 8.7 what happens within the power producing sector, when quota prices 
rise (or a fee is introduced), is that the Danish electricity export diminish. This effect is of 
course only seen in years with electricity export, and presupposes that no other countries 
relevant for the electricity import or export introduces CO2 taxes, quotas or emission 
trading. So production on marginal Danish coal fired power plants decrease. By how much 
emissions are reduced by reducing exports is difficult to say, but Danish electricity export 
was in the period 1984-1997 7 % of total Danish electricity production (Statistisk 
Tiårsoversigt, 1996, 1999). Given this average, if the Danish electricity export vanished this 
would reduce emissions by at least 7 % (the marginal electricity production is more CO2 
emitting than the average).  
At a quota price of 80 DKK/ton CO2 fuel conversion will be profitable (cf. Table 8.4). 
Assuming that approximately 60 % of Danish power production, in a ‘normal’ year without 
                                                           
84 The EU assumes an increase in emissions of 14 % over the same period in European Economy, no. 
51, 1992.  
Chapter 8. Quota prices 
202 Risø-R-1184 (EN) 
 
electricity export, is coal based (cf. Table 8.6), conversion from coal (95 ton CO2/TJ) to 
natural gas (57 ton CO2/TJ) would reduce emissions by 28 % (0.6*(95-57)/79, where 79 is 
the average ton CO2 emission/TJ in Danish electricity production. Converting orimulsion 
(80 ton CO2/TJ) to natural gas would further reduce emission by 3.5 % 
Table 8.6. Total electricity generation by energy source, net export and import in 1997. 
Energy source TWh Percent of total excl. export 
Import 0.0  
Export (assumed coal based) 7.3  
Coal 27.2 58.0 
Oil 1.0 2.9 
Natural gas 7.0 20.1 
Wind 1.9 5.5 
Biofuel 0.5 1.4 
Orimulsion 4.2 12.0 
Danish electricity generation   41.8  
- excluding (coal based export) 34.8 100.0 
 
Summing the emission reductions from the decrease in exports (a fee of 100 DKK/ton CO2) 
and fuel conversions (there is no double counting) gives a total of 38.5 %. of total 
emissions within the electricity sector. This reduction should in principle – and given 1997 
market prices for coal, natural gas and oil – be obtainable at a quota price below 100 
DKK/ton CO2. 
At a quota price around 100 DKK/ton CO2 (93 DKK. in Table 8.4) it will be profitable to 
substitute even relatively new coal fired power plants with new combined cycle natural gas 
power plants. New power plants have the advantage (compared to fuel conversion) of 
higher fuel efficiency. So if for example gas prices rise, this will make the construction of 
new power plants relatively more attractive compared to fuel conversion. 
A CO2 quota price of 100 DKK/ton CO2 increases electricity prices and reduces electricity 
demand. The price increase depends on how CO2 polluting the power sector is, and to what 
extent the quota price is reflected in electricity price increases. If the average CO2 
emissions from Danish electricity production in 1999 was equal to 0.8 ton/MWh a fully 
reflected quota price of 100 DKK/ton CO2 would raise electricity prices in Danish industry 
and households by approximately 20 % and 6 % (differences are due to different tax levels 
and price discrimination). Table 8.7 assumes that consumer prices of electricity increase by 
on average 10 %.  
A demand elasticity equal to -0.27 (as estimated in the Indus III model (1998), modelling 
energy consumption within Danish industry) means that if electricity prices rises by 1 %, 
electricity demand will fall by 0.27 %. If electricity demand and production fall by 0.27 %, 
emissions will fall by at least this percentage. 
Included in the CO2 reduction costs for windmills are cost to compensate for the fluctuating 
nature of wind power production. Therefore the windmills in the table in principle can 
substitute conventional power production.  
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Table 8.7. Emission reductions at quota prices below 250 kr/ton CO2. Different scenarios. 
Denmark 
 Quota 
price 
per ton 
CO2. 
Approxi-
mately 
Decrease 
in 
exports 
Decrease 
in 
marginal 
produc-
tion 
Decrease in 
CO2 
emissions 
within  
electricity 
sector 
Change in demand for electricity     
Decrease in foreign demand (average year) 100 DKK 100 % 7 % > 7 % 
Decrease in domestic demand for given 
elasticity 
100 DKK  2.5 %** > 2.5 %** 
Decrease in domestic demand for given 
elasticity 
250 DKK  6.3 %** > 6.3 %.** 
Change in power production     
75 % coal substituted by renewables*** 
25 % coal converted to gas 
 
<300 DKK 
  
0 
 
60 %* 
50 % coal substituted by renewables*** 
50 % coal converted to gas 
 
<250 DKK 
  
0 
 
49 %.* 
100 %coal converted to gas <100 DKK  0 28 %.*  
* The decrease in foreign electricity demand is subtracted before calculating the emission reduction. 
Therefore the decrease in exports may be added to this figure. The decrease in domestic electricity 
demand is not subtracted before calculating the emission reduction. Therefore the decrease in 
domestic demand cannot be added to this figure.  
** Numbers are calculated for a demand elasticity in electricity consumption equal to -0.27. Feed 
back effects are not taken into account, which it should be especially when considering big quota 
prices. Elasticities may be smaller when more than marginal changes in consumption prices are 
considered.  
*** It is assumed that wind power substitutes coal fired condensing power production (i.e. up to a 
maximum of 55 % of the total Danish electricity production).  
At quota prices of around 250 DKK/ton CO2 wind mills will be profitable. As the reference 
to the wind mills is a relatively new coal fired condensing power plant, it is in principle 
possible, at this price, to substitute all the coal fired condensing power plants with wind 
power production (provided that the wind conditions where the new mills are placed are 
good enough). Coal fired back pressure and extraction power plants can not directly be 
substituted by wind power, but may be substituted by straw, waste, wood chops or other 
renewables. In the table above different alternatives are shown.  
It may seem relatively extreme to let the coal based electricity production be substituted by 
50 or even 75 % renewables. But remember that even if coal was 100 % substituted by 
renewables there would still be 35 % oil, natural gas and orimulsion based electricity 
production. The examples suggest a different mix of fuel conversion and renewables and 
give a maximum quota price. But it is important to note that if a quota price of for example 
300 DKK was settled on the market, the investors and their investment behaviours would 
decide the optimal mix of CO2 reducing technologies.  
Taking the 50 % fuel conversion/50 % wind mill (renewables) production as an example, 
the table may be read in the following way: The stop of electricity export reduce emissions 
by at least 7 % in an average year (1984-1997). The specified changes in the power 
production structure adds 49 % reduction to this figure. So emissions within the sector will 
fall by at least 56 % But higher electricity prices will cause domestic electricity demand to 
fall. A very rough estimate of electricity price increases, a rough use of elasticities, and no 
use of feed back mechanisms, would suggest a 6 % decrease in domestic electricity demand 
and a higher decrease in emissions. Given the 6 % decrease, total emissions will fall by 
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59 % instead of 56 % (avoiding double counting). The quota price is below 300 DKK/ton 
CO2.  
Looking at the emission reduction costs and potentials in the rest of the economy – not just 
the electricity sector – complicates the analysis: Technologies are more diverse, potentials 
are smaller and consumption patterns differ. Macroeconomic demand elasticities may be a 
very easy way to represent aggregated responses of other sectors to a given quota price. Car 
driver’s response to increased gasoline prices, consumer’s response to increased oil and gas 
prices etc. tell how drivers and consumers reacted to price increases in the past, and tell 
something of past potentials for energy savings. One of the problems using demand 
elasticities is whether these elasticities are valid for very large price changes. 
A quota price of 100 DKK/ton CO2 raises the price of gasoline by 0.24 DKK/l or 3-4 %. 
Given a demand elasticity of approximately -0.5 as estimated in the ADAM model 
(Danmarks Statistik, 1996), this quota price will reduce emissions from private cars by 1.5-
2 %.  
According the ADAM and Indus models the fuel price elasticity within Danish industry, the 
primary sectors and transport industry is approximately -0.25. If this elasticity holds true 
fuel consumption may fall by as much as 10 % following a CO2 quota price of 100 
DKK/ton CO2.  
The macroeconomic responses and costs of Danish quota prices at for example 100 
DKK/ton CO2 depend on the design of the system.  
To conclude on a national Danish CO2 quota price:  
As the main emitter of CO2, the power sector has to reduce emissions considerably. At 
quota prices below 300 DKK per ton CO2, the power generating sector is capable of 
reducing by far the largest part of the Danish CO2 reductions needed to fulfil the Danish 
reduction commitments. Even at a quota price of 100 DKK per ton CO2 emissions within 
the power generating sector can be reduced significantly. This is due to in- and external 
decrease in electricity demand, fuel conversion and substitution of old capacity with new.  
If wind power in large scale is promoted by policies other than CO2 emission quotas, the 
price of CO2 emission quotas will almost certainly not be higher than the CO2 costs of fuel 
conversion as this is a technology with a very large emission reduction potential. It is likely 
that the quota price for the power sector, and the whole economy, will be equal to the CO2 
costs of fuel conversion. 
8.6 Estimated price range for EU CO2 emission quotas 
An exact estimate of future quota prices on a European CO2 emission quota market is 
impossible to give. The price will be dependent on CO2 reduction costs within and outside 
the EU countries, the country specific levels of economic activities and how much to be 
reduced. Below we try to give price ranges within which the quota price alternatively will 
be – under different conditions. Of course the more narrow these price ranges, the more 
informative the analysis.  
The analysis is very similar to the analysis above of a national Danish CO2 quota system. 
But of course the uncertainties with respect to the quota price are bigger. It may be easier to 
overlook important country-specific emission reduction potentials. Liberalising European 
energy (especially electricity) markets may have great emission reduction potentials and 
implications for a quota price. Fuel prices may be sensitive to for example large-scale fuel 
conversion from coal to gas.  
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The CO2 quota prices will be extremely dependent on the possibilities of buying emission 
reductions outside the EU: Prices at an EU quota market will not be higher than alternative, 
comparable prices on emission reductions outside the EU. 
To limit the analysis it is assumed, in what follows, that only emission reductions within 
the EU will be accredited. It will be highly relevant later to loosen this assumption to 
analyse whether the European quota market will survive ‘competition’ from outside, and to 
analyse the price implications.  
Two ‘areas’ are especially interesting with respect to CO2 emission reductions, because of a 
considerable contribution to the overall problem: The power generating sector and CO2 
emissions from transport. Within the EU the power generating sector contributed with 31 % 
of total CO2 emissions in 1990, and this percent is expected to increase to around 38 in 
2010 (cf. European Economy, No 51, May 1992). According to the same source, CO2 
emissions from European transport contributed with around 24 % in 1990 and this share is 
expected to remain constant. Total CO2 emissions are expected to increase 14 % over the 
years 1990-2010. So if the EU, following the Kyoto target, must reach a reduction in its 
emissions by 8 % before 2010 (compared to the 1990 emission level), this reduction could 
be achieved by either: 
• reducing CO2 emissions from the power generating sector by 51 %, or 
• reducing CO2 emissions from cars with 80 %, or 
• reducing CO2 emissions from cars and the electricity sector by 31 %.  
These three extreme alternatives assume that no other sectors reduce their CO2 emission 
compared to the reference scenario, and the other greenhouse gases mentioned in the Kyoto 
protocol are reduced to their 1990 level. 
If it is possible to find a minimum marginal CO2 reduction price of one or more of these 
reduction strategies, the minimum price will be the maximum price of European CO2 
quotas. 
The following analysis focuses on the power-generating sector. But it is worth noting that 
consumer prices on energy – electricity prices, prices on gasoline, etc. – differs widely 
within the EU (see for example statistics in Energy Prices and Taxes from the IEA), and so 
does energy intensity in for example private consumption. Price differences are due to 
monopolised energy markets, taxation, countries endowments with primary fuels, 
environmental considerations, competitiveness of domestic industries etc., etc. According 
to main stream economics it is reasonable to believe that these price differentials has 
resulted in different energy consumption patterns among the EU countries. Therefore 
narrowing the price differentials by rising the lowest energy prices may have large emission 
reduction potentials. This effect may be reflected in different sizes of price elasticities 
amongst EU countries. (Effects on energy consumption of very low energy prices are seen 
in the former Eastern Europe).  
8.6.1 Reducing CO2 emissions from the power generating sector 
Table 8.8 shows by which fuel electricity is produced within the EU.  
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Table 8.8. Electricity generation in the EU by fuel. Year 2000. 
Fuel Fuel input, % Electricity production, % 
Solids 20.7  
Oil (including refinery gas) 11.4  
Gas 16.9  
Biomass – Waste  3.5  
Thermal incl. biomass 52.5 52.5 
Hydro and wind  13.2 
Nuclear  34.3 
Source: Shared Analysis Project, Vol.5. Appendix. 
Very rough estimates suggest that: If we assume that the main part of emissions from the 
power generating sector originates from coal fired power plants, fuel switch to natural gas 
will reduce emissions by around 40 % (Coal is assumed to have an emission factor of 95 
tonne CO2/TJ and natural gas 56.9 tonne CO2/TJ. ((95-56.9)*100/95=40.1)). If 50 % of the 
emissions stem from coal85, the reduction will be 20 %  
(95-56.9)*20.7*100/(20.7*95+11.4*74+16.9*56.9)=  20.8 
(Remember that nuclear power, biomass, renewables and hydro power has got no 
emissions). If both oil and coal fired power plants fuel switch to natural gas emissions will 
be reduced by 26 %.  
Alternatively, if an extra 10 % of the total electricity production is supplied by renewables 
(compared to the reference), and this production substitutes coal fired power plants, this 
would reduce emissions by 20 % if coal fired electricity production is 50 % of total 
electricity production and coal is the main cause of CO2 emissions within the EU power 
producing sector ((95-0)*.1*100/(.5*95)). Emission reductions would be 26 % if coal fired 
electricity production was 20 % (and the percentages for gas and oil was 16.9 and 11.4) of 
total electricity production (cf. Table 8.8).  
The following Table 8.9 is almost identical to Table 8.4. It shows prices on CO2 reductions 
within the European power-producing sector under the same assumptions as in Table 8.1. 
The question is whether fuel conversion prices and investments in new capacity are the 
same in the rest of EU as in Denmark.  
Of course there are differences between the EU countries. The power producing sectors 
differ much with respect to the share of hydro, nuclear, wind and thermal power. But from a 
CO2 reduction point of view it is only the thermal power production, which is interesting to 
look at either to fuel convert or to substitute by more efficient power plants or renewable 
energy.  
The efficiency of Danish power plants is high compared to the average efficiency within 
the EU. This is an argument for low EU CO2 reductions costs compared to the Danish 
costs. Maybe the potentials in fuel switch to wood chops are higher in the EU than in 
Denmark. Prices on waste, straw and wood chops may be determined on local markets and 
may differ widely between the EU. But otherwise, given the same fuel input prices, 
electricity prices and prices on investments, and given the relative efficient reference coal 
fired power plants, the CO2 reduction costs in the table should be the same in the different 
EU countries.  
Effects on CO2 reduction costs from different price assumptions are shown in column 3 in 
Table 8.9. Coal prices are the same as in column 2. Prices on gas and electricity are higher, 
27 and 66 %, and prices on straw are lower, 56 % The relative price of electricity is much 
                                                           
85 This assumption is in line with Table 8.8 and standard emission factors. 
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higher in Column 3 than in Column 2, because it in Column 3 is assumed that the electricity 
prices increases to a level where it is profitable to invest in new power plant capacity. The 
market prices in Column 2 are near variable costs for conventional electricity production. 
Higher relative gas prices make fuel conversion from coal to gas more expensive and CO2 
reduction costs higher. Lower prises on straw, lowers the CO2 reduction costs. CO2 
reduction costs on new gas fired power plants increase with increasing gas prices and fall 
with increasing electricity prices. The net effect is falling CO2 reduction costs. Investments 
in windmills are more profitable – also from a CO2 reduction point of view – the higher the 
electricity prices.  
The changed fuel and electricity prices change the ranking of technologies with respect to 
the cheapest CO2 reduction costs. But fuel substitution from coal to gas, and investments in 
an increased share of renewables, are still possible at relatively low costs. All CO2 
reduction prices in Column 3 are below 307 DKK/ton CO2. 
Table 8.9. Prices for CO2 reductions in EU 
Country/ 
Technology 
EU 
DKK/ton CO2 
Market prices 1997 level 
EU 
DKK/ton CO2 
Changed relative fuel prices 
Fuel conversion   
– coal to gas 76 1901 
– coal to straw, 10 %   275 1362 
– coal to straw, 10 % in separate. boiler  446 3072 
   
New capacity   
Industrial CHP, gas   
Central KAD, coal 0 0 
Central GAD, gas 129 -703 
Central CC, gas 93 -903 
Wind mills, placed at land  241 1433 
Wind mills, offshore 282 1843 
Source: Elsam, 1997. 
Notes: 1) Coal prices are the same as in column 2. Gas prices are 27 % higher. 2) Coal prices are the 
same as in column 2. Prices on straw are 56 % of the prices in column 2. 3) Coal prices are the same 
as in column 2. Gas prices are 27 % higher. Prices on electricity are 66 % higher. 
Table 8.10 combine the CO2 reduction prices in Table 8.8 with very rough estimates of the 
EU potentials for CO2 reductions. The CO2 reduction costs are based on market prices for 
fuels. A quota price equal to 100 DKK is assumed to increase electricity prices with 6 % 
But this price increase is highly uncertain86. Given demand elasticities equal to -0.25 this 
price increase will result in a 1.5 % decrease in electricity demand (and production) and a 
more than 3 % decrease in CO2 emissions from the electricity sector (if the marginal 
productions is assumed to be coal based).  
A hundred percent fuel conversion from coal to gas gives a decrease in emissions from the 
power producing industry by 20 % The quota prise inducing this conversion would be 
under 100 DKK/ton CO2. If an extra 10 % of the electricity production were based on 
renewables this would reduce emissions by 26 %, if the marginal electricity production 
were coal based. The quota price inducing this would be below 300 DKK 
                                                           
86 The 6 % is a little lower than the assumed Danish electricity price increase. The simple, but highly 
uncertain, reasoning is: European net taxes on electricity are lower than the Danish, but Danish 
electricity production is more CO2 emitting. The first effect suggest a higher EU price increase than 
the Danish, the last effect a lower price increase.  The net effect could be 6 %.  
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The quota price giving incentives to extra 10 % renewables will also be an incentive to fuel 
conversion and maybe a higher percent of renewables. Fuel conversion may be very 
profitable at a quota price well above 100 DKK To the existing conventional power plant 
owners fuel conversion may be much more profitable than investments in renewables, for 
example wind mills. But to other investors windmills will be profitable and they will invest.  
If capacity in the power-producing sector increases and electricity prices fall – quota prices 
may rise to compensate the electricity price fall and induce further investments.    
Following the table, CO2 emissions will be reduced by 33 % if quota prices induced extra 
10 % renewables and 50 % fuel substitution from coal to gas Taking the demand effects 
into account would add an extra 5 % (if the marginal production is oil based).  
Halving emissions from the EU power sector, which is what is needed to fulfil the Kyoto 
target (if the power sector is the only sector to reduce emissions, and if emission projections 
are as previously mentioned) imply heavy reliance on renewable energy. The “halving” 
could be implemented in the following way: 
• Substituting coal based power production (20 % of total EU production) with (17 %) 
renewables (decrease in demand is 3.8 %).  
• Substituting oil and gas based power production (28 % of total EU production) with 
renewables. Leaving the coal based power production unchanged. 
• Some combination of the two alternatives above 
• Converting oil based power production to gas, and substitution 14 % of coal production 
to renewables. (Decrease in electricity demand is 3.8 % coal based).  
Whether it is possible to substitute almost all conventional coal based power production 
with renewables (at least 14 % of total electricity production) at a price not higher than 300 
DKK/ton CO2, is difficult to answer. With respect to wind power it depends on wind 
conditions, the size of the transmission net and the technical problems with the fluctuating 
wind power.  
The new Danish electricity act demands that 20 % of Danish electricity consumption should 
be based on renewables (which in practice will say almost 20 % wind). Compared to 
Denmark the EU has got very little combined heat and power. This means: 1) that wind 
power in principle can substitute almost all the thermal power production, and 2) that it is 
easier to use conventional power plants to compensate for the fluctuating wind. (In 
Denmark much of flexibility of the electricity production is hindered by the production of 
heat). 
In other EU countries conversion to biomass or other renewables than wind, may be 
cheaper than in Denmark. 
The conclusions with respect to an EU quota price are: 
As one of the main emitters of CO2, the power sector has to reduce emissions considerably. 
At quota prices equal to the costs of fuel conversion or costs of investments in new 
conventional capacity (i.e. below 100 DKK per ton CO2, given the assumptions in this 
section) the power generating sector is capable of reducing emissions by 20 % Given the 
emission projections hold, a 20 % emission reduction is the average reduction needed in all 
sectors to fulfil the EU Kyoto commitment.  
If the EU power sector has to reduce emissions by much more than 20 %, renewables 
(hydro power or nuclear power) must be an important part of the strategy. There is a large 
EU potential for wind power at quota prices below 300 DKK/ton CO2. It is possible that 
biomass is cheaper in the EU than in Denmark.  
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If renewables – for example wind power – is promoted by other policies than CO2 emission 
quotas, the price of CO2 emission quotas can be effected.  
There is a large emission reduction potential in renewables; therefore it seems likely that an 
EU CO2 quota price will not exceed the price of the marginal investment in renewables. 
Table 8.10. Emission reductions at quota prices below 300 DKK/ton CO2. Different 
scenarios. European Union 
 Quota price per ton 
CO2 
Approximately 
Decrease in marginal 
production 
Decrease in CO2 
emissions within  
electricity sector 
Change in demand 
for electricity 
   
Decrease in EU 
electricity demand, for 
given elasticity and 
price increase 
 
100 
DKK 
 
1.5 %** 
 
 3 %*** 
Decrease in EU 
electricity demand, for 
given elasticity and 
price increase 
 
250 
DKK 
 
3.8 %** 
 
 7 %*** 
Change in power 
production 
   
Extra 10 % of 
electricity production 
based on renewables 
 
< 300 
DKK 
 
0 
 
26 %* 
100 % coal converted 
to gas 
< 100 
DKK 
 
0 
 
20 %* 
Extra 10 % renewables  
50 % coal converted to 
gas 
 
< 300 
DKK 
 
 
0 
 
33 %* 
 
Increasing fuel 
efficiency 
   
* The decrease in domestic electricity demand is not subtracted before calculating the emission 
reduction. Therefore the decrease in domestic demand cannot be added to this figure.  
** The effect is highly uncertain. Price increases are assumed lower and elasticities identical to the 
Danish, but percentage price increases and price elasticities may differ widely between countries, 
and the true effects may be higher or lower than the Danish. Feed back effects are not taken into 
account, which it should be especially when considering big quota prices.  
*** It is assumed that the marginal power plant is coal based.   
8.7 Conclusions on CO2 quota prices 
This sections conclusions with respect to the price on especially an EU quota market are 
listed below. All cost estimates are subject to a number of highly uncertain assumptions. 
Therefore these estimates must be interpreted with a high degree of caution. But having 
said that, we believe that the cost estimates do carry information.  
A precondition for trade on an EU market is a sufficient supply of quotas at prices, 
which are equal to or lower than alternative emission reduction opportunities. 
If CDM or Joint Implementation with countries outside the EU is a possibility, or if a 
system of quotas including other countries than the EU counties exists, it will be a 
precondition for trade on the EU quota market that there is a supply of quotas at the 
equilibrium price on the EU market. That is, there must be at least one country within the 
EU, which have enough of low costs emission reduction options to fulfil their own 
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international commitments and to sell quotas on an EU-market with profits. If emission 
reduction prices are lower outside the EU, there will be no trade on an EU market for 
quotas.   
Given trade on an EU quota market, and if EU tradable quotas are one out of more 
alternatives to the agents, there will be a linking between the quota price and prices of 
the alternative emission reductions. 
Prices on EU quotas will be equal to either the quota price on broader markets, or equal to 
the price on Joint Implementation emission reductions outside the EU, if these markets 
exists (i.e. in case of a broader than the EU-market for quotas exists or if Joint 
Implementation with countries outside the EU is a possibility). 
EU quota price when EU tradable quotas are the only alternative to reducing your own 
emissions to the agents. 
The EU quota price will be equal to the cost of the marginal CO2 emission reduction within 
the EU as a hole.  
Upper limits to the quota price 
If there are backstop technologies (i.e. emission reduction technologies) which have great 
emission reduction potentials within the EU, the CO2 reduction price of one of these 
technologies may be the upper limit to the quota price. The cheapest backstop technology 
will be implemented first. 
Within the EU power sector there is a great emission reduction potential in fuel switching 
and higher fuel efficiency. The prices of CO2 reductions carried out through fuel switching 
range from 70 to 300 DKK per ton CO2, depending on which fuel is substituted by which, 
the type of power plant etc. The price span is not defined as the largest possible, but as the 
price span within which the bulk of emission reduction potentials are to be found. And 
furthermore, at the upper limit of the price span another technology with great potential 
takes over. 
The cost of extending the EU windmill capacity as a mean to reduce emissions, depends on 
the wind conditions where raised, and the technical possibilities of fitting fluctuating wind 
power into the overall power system. It will be technically possible to extend the EU wind 
capacity considerably at prices below 280 DKK per ton CO2.  
According the Kyoto Protocol the EU must reduce emissions by 8 % as compared to 
emissions in 1990. If it is technically possible to reach the 8 % target level through fuel 
switching in the power sector and increased wind power production, the upper limit to the 
EU quota price must be around the 280 DKK/ton CO2, which is the estimated price of 
reducing emissions trough installing new wind mills. Even if it is not possible to reach the 
target level solely by using these two techniques – if it is likely that cheaper CO2 reduction 
technologies in other sectors can reduce the rest, then the upper limit to the quota price will 
still be given by the marginal wind power investment.   
If windmills are the marginal CO2 reduction investment on a European quota market, the 
price of the quotas will be around 280 DKK/ton CO2. If fuel switch in the power sector will 
be the marginal investment, the quota price will properly be somewhere between 70 and 
280 DKK/ton CO2, depending on the price and potentials of alternative CO2 reduction 
investments.   
The lower limit to the quotas price 
The lowest possible quota price will be zero. This price will only be realised if: 
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• either new technology makes CO2 reductions almost free, or 
• due to low activity levels (within the EU or outside) there is sufficient of ‘hot air’ to 
reach the total EU target – and, none of the ‘hot air suppliers’ are able to expel 
monopoly power, and they are willing to sell quotas at prices next to nothing.   
Other policies, new technology etc. 
In general all EU and national policies having an impact on the CO2 emissions will affect 
quota prices, given an overall reduction target. For example will limitations of car traffic 
(through taxes or direct regulation (no cars in city centres) and heavy taxation of trucks (on 
a per kilometre basis) properly reduce emissions, and reduce the demand for and price of 
quotas. 
New technologies may affect the supply and demand for quotas and the quotas price: If new 
energy saving cars were introduced, if renewable electricity production became cheaper or 
new energy saving inventions were made, this would increase the low cost potentials for 
emission reductions and likely reduce the quota price. 
The speed of CO2 reductions 
The speed of CO2 reductions may be dependent on the size and wider implications of the 
investment decision, the profitability of the investments and technological factors. Fuel 
conversion and for example small-scale windmill investments may be fairly easy to decide 
on. Decisions to invest in new conventional power plants, large-scale wind or for example 
hydropower may be harder. High quota prices may ease the investment decisions, and 
fasten the CO2 reductions. 
Studies of quota prices when backstop technologies matter 
The present analysis stress the importance of attention on backstop technologies, the prices 
at which they become profitable and their emission reduction potentials, in studies of quota 
prices and costs of CO2 reductions. The present analysis indicates that failure to include 
backstop technologies may give quota price estimates of limited value. 
The result of the analysis indicate that the quota prices estimated in many model studies,  
see for example Figure 8.1, are very high – and may be too high. 
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Appendix A. Currency conversion and price levels 
Table A shows conversion factors between some selected currencies between 1990 and 
1998. The table is used as follows: 
Amount in target currency = Amount in source currency * inflator 
Table A. Conversion factors between ECU, USD and European national currencies 1990-
1998 
Source 
currency 
Deflation Target 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
ECU USD 1.273 1.236 1.295 1.167 1.184 1.293 1.253 1.129 1.122 
ECU  DKK 7.857 7.909 7.809 7.594 7.543 7.328 7.359 7.484 7.500 
ECU  NOK 7.964 8.024 8.032 8.295 8.352 8.192 8.088 7.993 8.471 
ECU  DEM 2.052 2.052 2.052 2.052 2.052 2.052 2.052 2.052 2.052 
USD  DKK 6.185 6.403 6.027 6.495 6.352 5.605 5.796 6.609 6.697 
USD  NOK 6.257 6.492 6.204 7.107 7.053 6.337 6.455 7.079 7.550 
USD  DEM 1.615 1.660 1.559 1.655 1.621 1.433 1.504 1.735 1.758 
ECU 1990 EU Consumer price ECU 1.000 1.042 1.084 1.120 1.148 1.177 1.207 1.231 1.251 
ECU 1990 EU Consumer price USD 1.273 1.288 1.403 1.307 1.360 1.522 1.512 1.390 1.403 
USD 1990 US Consumer price USD 1.000 1.040 1.070 1.110 1.130 1.170 1.200 1.230 1.250 
ECU 1990 EU Consumer price DKK 7.857 8.239 8.466 8.503 8.662 8.627 8.881 9.211 9.382 
USD 1990 US Consumer price DKK 6.185 6.660 6.449 7.209 7.178 6.558 6.955 8.129 8.371 
DKK 1990 National cons. price DKK 1.000 1.020 1.050 1.060 1.080 1.100 1.130 1.150 1.161 
ECU 1990 EU Consumer price NOK 7.964 8.359 8.707 9.288 9.590 9.645 9.760 9.839 10.596 
USD 1990 US Consumer price NOK 6.257 6.751 6.638 7.889 7.969 7.415 7.746 8.707 9.438 
NOK 1990 National cons. price NOK 1.000 1.030 1.060 1.080 1.100 1.130 1.140 1.170 1.193 
ECU 1990 EU Consumer price DEM 2.052 2.138 2.225 2.298 2.356 2.416 2.476 2.526 2.567 
USD 1990 US Consumer price DEM 1.615 1.727 1.668 1.838 1.831 1.677 1.805 2.134 2.198 
DEM 1990 National cons. price DEM 1.000 1.040 1.090 1.140 1.170 1.190 1.210 1.230 1.238 
Copyright 1999 by P. E. Grohnheit 
Sources: Eurostat: Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices. / Official ECU exchange rates 
calculated and published by the European Commission. Annual averages 1993-97(98) / Danmarks 
Statistik. Tiårsoversigt 1998. 
Notes: Development of a method for conversion of prices in different currencies and different years. 
(Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices from Eurostat and the official exchange rates from the 
European Commission DG II covering ECU exchange rates between ECU and most European 
currencies, US $ and Yen in monthly and annual averages since 1993). 
PRIMES is generally using ECU 1990. Fuel prices are quoted in US$ 1998. (inflation factor used for 
USD98/USD90 1.25 exactly, which is consistent with a consumer price index for the US – 1997-
value 124, Statistics Denmark). By chance the ECU inflation factor 1990-1998 is also 1.25 (ECU 
weighted consumer price index until 1995, HICP 1995-1997 and Euro convergence inflation 1997-
1998) 
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Appendix B. Methodology for the construction of 
marginal abatement cost curves using the Primes model 
From Capros and Mantzos, 1999: 
The calculations carried out within the present study followed the steps explained below: 
1) The analysis started from a baseline scenario projecting the EU energy system from 1995 
to 2010. The baseline scenario, also constructed by using the PRIMES model, reflects 
current policies and trends without including specific effort to reduce CO2 emissions. The 
definition of the baseline scenario has been a result of shared analysis activity, which is on 
going under the auspices of DG XVII of the European Commission. The version of the 
baseline scenario is that delivered on February 5,1999. 
2) Starting from that baseline, the model ran to compute the least cost solution 
corresponding to a given level of CO2 emissions in 2010, which is constrained to be lower 
than the level of the baseline in 2010. A large range of such emission levels were defined, 
all of them being towards reducing emissions from baseline. An emission reduction level is 
imposed as an exogenous global emission constraint applied to the whole energy system of 
a member-state, letting the sector without any specific constraint (except those that have 
already been imposed in the baseline scenario). The model determines the allocation of 
effort by sector within each member-state that is necessary to meet the global constraint.  
3) The analysis exploits the differences between the results of each model run 
corresponding to lower emissions and the results of the baseline. These differences span the 
whole energy system, showing changes that are necessary to reach the lower emission level. 
Such changes may concern behaviour in using energy, structural changes in energy uses 
and processes, possible accelerated adoption of new technologies, changes in the fuel mix, 
etc. The exploration of the series of least cost solutions, varying according to the magnitude 
of the emission reduction level, provides a rich set of information revealing the priority of 
changes that are recommendable by sector and country, and their nature. This information 
can further support design of concrete policies and measures. 
4) The model provides simultaneous estimations of the marginal and average costs of these 
changes, by sector and member-state. Following a least cost methodology, the marginal 
costs plotted against the varying levels of emission reduction, in other terms the model-
based marginal abatement cost curves, can be used as a basis for defining the sharing of the 
emission reduction effort by country and furthermore by sector. 
5) The PRIMES model simulates the overall market equilibrium of the energy sector. It 
computes the prices of energy products that lead to balancing demanded and supplied 
quantities of each energy product in a period of time (usually a five-year period). Since the 
PRIMES model is formulated as a complementary mathematical problem (dual to a 
mathematical programming problem), the imposition of a global constraint is 
mathematically strictly equivalent to the inclusion of a shadow variable which appropriately 
affects all economic costs, exactly as the global constraint would do. Let us call the value of 
the shadow variable “carbon-value” of the global emission reduction constraint. Obviously, 
there will be a single carbon value associated to a given emission reduction level for a 
given member-state. To facilitate the analysis, we prefer to present the results in terms of 
carbon value, which was set to vary from a small level of 1 EUR/ton-of-carbon up to 900 
EUR/ton-of-carbon. The comparison of the obtained emissions with the level of baseline 
scenario (per member-state) shows the magnitude of abated emissions that is dual to the 
level of the carbon-value. The adjustment of the energy demand and supply system, as 
computed by the model, is therefore exactly identical to the results from imposing the 
associated emission reduction level as a global constraint to the system of a member-state. 
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